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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper aims to disentangle the difficult relationship between anti-Zionism and 
antisemitism.  On one side, antisemitism appears as a pressing contemporary problem, 
intimately connected to an intensification of hostility to Israel.  Opposing accounts 
downplay the fact of antisemitism and tend to treat the charge as an instrumental attempt 
to de-legitimize criticism of Israel.  I address the central relationship both conceptually 
and through a number of empirical case studies which lie in the disputed territory 
between criticism and demonization.  The paper focuses on current debates in the British 
public sphere and in particular on the campaign to boycott Israeli academia.  
Sociologically the paper seeks to develop a cosmopolitan framework to confront the 
methodological nationalism of both Zionism and anti-Zionism.  It does not assume that 
exaggerated hostility to Israel is caused by underlying antisemitism but it explores the 
possibility that antisemitism may be an effect even of some antiracist forms of anti-
Zionism. 
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Introduction 
The research question
1
  
Most accounts which understand antisemitism to be a pressing or increasing phenomenon 
in contemporary Europe rely on the premise that this is connected to a rise in anti-
Zionism.  Theorists of a ‘new antisemitism’ often understand anti-Zionism to be a new 
form of appearance of an underlying antisemitism.  On the other side, skeptics understand 
antiracist anti-Zionism to be entirely distinct from antisemitism and they often understand 
efforts to bring the two phenomena together as a political discourse intended to de-
legitimize criticism of Israeli policy.  The project of this work is to investigate the 
relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, since understanding this central 
relationship is an important part of understanding contemporary antisemitism. 
The hypothesis that this work takes seriously is the suggestion that, if an anti-Zionist 
worldview becomes widespread, then one likely outcome is the emergence of openly 
antisemitic movements.  The proposition is not that anti-Zionism is motivated by 
antisemitism; rather that anti-Zionism, which does not start as antisemitism, normalizes 
hostility to Israel and then to Jews.  It is this hostility to Israel and then to Jews, a 
hostility which  gains some of its strength from justified anger with Israeli human rights 
abuses, that is on the verge of becoming something which many people now find 
understandable, even respectable. It is moving into the mainstream. 
An understanding of the rhetoric and practice of antiracist anti-Zionism as a form of 
appearance of a timeless antisemitism tends to focus attention on motivation.  Frank 
Furedi makes the same observation: 
Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal is one of those who argue that many critics of Israel are 
motivated by an anti-Semitic impulse. However, he acknowledges that it is difficult to 
demonstrate, convincingly, that someone is anti-Semitic. ‘[There] aren’t many anti-Semites today 
                                                 
1
  David Hirsh is a lecturer in sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London.  He has been centrally 
involved in the anti-boycott campaign within the British academic trade unions and he is the founding 
editor of the Engage website (www.EngageOnline.org.uk), an anti-boycott campaign and an antiracist 
campaign against antisemitism.  This positioning facilitates participant observation and action research by a 
key actor in these debates. 
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who will actually come out with it and say “I hate Jews”’, he notes. Therefore, ‘spotting an anti-
Semite requires forensic skills, interpretive wits, and moral judgement’ (Furedi 2007) 
But even with such skills, wits and judgment, we cannot know what goes on inside the 
minds of social actors – neither the conscious mind nor the unconscious.  All we can do is 
relate seriously to what people say, not to what we think they might mean or to what we 
think may be their true underlying motivation.  This approach does not seek to denounce 
anti-Zionists as antisemitic but it does sound a warning.  If some people are treating Israel 
as though it were demonic, if they are singling out the Jewish state for unique hostility 
and if they are denouncing ‘Zionists’ as Nazis or racists or identifying them with 
apartheid, then in doing so, they may be playing with the fire of antisemitism.  The 
danger is that antiracist anti-Zionism is creating commonsense discourses which 
construct antisemitism as thinkable and possible.  There are some people who are 
prepared to experiment openly with antisemitic ways of expressing themselves and are 
nonetheless accepted as legitimate by some antiracist organizations and individuals 
(Hirsh 2006j; Hirsh 2007).
2
  At the moment this form of antisemitism is generally played 
out at the level of discourse and politics, not on the streets.  And those who wish for 
antisemitism to remain unthinkable are often faced with a charge of interfering with 
freedom of thought.  What is more to the point, however, is the struggle over which 
notions become hegemonic or commonsense and which remain marginal.  Because there 
is a relationship between discourse and violence, there remains a possibility that 
discursive antisemitism may manifest itself in more concrete political movements and 
that these may constitute an increased physical threat to ‘Zionists’, especially Jews and 
Jewish communities, around the world.   
Some who theorize the connection between anti-Zionism and antisemitism (e.g. Matas 
2005, Foxman 2004), argue that anti-Zionism is necessarily antisemitic on the basis that 
it denies national self-determination to Jews whilst recognizing a right of national self-
determination for all other nations.  Most writers who investigate the relationship 
between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, however, understand the relationship in more 
fluid and complex ways.  Some argue there is often a level of ‘enthusiasm’ present in 
criticism of Israel which is not apparent in criticism of other similarly serious human 
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  I will argue, for example, that the Jazz musician and activist, Gilad Atzmon, is a case in point.  
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rights abusing states and that this can only be explained by factors external to the critique.  
For instance, Abram de Swaan (2004:1), maintains that this over-enthusiasm functions as 
…a vent for righteous indignation that brings some relief from the still-burning shame of the 
memory of the Shoah, it employs facile equations reducing the Jewish State to the last bastion of 
colonialism and thereby conceals the true issues underlying this conflict. 
Moishe Postone (2006) understands this ‘singling out’ of Israel to be a result of a 
particular kind of rupture in anti-hegemonic social movements, a shift from a positive 
politics of social transformation to a negative politics of resistance.  
Antisemitism… can appear to be antihegemonic. This is the reason why a century ago August 
Bebel, the German Social Democratic leader, characterized it as the socialism of fools. Given its 
subsequent development, it could also have been called the anti-imperialism of fools. As a 
fetishized form of oppositional consciousness, it is particularly dangerous because it appears to be 
antihegemonic, the expression of a movement of the little people against an intangible, global 
form of domination. It is as a fetishized, profoundly reactionary form of anti-capitalism that I 
would like to begin discussing the recent surge of modern antisemitism in the Arab World. It is a 
serious mistake to view this surge of antisemitism only as a response to the United States and 
Israel. This empiricistic reduction would be akin to explaining Nazi antisemitism simply as a 
reaction to the Treaty of Versailles. While American and Israeli policies have doubtlessly 
contributed to the rise of this new wave of antisemitism, the United States and Israel occupy 
subject positions in the ideology that go far beyond their actual empirical roles. Those positions, I 
would argue, must also be understood with reference to the massive historical transformations 
since the early 1970s, to the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. 
The central relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism may be thought of either 
as one of cause (underlying antisemitism motivates a disproportionate response to Israel) 
or as one of effect (a disproportionate response to Israel leads to antisemitic ways of 
thinking or to antisemitic exclusions of ‘Zionists’).  Postone points to the willingness of 
antiracist anti-Zionists to pursue political alliances with antisemitic movements and to 
turn a blind eye to the more open antisemitism of some mainstream Arab and Islamic 
forms of anti-Zionism. 
The outline of the paper  
In this Working Paper
3
 of the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of 
Antisemitism (YIISA) I am interested in pursuing this more fluid line of thought.  What 
follows will be a qualitative analysis of anti-Zionist discourse which suggests ways we 
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  This is a working paper rather than a book or a journal article.  It is intended to outline my arguments and 
to provide an extended and detailed analysis of a large amount of significant and relevant material analysis 
into the public domain.  This will facilitate theoretical discussion and will also allow researchers access to a 
large amount of relevant material. 
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might think through the relationship between hostility to Israel and antisemitism and thus 
help untangle this particular knot.  Discourses of anti-Zionism appear in a number of 
different forms: academic writing, political speeches and essays, campaigning literature, 
public debates, newspaper columns and reports, letters pages, blogs and websites.  It is a 
disparate and fragmented discourse.  Some of the important actors straddle the political 
and academic spheres and academic study tends also to constitute political intervention.  
This throws up complex methodological issues. 
The scholarly study of contemporary antisemitism is a particularly contested field.  First, 
there is a tendency for the distinction between primary and secondary research material to 
be blurred.  An academic treatise is also, in Foucauldian terms, a ‘monument’ to an 
episteme and can function as a political intervention (Foucault 1982).  It may itself be 
understood as an example of discursive antisemitism or an example of a spurious charge 
of antisemitism made to de-legitimize criticism of Israel.  Second, the official 
institutional framework also constitutes part of the terrain on which political struggles are 
conducted by, amongst others, academics.  For example, the Report of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism (2006) was not only a report but also an attempt, 
in which academic scholars were participants, to institutionalize as official a particular 
view of antisemitism.  The legitimacy of this official framework was angrily rejected by 
scholars holding opposing views.  The European Union Working Definition of 
Antisemitism
4
 is similarly contested by scholars in the field, some of whom have been 
actively involved in the work of drafting up the definition.  The boundaries of the primary 
material I am addressing are porous and include scholarly, political, institutional and 
popular texts.  
The outline of the Paper as a whole runs as follows. In the First Part, I will build a 
conceptual framework for thinking through the relationship between hostility to Israel 
and antisemitism.  I do not accept the view of antisemitism as an ahistorical, ever-present 
phenomenon which throws up different manifestations of fundamentally the same disease 
in different times and places.  At the same time I am cautious about the claim that there is 
                                                 
4
  European Union EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism, 
http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-draft.pdf, downloaded 8 November 2007 
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something radically new about the ‘new antisemitism’ and I am acutely aware that within 
the general rubric of anti-Zionism there are different streams and traditions.  This text 
accordingly contextualizes the antiracist anti-Zionist movement alongside other anti-
Zionisms and remains cognisant of the possibility that ideas and elements of rhetoric may 
move across the porous boundaries between different anti-Zionisms (Stalinist, Arab 
nationalist, Jihadist, neo-Nazi, liberal and antiracist). 
I develop a critique of what I see as a tendency in anti-Zionist writings toward 
‘explanatory flattening’; that is, to treat ‘Zionism’, at least in all important regards, as a 
homogenous phenomenon across time and across political divisions; for instance, by 
treating the Israeli peace movement and the settler movement as manifestations of one 
singular Zionist project or by squeezing out the usual distinctions of sociological 
understanding between state and civil society or civilian and soldier.  Another tendency 
in anti-Zionist discourse I address is its reliance on a methodological idealism which 
postulates an unusually direct relationship between the ideas of key Zionists and the 
actualization of those ideas in material reality.  The existence of an allegedly racist state 
in the 21
st
 century is held to be the result of an allegedly racist concept in the 19
th
 century.  
The straight line narrated from concept to actuality does not take sufficient account of the 
material changes which occurred in Jewish life in the middle of the twentieth century and 
especially the Holocaust. 
One of my own concerns is to understand the centrality of the Israel/Palestine conflict in 
contemporary left-wing and progressive thinking.  I do not think that antisemitism 
provides an adequate explanation.  Rather I focus on the shift on the part of a significant 
section of the radical left from a social programme of working class self-liberation to a 
‘campist’ view of the world, in which the central divide is between oppressed and 
oppressor nations.  This view, which was characteristically labelled internationalist, 
raises anti-imperialism to an absolute principle.  Amongst some on the left, anti-
imperialism is no longer one value amongst a whole set - democracy, equality, sexual and 
gender liberation, anti-totalitarianism, for example - but is the central value, prior to and 
above all others.  If Israel is understood to be a key site of the imperialist system, this 
threatens to put ‘Zionism’ at the heart of all that is bad in the world.  I am more inclined 
 10 
to look to this kind of political explanation rather than to a cultural antisemitism to 
explain the centrality of Palestine to much left-wing consciousness.  The potentiality for a 
link between anti-Zionism and antisemitism is straightforward. Most people who are 
referred to by the designation ‘Zionist’ are Jews.  Most Jews are in one political sense or 
another ‘Zionists’.  Most forms of antisemitism in history have allowed for ‘exceptional’ 
Jews.  It is not a necessary attribute of antisemitism that it must target every Jew and so 
there could exist an antisemitism which exempts those Jews who do not identify as 
‘Zionist’ from hostility.  It is not, then, my contention that anti-Zionism or anti-Israeli 
over-enthusiasm is motivated by conscious or subconscious antisemitism.  It is necessary 
to avoid the circularity of assuming antisemitism to be the cause of antisemitism. 
My own methodological standpoint is cosmopolitan.  I am aiming to use and to develop a 
framework for doing social theory which disrupts a methodologically nationalist 
tendency to view the division of the world into nations as being rather more fixed than it 
is.  I also understand cosmopolitanism to be a materialist methodology, in the sense that 
while it does aspire to radical social change, it retains a solid analytical connection to the 
world as it is.  Robert Fine (2007) describes cosmopolitanism as ‘a transformative as well 
as analytic project.’  I have contended that cosmopolitanism  
… is an argument for a way of fighting against totalitarianism that does not replicate that which it 
is fighting against. Yet it is a normative project that starts with an analysis of actual events and 
processes, not only with abstract principles or with utopian yearnings. (Hirsh 2005b: 378) 
Fine (2007:xi) describes the appeal of cosmopolitanism as having to do with the idea that  
human beings can belong anywhere, humanity has shared predicaments and … we find our 
community with others in exploring how these predicaments can be faced in common.  
Cosmopolitanism is therefore a universalistic methodology but one which seeks to avoid 
the emptiness of purely abstract, idealistic, or utopian universalisms.  Such universalisms 
may be dangerous as well as empty, since they break human aspiration away from 
existing human conditions.  It opens up a world where anything is thinkable and a world 
where it is easy to undervalue that which exists in favour of that which is in one’s mind.  
To quote Fine again: 
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Cosmopolitan social theory understands social relations through a universalistic conception of 
humanity and by means of universalistic analytical tools and methodological procedures. Its 
simple but by no means trivial claim is that, despite all our differences, humankind is effectively 
one and must be understood as such. (Fine 2007: xvii) 
In the post-war era, Isaac Deutscher, for example, worked towards a cosmopolitan 
understanding of Israel and its relationships with Arabs and Palestinians.  He understood 
the conflict as one in which there was both right and wrong on both sides of the ethnic or 
national divide.  Israel was, in his view, a life-raft state, built under the severest 
emergency conditions imaginable by Jews who were pushed out of Europe.  Deutscher 
insists that there could still have been outcomes other than seemingly endless conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  Deutscher’s refusal simply to endorse the nationalism 
of one side or the other, coeval with the establishment of the state of Israel, contrasts with 
retrospective tendencies at a later time either to support the nationalism of the oppressed 
against the ‘Zionism’ of the oppressors or, alternatively, to support Israel against its 
‘Arab’ neighbours. 
One of the side effects of relying on a binary opposition between the nationalism of the 
oppressed and that of the oppressor, a framework which is distinct from the cosmopolitan 
approach I am seeking to develop, is to construct the Palestinian nation itself as a single 
homogenous entity in its struggle for liberation.  This approach lends itself to the charge 
of ‘orientalism’ (Said 1978) in its inclination to downplay Palestinian agency and 
differences in favour of a unified narrative of unmediated oppression and resistance.  The 
analytical task, as I see it, is to dispute the image of a simple dualism of oppressed and 
oppressor.  My approach is to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict into two analytically 
distinct elements: the Palestinian struggle for freedom and the Israeli struggle for 
survival.  My argument is that an adequate analysis needs to recognize the reality and 
validity of both struggles, even if they become indistinguishable in practice. 
In Part II, I move on from a conceptual discussion of the relationship between anti-
Zionism and antisemitism to a discussion of how those concepts become actualized in 
public discourse.  Here I present a number of case studies selected to illustrate how 
hostility to Israel, and antisemitism have become knotted together in recent British 
debates.  Antiracist anti-Zionists acknowledge that there is such a thing as antisemitism 
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and that it is possible for antisemitism to appear on the left and within the Palestine 
solidarity movement.  However, in any particular case in which the charge of 
antisemitism is made, when it relates to ‘antiracist’ criticism of Israel, they are prone to 
argue that, when examined on its merits, it turns out not to be a case of antisemitism at 
all; or that, when looked at alongside other more serious racist threats, it is insignificant; 
or that the antisemitism is exaggerated in order to smear critics of Israel.   
I shall investigate a number of case studies of ‘criticism of Israel’ which lie within the 
disputed territory between criticism, demonization and antisemitism.  I identify a 
phenomenon which I call the ‘Livingstone formulation’, after Ken Livingstone, the 
Mayor of London.  He said: ‘for far too long the accusation of antisemitism has been 
used against anyone who is critical of the policies of the Israeli government’ (Livingstone 
2006).  I have found that this response to a charge of antisemitism is a common one yet it 
denies the crucial distinction between criticism and demonization and it subsumes both 
into the virtuous category of ‘criticism’. 
One case study concerns the role of the liberal media in the mainstreaming of those forms 
of anti-Zionism which touch on antisemitism.  Through an analysis of Comment Is Free, 
the website of the British liberal newspaper The Guardian, I discuss not only the effects 
of new technology in giving space to a wider range of unmediated opinions (some of 
which are arguably antisemitic), but also the role of the liberal press in normalizing 
debate in such a way as to give an entry to antisemitism which it does not give to other 
forms of racism. 
The next section goes on to look at examples of rhetoric, themes and images which 
resonate with, or repeat themes from, older forms of antisemitism.  These antisemitic 
themes may be split into two groups: blood libel, where Jews are accused of murdering 
children for their own pleasure or for the requirements of their religious observance; and 
global conspiracies to control the world, where Jews are accused of causing others to 
suffer in order that they can themselves benefit.  In contemporary forms of anti-Zionist 
discourse the former is mirrored, for example, in images and discourses that represent 
‘Zionists’ as wantonly cruel killers of children.  The latter is mirrored in scholarly theses 
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concerning the capacity of the ‘Israel Lobby’ to pervert US foreign policy from following 
its own national interest toward following the national interest of Israel. I argue that this 
thesis has had a major impact beyond the scholarly community and provides a vocabulary 
in which it is possible to articulate narratives of Jewish conspiracy in a form that does not 
appear to be antisemitic. 
The trajectory of my case studies leads from the denial of particular manifestations of 
antisemitism if they take the form of criticism of Israel, towards an ever more diminished 
caution over expressions of antisemitism. In the Third Part, I turn to the campaigns for 
boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel with a particular focus on the proposal 
for an academic boycott.  This section is a discussion of how the conceptual and 
discursive aspects of anti-Zionism combine in a movement for the concrete exclusion of 
Israelis, and of nobody else, from the cultural and economic life of humanity.  There 
follows an account of what happened to the various campaigns in the UK to boycott 
Israel, a detailed exploration of the debate over the boycott of Israeli academic 
institutions, and a discussion of the implications of the boycott campaign for our 
understanding of contemporary antisemitism.  For example, the boycott campaign itself 
employed a version of the Livingstone formulation to protect it against charges of 
antisemitism.  It wanted to treat the exclusion of Israelis as though it was simply 
‘criticism of Israel’: ‘criticism of Israel cannot be construed as anti-Semitic,’ declared a 
Motion advanced by the campaign and passed by the 2007 UCU Congress.  However, the 
boycott was not proposed for academics who work in other states held to be responsible 
for human rights abuses; it was only proposed against academics who work in Israel.  
Such a policy would impact in a number of direct and indirect ways, on Jews more than 
anybody else.  I argue that the boycott campaign further encouraged an exaggerated 
hostility to Israel and licensed antisemitic ways of thinking.  The material gathered in this 
Paper shows concretely how this took place.  
Methodological approaches to the study of antisemitism 
One of the unusual aspects of the scholarly study of contemporary antisemitism is that the 
object of study includes ourselves.  Everybody in these heated debates thinks that 
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everybody else is guilty of making ad hominem arguments.  Some scholars may expect 
this paper to fail to relate critically to what they say, but instead to accuse them of being 
antisemitic and thus to explain what they say.  This paper makes every effort to relate to 
what people who are hostile to Israel say and do.  It makes no claims about what they are 
or about how they are motivated.  In Homage to Catalonia George Orwell has this to say 
on the ad hominem argument: 
… so long as no argument is produced except a scream of ‘Trotsky-Fascist!’ the discussion cannot 
even begin… In such circumstances there can be no argument…  What purpose is served by 
saying that men like Maxton are in Fascist pay?  Only the purpose of making serious discussion 
impossible.  It is as though in the middle of a chess tournament one competitor should suddenly 
begin screaming that the other is guilty of arson or bigamy.  The point that is really at issue 
remains untouched. Libel settles nothing. (Orwell 2003) 
Sometimes people prefix their statements with the phrase ‘as a Jew’.  This is also an ad 
hominem argument.  They are inviting us to agree with them on the basis of their ethnic 
identity, not on the basis of evidence or argument.  Jews too can make antisemitic claims, 
use antisemitic images, support antisemitic exclusions and play an important, if 
unwitting, part in preparing the ground for the future emergence of an antisemitic 
movement. 
It is often claimed that people who warn of the danger of antisemitism are dishonest, 
particularly when the alleged antisemitism has a form which resembles criticism of Israel.  
It is said that those who seem to be concerned about antisemitism are really motivated by 
a wish to protect Israel from criticism of its human rights abuses and so they ‘cry 
antisemitism’ or ‘play the antisemitism card’ in order to make such criticism appear to be 
illegitimate.  This form of attack is also ad hominem.  It refuses to take seriously what 
those concerned about antisemitism say.  Instead it tells us what the cynic believes that 
the anti-antisemites really mean.  The charge is that really they are concerned with 
defending the racist treatment of Palestinians and not with challenging the anti-Jewish 
racism which they themselves, it turns out, have either invented or provoked or, 
strangely, both.  The campaign to boycott Israeli academia constitutes, in itself, one big 
ad hominem attack against Israeli scholars, who are to be excluded from the academic 
community not for what they write but for who they are (Pike 2007). 
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Nowhere in this paper is the claim made that all criticism of Israel is antisemitic; indeed 
contrary to received wisdom, it is exceedingly unusual for any serious person to make 
such a claim.  I do not think that this paper leaves itself open to the ad hominem attack 
that it treats all criticism of Israel as though it were antisemitic, even while it denies 
doing so.  However, if we accept that it is possible for a text to take the form of criticism 
of Israel but also to be antisemitic in content, then we need to work through the 
distinction between criticism and demonization.  We need to be aware of the possibility 
of demonization so that it can be avoided and so that criticism can be critical, strong, 
sharp and effective.  Any literary or social critic knows that there is a distinction between 
demonization and criticism and that public debate over where and how the boundary is 
drawn, is legitimate and important. 
This paper is not centrally about Israel or Palestine; it is a paper about contemporary 
antisemitism, contemporary hostility to Israel, and the relationship between the two. 
Antisemitism is not necessarily the worst thing in the world, it is not the original sin, 
apart from all other sins.  Today, people who say antisemitic things are likely to have 
stumbled into antisemitic ways of thinking.  They are unlikely to be wicked people.  If I 
find that the demonization of Israel is common in the anti-Zionist literature and in the 
anti-Zionist movement, my intention is not to reverse the logic of demonization in order 
to demonize the demonizers.  It is, rather, to work within a cosmopolitan framework 
which tries hard to avoid replicating that which it critiques.  In this paper I pick up a few 
stones and find some traces of an antisemitic culture (or worse) underneath some of them.  
It does not follow that I see antisemitism under every stone.
5
 
Antisemitism is not a timeless fact of human civilization.  It exists within, not outside of, 
history and society.  It is not a single monster across time and across the globe.  Nor are 
manifestations of hostility to Jews isolated from other forms of racism and exclusion.  
                                                 
5
  I am aware that the objects of this study are global phenomena which manifest themselves differently in 
different places.  While my own primary empirical focus is on the UK, it is necessary to avoid both British 
parochialism and abstract universalism in order to disentangle the global from the spatially and culturally 
particular.  It is possible to come to conclusions both about the nature of global trends and about what may 
be specifically British factors which shape their local manifestations. However, this goes beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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The struggles against Islamophobia, antisemitism and anti-Arab racism, the struggle 
against the occupation of the West Bank and the struggle against the project to smash the 
state of Israel – these are all potentially democratic struggles and although they are 
distinct, they can be understood in a cosmopolitan way as belonging to the same family. 
In this work antisemitism is written without a hyphen because there is no ‘semitism’ 
which antisemitism is against.  Antisemitism constructs ‘the Jews’ or ‘the Zionists’ who 
are to be hated or excluded.  In this paper antisemitism is taken to mean racism against 
Jews; it is not taken to mean racism against ‘Semites’ or people who speak Semitic 
languages, or against anybody else.  The term ‘new antisemitism’ is not my favourite 
since there is no single authentic ‘old’ or classic antisemitism from which contemporary 
antisemitism is distinct.  In the British Library there is a book from 1921 entitled The 
New Antisemitism (1921) which debunks the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.  This paper 
does, however, work with the hypothesis that a significant element of contemporary 
antisemitism is related to exaggerated hostility to Israel.  I am not saying that anti-
Zionism is a form of antisemitism; but rather that there is a complex relationship between 
the two.  This paper does not rely on a definitional identity of one with the other.  It bases 
its case on an investigation of social reality, not on the meanings of words.  Muslim, 
Islamist and Jihadi antisemitism are important and relevant phenomena but they are not 
the focus of this paper.  They are relevant here only insomuch as they impact upon 
mainstream, left and liberal antisemitism in the UK. 
This paper presents and analyzes a snapshot of contemporary events.  It is not a historical 
study which traces the trajectory of anti-Zionist and antisemitic movements.  While many 
of the case studies relate to ephemeral material, it is my contention that enduring threats 
are manifested through this ever changing form of appearance.  Much of the text is 
forgotten the day after it appears on the internet, but it is constantly regenerated with new 
articulations of opposition to ‘Zionist’ power, dishonesty and bloodlust. 
There are a number of strange and particular difficulties which present themselves to the 
scholar studying antisemitism or to the activist opposing antisemitism.  There is the 
repeated belittling, half-explicit, half-internalized allegation that one is being a touchy, 
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paranoid, over-sensitive Jew; or that one will be thought of as such.  There is the fear that 
lifting up the stones to see what is underneath, prodding, investigating, labelling and 
opposing, encourages the growth of the nascent antisemitism that one finds.  We may be 
advised to let sleeping dogs lie and not to make a fuss; others suffer more than Jews do; 
Jews are not poor, not excluded, are not an underclass. Simply to write about 
antisemitism requires that we confront this quietism.  
In developing this critique of the relation between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, my 
own approach is influenced by and draws upon the cosmopolitan and anti-totalitarian 
frameworks built by political activists and social theorists such as Hal Draper, Hannah 
Arendt, Isaac Deutscher, George Orwell and Robert Fine.  All are radicals who refuse to 
accept the existing world as given, but whose analysis is firmly rooted within it and 
anchored to it; all are partisans of cosmopolitan projects which aim to find better, not 
worse, organising principles than nationalism; all try to come to terms with the awful 
realities of radical projects whose solutions towered above the problems they were 
supposed to address in horror, cruelty and the negation of humanity; they are all people 
who understand that we have much more to lose than our chains, but who still aim to 
break chains.  All are human, not gurus or Gods; they change over time, they change their 
minds, they make mistakes, they get things wrong, they work things through. 
Hannah Arendt struggled with the contradictions of Zionism and of fighting antisemitism 
‘as a Jew’; she rejected the intuitively attractive understanding of antisemitism as an 
ahistorical given.  She was denounced as a traitor by conservative Jews and as a cold-
warrior by conservative leftists.  She devoted her intellect and energy to understanding 
how European civilization, and its emancipatory project, had thrown up the horrors, first 
of imperialism and then of totalitarianism.  But she never stopped trying to understand; 
understanding, like friendship, was itself a crime against totalitarianism and punished 
severely.  She thought the trial of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem was a missed 
opportunity for the project of cosmopolitan law, but she insisted that Israel had every 
right to put him on trial.  Robert Fine has struggled with the complexity of holding on 
both to the critique of the world as it exists and to the critique of the critique.  If you drop 
the critique then you make your peace with endemic injustice; drop the critique of the 
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critique and you recklessly, in spite of the repeated warnings of history, risk the horrors 
of totalitarianism.  He has taken the Arendtian mission of understanding seriously in his 
critiques of democracy, apartheid, totalitarianism and antisemitism and in his re-
conceptualization of Marx’s political philosophy and cosmopolitanism. 
George Orwell stood for a left which valued internationalism, equality, respect, 
antiracism, anti-imperialism, anti-totalitarianism, democracy and secularism, yet he 
understood the danger of raising one of these values to an absolute at the expense of the 
all the others.  He learned to shoot at Eton but went to shoot fascists in Spain; he learned 
to hate imperialism as a policeman in India, he fought against imperialism, but he also 
understood that some things were worse than British rule in India.  Isaac Deutscher 
opposed Zionism when it was a political project, loved the state of Israel when it was 
founded, didn’t even consider the possibility of an anti-Zionism after the Holocaust, but 
never identified himself as a Zionist.  If he was soft on Stalinism, he was not soft on 
Stalinist anti-Zionism.  Hal Draper’s interpretation of Marx was necessary to make 
explicit Marx’s implacable opposition both to antisemitism and to totalitarianism.  
Draper’s Marxism gave us a vision of the socialist movement as a democratic project; a 
project of self-liberation, a collectivity of free individuals; the exact opposite to what was 
generally accepted as Marxism in Hal Draper’s time.  Draper offered a socialist 
framework for understanding the Israel/Palestine conflict.  He was not necessarily right, 
as it turned out, but he was a socialist.  Many ‘socialist’ analyses of the conflict which are 
offered today are very far away from any conception of socialism with which he would 
have identified.  Let me end with an example of how he addressed the issue in May 1948: 
To recognise the right of the Jews to self-determination, if it is not merely to be a pious obeisance 
to a formula, requires socialists also to recognize the right of the Jews to defend their choice of 
separate national existence against any and all reactionary attempts to deprive them of that right, 
whether by Arab feudal lords or UN imperialism. That is why we demanded recognition of Israel 
by the government, and why our British comrades particularly must demand similar action by the 
Labour government — as the concretisation of the demand that the imperialists keep out. That is 
why we demand the lifting of the imperialist embargo on arms to the new Jewish state… The 
reunification of Palestine and of the two peoples in it can take place only through a struggle from 
below. The conditions for such a struggle are present as they were before partition — the class 
struggle within Jewish society, and the grinding exploitation of the Arab peasants by their lords 
and masters… While opposing any attempt by the Arab landlord regimes to overthrow the Jewish 
state and impose their reactionary sway on the whole land, it is the duty of real socialists in Israel 
to fight for a policy, programme and a government of the working people which can bring about 
such reunification instead of deepening the nationalist gulf. (Draper 1948) 
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PART I ANTISEMITISM AND CRITICISM OF ISRAEL:  
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
(i) The many headed hydra: an ahistorical model 
There is a commonsense intuitive view which interprets different manifestations of anti-
Judaism as being forms of appearance of an ever present underlying antisemitism.  This 
view understands antisemitism as though it was like a many headed sea monster.  It is 
always lurking under the surface of the water and it puts up different heads in different 
places and times.  Antisemitism in this view is an ever-present fact of human history; the 
difference between a time or a place where it is visible and one where it is not is purely 
contingent.  When one head of the monster is cut off it simply grows another but it never 
dies. 
Medieval Christian antisemitism was one such form of appearance of the underlying 
monster, one menacing head which became visible above the surface.  This antisemitism 
demonized Jews as Christ-killers.  It charged them with deicide and with regularly and 
ceremonially re-performing the crucifixion of Christ on innocent non-Jewish children 
(Julius 2006). 
An early left wing form of antisemitism saw Jews as evil capitalists or as greedy money 
lenders.  Some people who considered themselves to be on the left felt that campaigns 
against Jewish capital and Jewish bankers were legitimate and useful ways to introduce 
the masses to campaigns against capital and bankers in general. 
Right wing antisemitism has often portrayed Jews as embodying the Bolshevik threat.  
Jews corrupt the normal workings of society and nation by fighting for ideas such as 
socialism, human rights, equality, democracy, which work to undermine the cohesion and 
the natural functioning of social life. 
Racist pseudo-scientific antisemitism emerged, which understood Jews as a biological 
infection to the social body.  This head of the monster had no difficulty in holding that 
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the Jewish infection worked both through Jewish capitalism and through Jewish 
Bolshevism.  Both were means by which ‘the Jews’ polluted the human community. 
Now, argue a number of theorists, we are seeing a ‘new antisemitism’ (Chesler 2003; 
Iganski and Kosmin 2003; Foxman 2004; Matas 2005; Phillips 2006; Rosenfeld 2006).  
Often, but by no means always, ‘new antisemitism’ is understood as a new form of 
appearance of the same old monster.  Previous antisemitisms stressed the cosmopolitan 
nature of Jews.  They stressed the abnormality of a people with secret international 
communal loyalties which threatened the ‘normal’ kinds of open loyalty which people 
have to their community, their nation or their class.  But when Jews build a nation-state 
and ‘normalize’ their national allegiance, there arises a ‘new antisemitism’ which enables 
a shift of the embodiment of evil from the Jewish individual to the Jewish state.  It is now 
the state that is accused of standing in the way of world peace, of being responsible for 
stirring up wars, of being uniquely racist or apartheid or dangerous in some other way.  
Anti-Zionism has a tendency to present the crimes and failings of the Jewish state as the 
whole and necessary truth of the Jewish state.  This, it is argued by many ‘new 
antisemitism’ theorists, is analogous to the way that antisemitism presented the crimes 
and failings of particular Jews, the Bolshevism of Trotsky, the greed of the landlord 
Rachman, the capitalist exploitation of the Rothschilds, as the whole and necessary truth 
of all Jews in general. 
One strength of this view, that these are all forms of appearance of the same underlying 
phenomenon, is that it is intuitively attractive.  It has often felt to Jews that each new 
attack was nothing but a mere repetition of the old ‘cancer’, or a current mutation of the 
familiar ‘virus’; it was only ever in temporary remission. 
Another strength of this view is that it can account for the fact that many of the themes 
and images of demonization are common to the different forms of antisemitism and are 
also frequently mirrored in contemporary anti-Zionist discourse. 
One problem with the ‘Hydra’ explanation is that while each form of anti-Judaism does 
draw on and replicate older forms, they are also hugely different phenomena.  They arise 
and they become widespread in radically different times and places.  They have different 
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manifestations, are employed by different social forces, they make use of different 
narratives.  The differences are actually as striking as the commonalities, between the 
Spanish Inquisition, Christian antisemitism in nineteenth century Poland, socialist 
antisemitism in Germany at the time of August Bebel, right wing antisemitic anti-
Bolshevism, racist antisemitism, Nazi genocidal antisemitism, understated and 
gentlemanly English exclusion, contemporary anti-imperialist anti-Zionism and Jihadi 
antisemitism. 
The second problem for an ahistorical essentialist view of antisemitism is that there have 
been times and places where life has been, in general, good for Jews, where Jews have 
been able to function well as part of the wider community, where they have not been 
excluded from public life, education or the professions; where they have had freedom to 
worship and where other racisms have been more dangerous, immediate and threatening. 
Contemporary Europe is in many ways one of those good times and places for Jews.  
Although the frequency of  antisemitic attacks has been rising sharply in the last decade,
6
 
you are still more likely to be beaten up on the street, excluded from society, excluded 
from the economy, excluded from education or demonized in the media, if you are black 
or Muslim, for example, than if you are Jewish.   
The many headed sea-monster theory could lead us to react to current threats as though 
they were identical to previous threats.  Some Jews mistakenly thought they could 
appease Nazism, deal with it, come to an accommodation with it, as they had, to an 
extent, been able to do with previous threats.  But the Nazi threat was different.  Now, 
some campaigners
7
 feel that they are facing an imminent genocidal onslaught of the kind 
that was faced in the 1940s.  But perhaps the current threat is not just a new manifestation 
of the previous one, but is in fact a different set of phenomena, in a different society at a 
different time, for different reasons. 
                                                 
6
  Antisemitic Incidents Reports 2005, Community Security Trust, London, 
http://www.thecst.org.uk/index.cfm?content=7&menu=7, downloaded 21 December 2006; Antisemitic 
Incidents Reports 2006, Community Security Trust, London, 
http://www.thecst.org.uk/docs/Incidents%5FReport%5F06.pdf, downloaded 15 February 2007. 
7
  For example, Phyllis Chesler (2006): ‘Just as Hitler was appeased until it was too late, so too has 
Ahmadinejad been appeased’.   
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Another problem with an essentialist and ahistorical theory of antisemitism is that, as 
Hannah Arendt argued, it undermines human agency and responsibility for antisemitism.  
It constructs antisemitism as an ever present structure which dominates human 
subjectivity: 
In view of the final catastrophe...  the thesis of eternal antisemitism has become more dangerous 
than ever.  Today it would absolve Jew-haters of crimes greater than anybody had ever believed 
possible. (Arendt 1975:8) 
Antisemitism understood as a timeless fact of human history is also likely to be thought 
of as undefeatable.  This insight would have significance for the strategy adopted to 
respond to the ‘new antisemitism’, and in particular would shed light on who should be 
thought of as a racist enemy and who, on the other hand, who should be thought of as 
being susceptible to argument, education and persuasion. 
(ii) The tropes of anti-Zionism 
I am using the term ‘anti-Zionist’ to denote a variegated set of movements which do not 
coalesce around criticism of Israeli policy or criticism of racist movements within Israel 
but rather around a common orientation to the existence or to the legitimacy of the state 
of Israel itself. 
I have not argued that antiracist anti-Zionism and anti-Israeli over-enthusiasm are 
motivated by antisemitism.  I have looked for more complex explanations of the 
outcomes of anti-Zionist thinking and I have maintained that to do this it is necessary to 
examine the central tropes of antiracist anti-Zionist discourse.  It is by beginning to make 
sense of these discourses, what they claim, by what kind of methodologies they are 
produced, in what kind of political traditions they stand, that it is possible to unravel 
some of the elements of the central relationship between these discourses and antisemitic 
ways of thinking which may be immanent within them.  It may be asked why one should 
focus on the anti-Zionism when most contemporary critics of Israel are not existential 
anti-Zionists.  Yet criticism of Israel, of this or that thing that Israel does, is not the focus 
of this work.  The focus of this work is antisemitism.  So it is a hypothesis, at this stage, 
that anti-Zionist discourse is important in shaping, not criticism of Israeli policy, but 
those whose hostility to Israel constitutes something more threatening than criticism, 
something indeed, which cannot be properly understood as criticism. 
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Hostility to the idea and practice of Israel comes from various sources – among which are 
liberal nationalism, Marxist anti-imperialism, democratic cosmopolitanism – and it is not 
the same as hostility to Jews.  I am asking whether it can nevertheless throw up a politics 
and a set of practices which creates a commonsense notion of Israel as a unique evil in 
the world and which thereby sets itself up for a fight with Jews; those Jews, anyway, who 
do not define themselves as anti-Zionist.  The antiracist variants of anti-Zionism 
constitute minority discourses and minority movements within the global set of anti-
Zionist discourses and movements.  They are conditioned by their location within this set 
of different discourses and movements, through the circulation of common elements of 
rhetoric, of commonsense assumptions, and through explicit or tacit political alliances.
8
   
Contemporary left wing secular antiracist anti-Zionism cannot be understood solely as an 
intellectual or political critique of ‘Zionism’ but also needs to be understood as a broad 
and variegated movement which exists alongside a set of other anti-Zionist movements.  
Methodologically, therefore, it is necessary to look at the theory, the discourse and the 
claims of anti-Zionists, but it is also necessary to take into account  the social reality of 
the ways in which these are actualized in the world.  The movement is the site where the 
relationship between a set of shared conceptual meanings and understandings on the one 
hand, and the real-world political and social actualization of those understandings and 
meanings, on the other, are played out. 
This contemporary movement is distinct from late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
anti-Zionist movements.  These were predominately Jewish movements which proposed 
responses to antisemitism other than Zionism, such as Bundism or revolutionary 
socialism.
9
  Contemporary anti-Zionism often sees itself in these anti-Zionist traditions 
but actually exists in a radically different world, made different by the history of the 
twentieth century.  It is largely the way that contemporary anti-Zionism relates to this 
                                                 
8
  An example of an alliance between antiracist anti-Zionism and Islamist anti-Zionism is the Respect party 
in the UK (now apparently splitting apart).  An example of the kinds of compromises that are tempting is 
the adoption of the slogan ‘We are all Hizbollah now!’ by many in the summer of 2006 (Hirsh 2006b).  
Hizbollah is open about its own antisemitism. 
9
  Miller (2007) focuses on the commonalities between non-Jewish anti-Zionism in Britain before 1948 and 
today;  he foregrounds the similarities, ‘in particular the common arguments that both current and past 
British anti-Zionists have used to demonize and de-legitimize Zionism’.  My argument here, in contrast, 
focuses on the differences between opposition to a political movement and opposition to a nation state. 
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different world that defines it as a movement.  Opposition to Israel’s existence tends to 
constitute a battle of ideas against an idea.  Its first focus is on ‘Zionism’ as an ideology 
and its relationship to real-world phenomena is often conditioned by its explanatory 
emphasis on ideology. 
Post-1948 anti-Zionism is not a single movement but a collection of differing currents.  
There is a current of Middle Eastern anti-Zionism which was hostile to Jewish 
immigration into Palestine, to a Jewish presence there and to the foundation and the 
continued existence of the state of Israel.  In the Middle East there are both secular and 
Islamic anti-Zionist traditions.  In the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc there was a 
tradition of Stalinist anti-Zionism.  Right wing and neo-Nazi antisemitism is increasingly 
articulating its hostility to Jews in the form of anti-Zionist rhetoric (for example David 
Irving; David Duke (2004; 2004a).  There is also a contemporary current of anti-Zionism 
which toys openly with antisemitic rhetoric that is hard to place in terms of the left/right 
scale but has connections with both (for example, Gilad Atzmon,
10
 Paul Eisen, Israel 
Shamir). 
In order to approach a clear analysis of this contemporary anti-Zionism, it is necessary to 
do more than look at the arguments and the narratives that anti-Zionist theorists produce. 
 It is also necessary to look at how they are realized in the practices of political 
movements and campaigns.  In this arena ideas do not exist in isolation; they are part of a 
movement.  And the anti-Zionist movement has unclear, porous and shifting boundaries.  
The debate exists at the intersection of a number of different and mutually hostile 
terrains; the left discourses of ‘anti-imperialism’ and post-colonial theory; the totalitarian 
discourses inspired by Nazism, Jihadi-fundamentalism and Stalinist communism, the 
nationalist discourses of Arab and Palestinian anti-colonialism, the Christian and Muslim 
religious discourses of antisemitism and Jewish communalist minority anti-Zionist 
movements.  Concepts and commonsense notions developed within one kind of discourse 
tend to slip and slide, and metamorphose, into those of the other terrains. 
                                                 
10
  See Part II for a fuller discussion of Atzmon 
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I am interested in the emergent properties of these ideas, discourses and narratives when 
they are actualized in these living movements; when elements of rhetoric which are not 
formally antisemtic gain a life of their own; when they escape the control and supervision 
of the antiracists who formulate them and who put them to work in political campaigns.  
The political work here is to win mainstream left and liberal milieus over to the 
internalization of various claims about Israel and ‘Zionism’ as commonsense and 
heartfelt truths. 
If some elements of the broad anti-Zionist movement are self-consciously antisemitic, 
that is, racist against Jews, it is necessary to analyze the ways that those who think of 
themselves as antiracist relate ideologically to these other traditions and to look at how 
concepts function in the movements which take them up, how they migrate and develop 
in their exposure to the public sphere, and how that actuality relates back to the 
development of narrative and theory.  I am not only interested in the truth or coherence of 
the ideas of anti-Zionism but also in the properties which emerge, sometimes unforeseen 
or unintended, through their use and propagation. 
For example, anti-Zionist discourse often challenges the claim that Zionism is a form of 
nationalism.  Nationalism is usually understood to contain racist potentialities as well as 
elements which define a community of common responsibility.  But Zionism is often 
understood to be essentially different from all other nationalisms – as nothing at all but a 
mode of exclusion.  It is necessary to investigate the empirical truth of this claim as well 
as the coherence of the argument.  But this will only uncover half of the story.  The other 
half is to be understood by looking at the ways that the Zionism=Racism claim is 
actualized in the movement and in the world beyond.  How does the anti-Zionist 
movement actually relate to ‘Zionists’, who are defined as racists?  How does it license or 
encourage others to relate to ‘Zionists’?  How does it, in practice, define the group, 
‘Zionists’, who are to be treated as racists and how do others define the term? 
This is partly a question of how anti-Zionist theorists and activists understand their own 
political responsibilities.  Michael Neumann, a philosophy professor at Trent University 
in Canada, is an extreme example of one who refuses to take political responsibility for 
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the consequences of his anti-Zionism.  He outlines his approach to the question in an e-
mail exchange with an antisemitic group (Jewish Tribal Review 2002).  They ask him 
whether he thinks that their website is antisemitic.  He replies 
Um, yes, I do, but I don’t get bent out of shape about it. I know you’re site and it’s brilliantly 
done.  Maybe I should say that I’m not quite sure whether you guys are antisemitic in the ‘bad’ 
sense or not….  [I]n this world, your material, and to a lesser extent mine, is a gift to neo-Nazis 
and racists of all sorts.  Unlike most people in my political niche, this doesn’t alarm me: there are 
far more serious problems to worry about….  [O]f course you are not the least bit responsible for 
how others use your site.
11
 
This discussion occurred five months after Neumann (2002) had published a piece 
entitled ‘What is Antisemitism?’ in which he argued that antisemitism is trivial compared 
to other racisms and that it is understandable that Israeli crimes result in a hatred of Jews 
in general.  Here are some quotes from this piece by Neumann which illustrate a willful 
and showy refusal by somebody who considers himself to be an antiracist, to take 
antisemitism seriously: 
Undoubtedly there is genuine antisemitism in the Arab world: the distribution of the Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion, the myths about stealing the blood of gentile babies. This is utterly 
inexcusable. So was your failure to answer Aunt Bee’s last letter…. The progress of Arab 
antisemitism fits nicely with the progress of Jewish encroachment and Jewish atrocities. This is 
not to excuse genuine antisemitism; it is to trivialize it. … If Arab antisemitism persists after a 
peace agreement, we can all get together and cluck about it. But it still won’t do Jews much actual 
harm.  … Israel has committed war crimes. It has implicated Jews generally in these crimes, and 
Jews generally have hastened to implicate themselves. This has provoked hatred against Jews. 
Why not? Some of this hatred is racist, some isn’t, but who cares? Why should we pay any 
attention to this issue at all? (Neumann 2002) 
The anti-Zionist movement has a tendency to flatten analytically important distinctions.  
For example, many believe the distinction between state and civil society in Israel to be 
entirely absent, indeed, some take this insight to such lengths that they do not define 
Israel as a state at all.
12
  The idea of a unity of ‘the people’ with ‘state’ sets up a frame for 
doing criticism that tends to dissolve politically relevant distinctions.  Anti-Zionism tends 
to fuse civil society with the state.  It erodes the distinction between the people in their 
plurality and state policy.  It erases the complexities of Israeli society and history.  It is 
                                                 
11
  This email exchange is published by ‘Jewish Tribal Review’ against the wishes of Michael Neumann.  I 
asked Neumann whether this exchange was a forgery: ‘The material is not a forgery but I do not vouch for 
its reliability because I no longer have the original correspondence’ (e-mail 5 July 2005). 
12
  See for example Image 5, a map of Lebanon on the Respect website entitled ‘Map of Israeli Terror’.  
The countries around Lebanon are named: Syria and ‘Occupied Palestine’. 
 27 
often also tempted to dissolve the distinction between civilian and soldier.  ‘Zionism’ is 
typically presented in anti-Zionist discourse as a one-dimensional unity.  There is a 
rejection of a methodology that is interested in development over time or in 
understanding the phenomenon in context or of understanding the complex and 
contradictory dynamics that are usually thought to characterize the development of a 
movement or state. 
Distinctions between left and right, bigots and antiracists, one form or tradition of 
Zionism and another, settlers and non-settlers, occupied territories and Israel, Arab 
citizens and Arab non-citizens often become fuzzy.  The distinction that remains clear, 
that dominates, is between Zionist and anti-Zionist; the significance of everything else is 
downplayed. 
Anti-Zionists may respond to this charge by saying that it is not the anti-Zionists who 
blur distinctions but ‘the Zionists’.  It is Israel that has no separation between state and 
civil society; it is Israel that wants to annexe the West Bank; it is Israel that subordinates 
politics to the imperatives of ‘security’, it is Israel that singles itself out in the world.  
This is an illustration of the way that anti-Zionism tends to replicate in its critique the 
errors and crimes of ‘Zionism’.  ‘Zionism’ in this paper is often in inverted commas 
because it is not actual Zionism or the actual practices of Israel that the anti-Zionists 
replicate, but rather it is their own construction of ‘Zionism’, which bears little 
resemblance to the material reality of the state of Israel or Israeli society.  Their 
‘Zionism’ is a totalitarian movement which is equivalent to racism, Nazism, or apartheid.  
Anti-Zionism tends to itself against a notion of ‘Zionism’ that is largely constructed by its 
own discourses and narratives.  The ‘Zionism’ that anti-Zionist discourses typically depict 
and denounce is more like a totalizing and timeless essence of evil than a historical set of 
changing and variegated beliefs and practices.  It is presented as an unthinkable object 
which requires either unconditional rejection or belief, rather than as a social and political 
phenomenon.  The term ‘Zionism’ is often used in such a way as to bring it closer to the 
language of evil than to the province of social scientific or historical understanding.  
‘Zionist’ often hits out like an insult and carries such pejorative connotations that the reality 
behind it has ended up disappearing under layers of stigmatisation.  For example: ‘The 
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Zionists think that they are victims of Hitler, but they act like Hitler and behave worse 
than Genghis Khan’ (President Ahmadinejad quoted in Jerusalem Post 2006); ‘Zionism is 
a form of racism…’, UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (later rescinded); ‘Zionists 
and their friends are desperate to silence the voices of and for Palestine’, (from an op-ed 
piece in the Guardian newspaper Soueif 2006); ‘[Respect] is a Zionist-free party... if there 
was any Zionism in the Respect Party they would be hunted down and kicked out. We 
have no time for Zionists’, (Yvonne Ridley, February 2006, Imperial College, London, 
or-Bach 2006). 
The demonization of ‘Zionism’ appears to be part of an anti-oppression politics, but it 
points in another direction: toward a totalitarian way of thinking whose language is that of 
conspiracy conducted by dark forces.
13
  A solution is often conceived not in terms of peace 
and reconciliation but rather in terms of destroying or uprooting the evil, wherever it is to 
be found.
14
  
Joseph Massad (2003) begins his analysis with the assertion that Zionism is a colonial 
movement that is ‘constituted in ideology and practice by a religio-racial epistemology’, 
adding that it is ‘important also to analyze the racial dimension of Zionism in its current 
manifestation….’  He understands Zionism to be defined by its commitment to ‘building 
a demographically exclusive Jewish state’, which he understands alongside the European 
colonial ideology of white supremacy over colonized people.  Already we can see that 
Massad’s notion of Zionism is for practical purposes, homogenous.  It is one ‘Jewish 
supremacist’ movement, from the 1880s to the present day.  There are no significant 
differences between Zionism in the 19th and in the 21st century; between left and right 
Zionism, between religious and secular Zionism, between Labour Zionism and the 
Zionism of the fundamentalist settlers.  Massad writes as though there was a single Israeli 
culture with a single ideology and a single purpose; a homogenous body of Israeli Jews.  
All differences are flattened out by the dominating principle of ‘Jewish supremacism’.  
This assumption of homogeneity underpins a methodology which takes incidents and 
                                                 
13
  For example, Sue Blackwell, ‘…the boycott was defeated following a well-funded campaign by the 
Zionist lobby’ http://www.sue.be/pal/academic/AUT.html, downloaded 15 February 2007.  More examples 
are analyzed in Part II of this paper. 
14
  For example Hayim Bresheeth on the Oslo peace process: ‘The Palestinians are not turkeys, and will not 
vote for Christmas, and the idea that they can be forced into the 16 ghettoes is ludicrous.’ (Bresheeth 2004) 
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quotations from particular people, places and times to stand for and to illustrate the true 
nature of all Zionists in all places and throughout history.
15
 
While antiracist anti-Zionism often claims to rest on a ‘historical materialist’ 
methodological foundation, some of its central assumptions seem to rely more on a 
methodology which gives primacy to ideas in the shaping of social life than to one which 
focuses on material factors.  Antiracist anti-Zionism has a complex relationship with the 
Nazi genocide of the Jews, yet it is often more comfortable looking at cultural 
constructions of the Holocaust than it is thinking about the material effect of the 
Holocaust itself. 
Massad’s methodology starts with ‘Zionist’ ideology and this task is much simplified by 
the assumption that in all its essentials, ‘Zionist’ ideology is one coherent body of 
thought.  This assumption, in turn, is justified by reference to two things in Massad’s 
work.  Firstly, Zionism is understood as part of the European colonial project.  This 
                                                 
15
  For example, Massad tells that the leading Russian language daily in Israel published an article in 
January 2002 called ‘How to force them to leave’ suggesting that the Israeli government should use the 
threat of castration to encourage Arabs to leave the country (Relying on Galili 2002, which is a newspaper 
report translated into English from Hebrew of the original newspaper article in Russian).  The assumption 
of Zionist unity means that one opinion piece in one newspaper can be understood to illustrate the nature of 
Zionism as a whole.  The fact that the paper reportedly received no outraged feedback from its readership 
should not come as a surprise, Massad tells us, since the following month the Tourism Minister Benny Elon 
proposed that the entire Arab population should be expelled from Israel.  Elon, a fundamentalist religious 
Jewish settler who is defined by his support for what he euphemistically calls ‘transfer’, according to the 
assumption of Zionist homogeneity, speaks for all ‘Jewish supremacists’, or Zionists.  Shimon Peres, Ariel 
Sharon, Benny Elon, Theador Herzl, Golda Meir, and the Meretz party are all used in this piece to 
exemplify ‘Jewish supremacism’.  One piece in the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv entitled ‘The Jews who run 
Clinton’s cabinet’ demonstrates the ‘major ideological convergence between anti-Semites and Jewish 
supremacists’ (Massad 2003:446).  
 
David Duke, a right wing open antisemite also uses the term ‘Jewish Supremacism’.  He uses the term to 
refer primarily to the world Jewish conspiracy, although his rhetoric takes both anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist 
forms.  Duke (2004), also makes much use of the Ma’ariv article in his piece ‘Want to know the truth about 
Jewish Supremacism in their own words?’ on his website. 
 
The Ma’ariv piece is a manifestation of the Zionist project of ‘turning the Jew into the anti-Semite’(Massad 
2003:446), which was, Massad tells us, from the early days of the Haskala thinkers and Herzl himself, what 
Zionism aimed to do.  An Israeli newspaper article, an assertion and a quote from Herzl’s diary are 
employed to outline Zionist thinking on antisemitism.  In a footnote, Massad directs us to another of his 
papers for his analysis of ‘Zionism’s complicity with antisemitism and its use of anti-Semites as a model’.  
He then adds an incident where an Israeli officer said that there was something to be learnt about military 
technique from the methods employed by the Nazis to clear the Warsaw ghetto, to an assertion that it is 
Israeli practice to write numbers on the arms of thousands of Palestinians in detention camps, to reveal 
something more about the relationship between Zionism, antisemitism and Nazism. 
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expands the methodology of explanatory flattening globally and across five hundred 
years.  The whole history of ‘white’ imperialism is understood as essentially one racist 
project.  The Crusades, British rule in India, colonization of Australia, New Zealand, the 
United States, South Africa, the British Mandate in Palestine, US policy during the Cold 
War in South and Central America and East Asia, the wars against the Saddam regime in 
Iraq, Belgian rule in Congo: all are essentially the same.  Particularity becomes 
insignificant next to the one explanatory element of European racist exploitation.  And 
Israel is part of this wider project.  Actual history, human agency and contingency 
constitute little but the way that the big project happens to have played itself out in 
different places and at different times.  
The second justification for the assumption that ‘Zionist’ ideology is one coherent body 
of thought is that the ‘Jewish supremacist’ project is not a racist movement among Jews, 
in Massad’s understanding, but rather it is presented as something global: 
[T]he only way these arguments acquire any purchase is in the context of an international, read 
western, commitment to Jewish supremacy, wherein Jews are seen as white Europeans defending 
white European values and civilization against the primitive Arab hordes’ (Massad 2003: 449). 
‘Zionists’ and Israel constitute, therefore, for Massad, one central element of the larger 
Western imperialist project.  Some nineteenth century ‘socialists’ constructed Jews as 
being a central element in the workings of international capitalism.  Much contemporary 
anti-Zionism understands the Jewish state to play a pivotal role in global imperialism. 
The second element that justifies the assumption of Zionist homogeneity is definitional.  
What various ‘Zionists’ have said and written is interpreted as coherent and unified 
agreement upon an essentially racist project.  Zionism is defined by Massad as ‘Jewish 
supremacism’; it is related to racist movements, to Nazi movements, to colonialist 
projects and to Apartheid.  The essential, necessary and unchangeable character of Israel 
is defined by etymology.  Actuality is found to be a manifestation of this definitional 
necessity.  One key way of defining the difference between anti-Zionism in the sense that 
we are using it here and criticism of Israeli policy, is the anti-Zionist insistence that Israel 
is necessarily and unchangeably unique.  ‘Zionism’ is Nazism but Israel is not like 
Germany; ’Zionism’ carries out ethnic cleansing but Israel is not like Croatia or Serbia; 
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‘Zionism’ settles occupied land but Israel is not like China; ‘Zionism’ is a colonial settler 
project but Israel is not like Australia.  For anti-Zionism Israel is the totalitarian 
movement, not a nation or a state.  Its policy at any particular time is often understood to 
be a manifestation of its inner essence, derived definitionally. 
This framework gives huge explanatory importance to ideas and ideology.  The racist 
idea is held to create and define the necessarily racist state.  The story is often told by 
anti-Zionists.  It begins with Herzl and it picks out some racist quotes from his book; it 
moves on to Jabotinsky and to Ben Gurion, picking quotes and anecdotes, before it 
arrives in 1948 and the Nakba, as the actualization of the racist idea in the world.  It goes 
on to 1967 and shows how the inherently expansionist and colonial character of the 
‘Zionist idea’ is manifested by the taking and settling of territory.
16
   
There is a joke from the 1920s: What is the definition of a Zionist?  A Zionist is one Jew 
who gives money to a second Jew so that a third Jew can go to Palestine.   
Contemporary anti-Zionist discourse is comfortable on the terrain of the narrative 
construction of the Holocaust but it is less comfortable with the Holocaust itself.  The 
Holocaust is understood as the trauma that psychoanalytically pathologises Israel, 
rendering it uniquely compromised (Rose 2005).
17
  The Holocaust is understood as 
something that is used by the ‘Zionists’ to justify their racist actions and to make some 
money on the side (Finkelstein 2003); it is understood as an event that, if not authored by 
the Zionists themselves, was aided by them or in which they were tied by complicity 
(Brenner 1983; Allen 1987);
 18
 it is understood as a source of illegitimate Jewish power 
and Jewish moral authority. 
                                                 
16
  The withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, first held by my anti-Zionists to be impossible, then interpreted 
only as another manifestation of racist demographic necessity, is now understood as a means of further 
imprisoning and constricting and isolating the inhabitants of Gaza and facilitating a more barbaric form of 
occupation.  The fault-line in Israeli politics at the time of the withdrawal, between the orange and the blue, 
was understood only to be illusory; and anyway, an insignificant spat between Jewish supremacists over 
how best to further the cause of the racist movement. 
17
  For a critique of Jacqueline Rose by Shalom Lappin and for her response, See Issues 6 and 7 of 
Democratiya, at http://www.democratiya.com/. 
18
  For more on Jim Allen’s Perdition and on the relationship between the anti-Zionist left and Holocaust 
denial, see Ezra (2007) and Rich (2007). 
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Gillian Rose wrote about a tendency in the 1990s to treat the Holocaust as something 
ineffable.  She criticized Habermas’ implication that the Holocaust should be thought 
about as though it was holy, as though it was outside of history: 
It is this reference to ‘the ineffable’ that I would dub ‘Holocaust piety’.…  ‘The ineffable’ is 
invoked by a now wide-spread tradition of reflection on the Holocaust: by Adorno, by Holocaust 
theology, Christian and Jewish, more recently by Lyotard and now by Habermas.  According to 
this view, ‘Auschwitz’ or ‘the Holocuast’ are emblems for the breakdown in divine and/or human 
history.  The uniqueness of this break delegitimaises names and narratives as such, and hence all 
aesthetic  or apprehensive representation (Lyotard). (Rose 1996) 
Rose was right to warn against Holocaust piety and was also perhaps prescient in 
understanding that what would follow piety would be its opposite, Holocaust sacrilege.  
First Holocaust piety was misunderstood and misrepresented as a willful self-interested 
and dishonest instrumentalism rather than as a healthy seriousness and respect taken too 
far.  Then it became possible for antiracist anti-Zionists to allow themselves the frisson of 
committing sacrilege – in the cause of Palestine, naturally.
19
 
The anti-Zionist movement understands itself to be in the tradition of pre-war opposition 
to the project of Zionism, but it has difficulty relating its tradition to the material, 
historical, events of the twentieth century.  What happened was that the perspectives of 
the European Jewish anti-Zionists were not only politically defeated by Nazism (not by 
‘Zionism’) but most of the anti-Zionists were also killed by Nazis.
20
  Jewish life and 
culture over large parts of Europe was removed.  Certainly amongst the remnants, the 
attraction of Zionism, of the idea of Jewish national independence, was strong.  But it 
would surely be incomplete to understand events as the actualization of an unbroken 
thread of ideas and to neglect the huge material transformation that gave an entirely new 
context to those ideas. 
                                                 
19
  Simonon (2006) tells the story of the political wrangles which occurred around the commemoration of 
the Holocaust in Belgium at the site in Mechelen of the deportation of Belgian Jews to Auschwitz: ‘So, in 
September 2005, the new committee of experts published their conclusions. Their opinion on the museum 
[at the site of the deportations under Nazi occupation] was that it should be transformed into a more 
inclusive outlet, a memorial not just to the Holocaust but to all genocides and crimes against humanity. In 
other words, its Jewish specificity was inappropriate.’ 
20
  This fact, perhaps, sheds light on why many anti-Zionists go to such length to demonstrate the 
ideological ‘similarity’ of Nazism and Zionism.  It is only in this way, that it is possible to paint the Nazi 
defeat of pre-war anti-Zionism as a victory for ‘The Zionists’. 
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In the middle of the 20
th
 century Israel was not imagined as a European colony.  It is 
strained, to say the least, to believe that Jews in the refugee camps in Europe and in 
British Cyprus, recovering from starvation and from existences as non-humans, were 
thinking of themselves as standard bearers of ‘the European idea’.  The seamless 
insertion of the history of ‘Zionism’ into a schematic history of colonialism casts Jews as 
going to Palestine in order to get rich on the back of the people who lived there.  Jews, 
who are said to embody some European idea of whiteness, also embodied a European 
idea of rats and cockroaches which was held to constitute an existential threat to Europe.  
Massad mentions the effect of the Holocaust in transforming ‘Zionism’ but he does not 
analyze its significance.
21
  He does not discuss what it was about the Holocaust and the 
establishment of the state of Israel that changed the terms of the debate so completely.  
He writes as though the debate remains fundamentally the same in spite of the fact that 
the social reality of Europe and its relationship with Jews had changed.  It is difficult to 
imagine how it could have changed more radically.  He also mentions the fact that Jews 
did not emigrate to Palestine en masse due to an ideological commitment to Zionism but 
due to their expulsion from European and Middle Eastern countries,
22
 but he does not 
grasp the significance of this fact – that ‘Zionism’ was not only a construction of 
ideology but to a significant extent was the result of material circumstance. 
Jews, Massad, rightly points out, did not go to Israel because they were convinced 
Zionists in the sense of the pre Holocaust debates.  They went to Israel because the world 
had changed, because they had nowhere else to go, because they were homeless and they 
wanted to find a home.  Also, as Massad says, Jews arrived in Israel because they were 
expelled from a number of countries in the Middle East.  Massad is not explicit about 
                                                 
21
  He says: ‘Jewish anti-Zionists continued to oppose Zionism’s Jewish supremacist plans until 1948 when 
most of the support they had received over the decades dwindled against the reality of the holocaust and the 
establishment of the Jewish supremacist state’ (Massad 2003:445). 
22
  ‘…[I]t is also important to remember that the majority of Jews who reside in Israel today, or at least who 
emigrated to Israel in the 1930s and ‘40s and ‘50s, did not come to Israel because of Zionist reasons.  We 
have to remember that the larger segment of the Israeli Jewish population came to Israel as refugees after 
the war, and after 1948, from both Europe and the Arab countries, not because of the success of Zionism, 
but because they were refugees and had no other place to go.’ (Whitehead 2002:213). 
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how this huge influx of refugee Jews was incorporated into the white Jewish supremacist 
colonialist project.  But he believes that they were, quickly and completely.
23
 
Left anti-Zionism is often adopted by people who consider themselves to be influenced 
by Marxist historical materialistm, yet it operates with a methodology that tends to give 
an overwhelming explanatory importance to ideas.  This methodology is selective.  What 
it leaves out is as important as what it includes.  For example the Holocaust; for example 
the ethnic cleansing of Jews from the rest of the Middle East in the 50s and 60s; for 
example the existence of  the antiracist Israeli left and peace movement; for example 
Middle Eastern antisemitism; for example, the influence of Nazism in the Middle East 
during the 1940s. (Küntzel 2006) 
Left anti-Zionism is often adopted by people who consider themselves to be anti-
essentialist yet it operates with a methodology that understands events as little more than 
the manifestations of Israel’s racist, colonialist and totalitarian essences. 
Left anti-Zionism is often adopted by people who consider themselves to be politically 
responsible yet it operates in a world where, increasingly, antisemitism clothes itself in 
the rhetoric of anti-Zionism (EG Duke 2004; 2004a).  It fails to see this context as 
significant and it refuses to take reasonable care in its consciousness of the boundaries 
between the antisemitic demonization of Israel and the legitimate criticism of particular 
policies of the Israeli state.  It operates as though the only kind of anti-Zionism that is 
significant is antiracist anti-Zionism.  It often fails to take seriously the fact that much of 
the anti-Zionism around its own political universe is hostile to Jews, viscerally, 
religiously, implicitly or only de facto. 
The anti-Stalinist left, particularly those sections which identified as Trotskyist, 
encountered huge difficulties in general, when faced with a post-war world in which 
Trotsky’s global revolutionary perspective had been entirely defeated.  Neither of the two 
possibilities which Trotsky foresaw had happened; the ‘degenerated workers state’ of the 
                                                 
23
  ‘ The Jewish side, and by that I mean both Israeli Jewish society and the Israeli government, are still as 
Zionist as they have always been, and committed to Jewish supremacy.  Jewish supremacy is the basis of 
the Israeli state.  This is exactly the crux of the matter.’ (Massad in Whitehead 2002:214) 
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Soviet Union did not collapse, nor did the workers show signs of making a ‘political 
revolution’ against the ‘bureaucracy’.  In fact, the ‘degenerated workers state’ came out 
of the war hugely strengthened and it replicated itself across a significant section of the 
world.  Capitalism showed itself again, also against all expectations, to be hugely 
dynamic, and its ‘death throes’ seemed to go on for a long time.  The world seemed to 
find a third option that was neither socialism nor barbarism.  Much of the anti-Stalinist 
left had great difficulty coming to terms with this new world, and much of it preferred to 
operate by denying that there was a new situation and a new stabilization.  So the anti-
Zionist denial about how the world had changed following the Second World War could 
be understood as only a part of a much wider failure to come to terms with a new 
situation. 
Some on the Trotskyist left remained for decades in a state of frenzy, convinced that this 
was the moment of the final crisis of capitalism and of state ‘socialism’.  Others 
eventually over-embraced the new situation and became convinced that the Soviet Union, 
Eastern Europe, and China were, after all, in spite of their evident failings, in some sense 
an advance on capitalism: they embraced one side of Trotsky’s pre-war programme, 
‘defend the Soviet Union’.  By this route, many on the Trotskyist left managed to 
downplay their opposition to the ‘bureaucracy’ in favour of defending the ‘workers’ 
states’ against imperialism.  In this way Marxist politics, for some, was radically 
transformed.  It used to be a programme for the transformation of society from the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie into a democratic and free community of producers; yet 
many now saw their immediate task not as siding with the workers, or with the oppressed 
in general, but as siding with ‘progressive’ states against imperialist ones.  Whereas 
classical internationalism was a programme of common struggle against capitalism, it 
now became a programme of taking sides in geopolitical power struggles.
24
 
But the Soviet flag was not the first national flag that had been waved by some on the 
left.  The first, perhaps, was the Tricolor of revolutionary France.  France, and later 
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  One consequence of this was that very few Trotskyists later defended the right of Soviet Jews to leave 
the USSR, and very few spoke up for dissidents like Andrei Sakharov. 
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Russia, were seen by some as universal nations, whose national interest coincided with 
the interest of humanity (or the working class) as a whole (Fine 2001).  
How much easier to ally with some actually existing state than with a set of cosmopolitan 
politics?  And later other options emerged - Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela. For some it 
didn’t matter that the leaders of the good ‘progressive’ nations wore military uniforms 
and had secret police forces and ruled tyrannically over their own populations.  What 
mattered was that there was some actually existing state to which they could attach their 
feelings of patriotism. 
Interestingly, Israel, for some, in its early days, was seen as one of these good nations.  
The questions that Wheatcroft (2006), for example, asks about Israel and the way that it 
is thought about in left and liberal circles in the UK, are more interesting than the 
tentative answers that he offers.  He says that people on the left, and liberals, used to love 
Israel but have now reversed their position,
25
  and he asks, which is right?  He is asking, 
in effect whether Israel is a good nation or a bad nation, a progressive nation or a threat to 
progress.  This methodologically nationalist framework for thinking is a break from the 
cosmopolitan tradition of the left, which aimed to unite people in all states against the 
social and political structures that divided them. 
This phenomenon degenerated further for those who substituted victim nations for good 
nations.  Good nations, that is, nations thought to have socialist or progressive regimes, 
were, some noticed, always opposed by imperialism.  So some on the left began to 
support any regime which opposed imperialism.  In this way, left-wing political currents 
arose which flew the flags of the countries which were opposed by the ‘oppressor’ 
nations and some of them, in the name of anti-imperialism, even turned themselves into 
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  ‘There has, indeed, been a dramatic turn in opinion. It’s very hard to recall the esteem and goodwill in 
which Israel once basked, not least on the broad liberal left, where there is now a received view that Israel 
has deserved this change in affections: that Israel and Zionism are vicious now, having been virtuous once. 
The view may be almost universal - but is it true?’  Some pinned their hopes on Israel in the early days, as a 
new social democratic model and were inspired by the bold socialist experiment of the Kibbutz movement. 
This was mixed with a liberal ‘philosemitism’ and a feeling of ‘horror and shame’ about the Holocaust, he 
tells us. Yet this warmth was only achieved, he says, because the ‘right-thinking liberal west closed its eyes 
at the time’ to the ‘wholesale expulsion of three-quarters of a million Palestinians in 1948’. 
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apologists for Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Kim Jong-
il and for the ‘resistance movement’ in Iraq.   
Wheatcroft tells us that some people on the left in the 1950s had great illusory hopes in 
Israel as both a good nation and a victim nation and they began to wave its flag.  It is 
sometimes these same people who have now swung round in disgust when it turns out 
that Israel is not a utopian beacon for mankind.
26
  With all the passion of people who 
have been made fools of by history, and by the crumbling of their own adolescent 
illusions, sections of the left are now turning on Israel with a rage, a single-mindedness, 
and an enthusiasm explainable more readily by feelings of betrayal than by looking at the 
actual nature of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. 
Many on the contemporary left split the world into camps.  In one camp is imperialism, in 
the other camp there is the oppressed.  Those who adopt this campist view tend not to 
support the oppressed, but instead to support those who claim to speak for the oppressed 
and those who (sometimes forcibly) organize the oppressed.  They are less concerned 
than they might be with the question of what kind of society those who speak for the 
oppressed propose to replace ‘imperialism’ with.  The preponderance of this world-view 
goes some way to explaining why there is so much visceral hatred of Israel on the left, 
while there is so little anger caused by much greater human rights abuses perpetrated by 
regimes that are not thought to be ‘imperialist’. 
The story goes that Israel is a creature of imperialism or a client state of the USA (putting 
to one side, for the moment, the story that says Israel controls global imperialism and the 
USA.).  John Rose, for example, relying on Noam Chomsky’s argument that Israel 
became a ‘strategic asset’ in the securing of US access to Middle Eastern oil, argues that 
                                                 
26
  Beller (2007) argues against an attitude which normalizes hostility between Israelis and Palestinians 
because they are at war, as follows:  ‘The ‘It is war!’ argument is really a counsel of despair, and an 
admission of defeat for the higher values that Israel was meant to achieve.  Jews are supposed to value 
human life above all, not just Jewish life, human life.’  Kuper (2006) argues that it is legitimate to hold 
Israel to higher standards than other states on the basis that ‘Israel sees itself as a state based “on the 
precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew Prophets”. In the words of Isaiah, ‘We are a 
light unto the nations’”. 
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Israel could play its part in helping encase the region in a military structure, which would protect 
Western oil supplies….  Within just three years of its foundation, its ideologues were ready to tie 
Israel’s survival to the predatory intentions of the ‘Western powers’….  Radical nationalism was 
poised to sweep across the Middle East.  Israel’s statement of intent could hardly have been more 
prescient.  Israel would indeed become the watchdog.  (Rose 2004) 
 Whether Israel is represented as a part of the white project of colonialism, or as a 
America’s ‘strategic asset’ in the Middle East, the amount of slippage required to 
transform Israel into an essentially imperialist entity is small.  What makes Israel so 
demonic is an explosive mixture of racism, human rights abuses, and imperialism.  Some 
on the left are not enraged by, or motivated to act in solidarity against, much greater 
racism and human rights abuses committed by states that are not also ‘imperialist’. 
There are many disconnects between this worldview and the actual world.  One problem 
is that Israel would not have come into existence when it did without a shift in Soviet 
policy on the Middle East in the mid 1940s and Soviet bloc support for partition during 
1947-1948.  Israel’s origins are bound up in early Cold War politics and growing US-
USSR rivalry.  Another problem is that Israel would have been killed at birth in the war 
of 1948 if it had not been armed by Stalin’s Soviet Union against a British and American 
arms embargo.
27
  Now perhaps the Soviet Union was also imperialist, so it is after all true 
that Israel was helped into existence by ‘imperialism’.  Except that the Czechoslovakian 
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  An article in Haaretz, quoted in Hirsh (2006h), gives fascinating details of the military help that flowed 
from Czechoslovakia to the Jews in Palestine.  
‘The first arms deal with Czechoslovakia was signed in January 1948 - less than two months after the UN 
resolution creating Israel and four months before the state was actually established. Immediately after the 
Partition Plan was passed, Ben-Gurion began searching for sources to supply arms to the Israeli defense 
forces, but found that the legal sources in the United States and most European countries were closed off to 
the institutions of the Jewish state in formation. The only alternative seemed to be illegal arms acquisitions 
and an appeal to the Soviet bloc.’ 
‘As part of the deal signed in January, Czechoslovakia supplied some 50,000 rifles (that remained in use in 
the IDF for around 30 years), some 6,000 machine guns and around 90 million bullets. But the most 
important contracts were signed in late April and early May. They promised to supply 25 Messerschmidt 
fighter planes and arranged for the training - on Czech soil and in Czech military facilities - of Israeli pilots 
and technicians who would fly and maintain them. The planes, which were disassembled and flown to 
Israel on large transport planes, after their reassembly played a very important role in halting the Egypt 
Army’s advance south of Ashdod, at a place now called the Ad Halom Junction.’ 
‘The assistance to the air force continued to flow in during the second half of 1948 - when it consisted of 56 
Spitfire fighter planes. These were flown to Israel, some of them by Israeli pilots.’ 
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weapons which were smuggled to the Jews in Palestine in 1948, were sent in the name of 
anti-imperialism by the ‘Communists’, who always denied that they were imperialists.  In 
fact they positioned themselves as part of the ‘oppressed’ which opposed global 
imperialism.  Many of the ‘anti-imperialists’ of today who so despise Israel do not 
consider the old Soviet empire to have been an imperialist formation. 
The leadership of the Jews fighting for a state in Palestine was nationalist and nationalists 
tend to take help from wherever they can get it.  Accepting help from the imperialist 
Soviet Union against the British Empire and in the face of an American arms embargo 
was unremarkable in the context of the history of nationalist struggles for independence.  
In the 1950s the USSR reconstructed its Middle East policy when it realized that it could 
push its own imperialist ambitions in the Middle East more effectively by backing Arab 
nationalist regimes against Israel; and the USA gradually came to back Israel against the 
Soviet backed Arab states.  This was routine bloc politics of the Cold War.  What is 
remarkable is the myth that is currently believed by many on the left, that Israel is not at 
all a nation state like any other but is in reality little more than a creation of, and a 
creature of, the United States.  The assumption that some work with is that Israel was put 
there by Europe and America in order to facilitate the imperialist domination of the 
Middle East.  Never mind the fact that the US-Israeli alliance, which began to develop in 
the early 60s, was cemented only after the Six Day War in 1967.  Never mind the fact 
that when the US wants to organize military adventures in the Middle East in the 
contemporary period, Israel is of no use to it, and it has to rely on Egypt, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and other regimes for air-bases. 
Isaac Deutscher, who had lived his early political life in the Yiddish-speaking milieu of 
the Jewish left in Europe, before the Holocaust, wrote in 1954:  
I have, of course, long since abandoned my anti-Zionism, which was based on a confidence in the 
European labour movement, or, more broadly, in European society and civilization, which that 
society and civilization have not justified… (Deutscher 1968:111-2, written 1954) 
Deutscher dismisses anti-Zionism after the Holocaust without a second thought.  It does 
not seem to have occurred to him that a new anti-Zionist movement might emerge to 
pump new content into his own political heritage.  Yet Deutscher still did not identify 
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himself as a Zionist.  He was interested in coming to a non-nationalist, cosmopolitan 
analysis and politics.  And in response to futile arguments over who started the conflict 
between Jews and Arabs, he tells the following story: 
A man once jumped from the top floor of a burning house in which many members of his family 
had already perished. He managed to save his life; but as he was falling he hit a person standing 
down below and broke that person’s legs and arms. … If both behaved rationally, they would not 
become enemies. … But look what happens when these people behave irrationally. The injured 
man blames the other for his misery and swears to make him pay for it. The other, afraid of the 
crippled man’s revenge, insults him, kicks him, and beats him up whenever they meet. …  The 
bitter enmity, so fortuitous at first, hardens and comes to overshadow the whole existence of both 
men and to poison their minds. (Deutscher 1968:136-7, from an interview in New Left Review, 23 
June, 1967) 
If we understand the establishment of the state of Israel at least in part in the context of 
the huge events of the middle of the twentieth century, and if we understand that it has 
material causes as well as ideational ones, especially in the needs of a persecuted 
minority in both Europe and the Middle East, then we can see that anti-Zionism in 1929, 
for example, had a different meaning and content to the one that it has today.  The debate 
now is about different issues.  How can Israeli Jews and Palestinians forge a just peace?  
How can the racist currents within Israel and also within Palestine be defeated 
politically?  How can the tragic history that brought Jews and Palestinians into such a 
bloody conflict be transcended into the future?  But even now, Ghada Karmi (2007), for 
example, yearns ‘to turn back the clock before there was a Jewish state and re-run history 
from there’ (p 265).  She still wishes that the ‘tormented, suspicious and neurotically self-
absorbed community toughened by centuries of the need to survive’ had never gone to 
Palestine (p 120).  But the terms of the debate, and what is at stake in the debate, have 
changed radically since the 1880s and the 1890s and the 1920s. 
Norman Finkelstein quotes this very passage from Deutscher and in his attempt to refute 
its relevance, he exemplifies a number of defining features of left anti-Zionist discourse.  
He says that 
The Zionist denial of Palestinians’ rights, culminating in their expulsion, hardly sprang from an 
unavoidable accident….  It resulted from the systematic and conscientious implementation, over 
many decades… of a political ideology the goal of which was to create a demographically Jewish 
state in Palestine.…  To claim that Zionist leaders acted irrationally in refusing to ‘remove or 
assuage the grievance’ of Palestinians, then, is effectively to say that Zionism is irrational: for, 
given that the Palestinians’ chief grievance was the denial of their homeland, were Zionists to act 
‘rationally’ and remove it, the raison d’être of Zionism and its fundamental historic achievement 
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in 1948 would have been nullified…. To suggest that Zionists had no choice—or, as Deutscher 
puts it elsewhere, that the Jewish state was a ‘historic necessity’—is to deny the Zionist 
movement’s massive and, in many respects, impressive exertion of will, and the moral 
responsibility attending the exertion of this will, in one rather than another direction. (Finkelstein 
2005:11). 
Here, Finkelstein relies on the assumption of Zionist homogeneity.  While anti-Zionists 
often insist on rhetorically splitting ‘the Zionist leadership’ from the Jews who were 
persuaded, cajoled, fooled and forced into following, they also tend to insist on the 
homogeneity of Israelis and their total incorporation into the ideology of ‘Jewish 
supremacism’.  Here Finkelstein bestows his enemy, now collapsed into the phrase ‘the 
Zionist Movement’, with a satanic greatness, capable of a ‘massive… impressive exertion 
of will’.  He cannot accept Deutscher’s ‘ex post facto’ explanation of Zionism’s 
transformation from a utopian movement into a state (what other sort of explanation is 
there?).  It can only be explained by the extraordinary (massive, impressive) ‘will’ of 
Zionism since to accept that Israel’s existence is somehow connected to the Holocaust 
and to the plight of oppressed Jews would be to muddy the explanatory dualisms upon 
which anti-Zionism relies; white/non-white; oppressor/oppressed; good nationalism/bad 
nationalism; coloniser/colonised. 
Deutscher says that if both Israelis and Palestinians had behaved rationally then they 
would have not become enemies.  Finkelstein here falls back onto etymological rather 
than sociological explanation.  He replies that the only way that Israel could have made 
peace with Palestine would have been to dissolve itself, since it was, by definition, 
incapable of living in peace.  He says that the Palestinians’ chief grievance was the denial 
of their homeland and he then says that ‘Zionists’ could only remove this grievence by 
nullifying the the ‘raison d’être of Zionism’.  Deutscher was trying to find a political 
orientation that could transcend both nationalisms.  Finkelstein replies by saying that 
Israeli nationalism is definitionally racist and so instead of looking for a political 
orientation that could move beyond nationalism he finds no other option than choosing to 
support one nationalism against the other; one of the nationalisms, in any case, is often 
represented by anti-Zionists as an ersatz nationalism, a totalitarian movement posing as a 
nationalism.  The ‘raison d’être’ of Zionism would necessarily be removed, for 
Finkelstein, by a meaningful peace agreement.  He goes on: 
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It’s equally fatuous to assert that Palestinians act irrationally when they ‘blame’ the Zionists ‘for 
their misery’ and not accept that they were ‘the victim of circumstances over which neither of 
them had control.’ It’s only irrational if Zionists bore no responsibility for what happened. 
(Finkelstein 2005:12) 
Here he shifts the frame of the debate.  Deutscher is arguing that the foundation of Israel 
can only be understood with reference to the events in Europe that preceded it.  
Finkelstein reads Deutscher as using ‘the Holocaust’ in order to justify the unjustifiable.  
And the only way Finkelstein can frame this claim is by totalizing it.  Either ‘the 
Zionists’ were responsible (hyper-agents with a ‘massive’ and ‘impressive’ will) or they 
were innocent refugees (victims), in which case they would have behaved how innocent 
refugees ‘ought’ to behave.  Finkelstein reads Deutscher as saying that ‘Zionists’ bore no 
responsibility for the hurt inflicted on Palestine.  But what Deutscher seems to be trying 
to come to terms with is that it is understandable that Jewish refugees were taught to be 
frightened, angry and distrustful nationalists by their experience in Europe, and later in 
the Middle East, but that still other outcomes were possible.  Events were not determined 
by the etymological essence of ‘Zionism’ but rather by 20
th
 century history and by 
political battles won and lost amongst Jews and amongst Palestinians. 
Anti-Zionism, as well as some opponents of anti-Zionism (e.g. Chesler 2003; Phillips 
2006), often construct the struggle over ideas in such a way as to compel one to choose 
between competing nationalisms.  Supporters of each nationalism are tempted to tell the 
narratives of the Middle East so that we are forced to side with either Israel or with 
Palestine, against the other.  More cosmopolitan approaches attempt to break from this 
artificial binary, arguing that it is necessary to resist the simple choices we are offered 
and to go beyond a passive acceptance of the world as it exists.  Such an approach would 
fight against the demonization of Israel and Jews on the one hand but would also reject 
alternatives and explanations that demonize Muslims and Arabs on the other.  A more 
cosmopolitan approach is not incompatible with those enlightened Israeli and Palestinian 
nationalist approaches which assume national self-interest to consist firstly in building a 
political framework whereby both Israel and Palestine can be guaranteed national self-
determination. 
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It is not only Israeli nationalist imaginings of homogeneity that are accepted by left anti-
Zionism as a picture of reality, but also Palestinian ones.  The Palestinian population, 
Massad tells us, ‘understood Zionism for what it was and resisted it from its inception in 
the late nineteenth century’ (Massad 2003:444).  This view of the world as being divided 
into monolithic peoples, with single purposes and understandings is recurrent in both 
Zionist and anti-Zionist writing.  He repeats this claim in a debate with Benny Morris 
(Whitehead 2002:213): ‘From the Palestinian perspective, the nature of Zionism has 
always been clear.’  He writes as though there was a single Palestinian perspective.  But 
this perspective, it seems is not always the one of the Palestinian leadership, which, 
during the Oslo process, Massad tells us, accepted ‘in many ways, the Zionist version, 
both of Jewish and Palestinian histories, and succumbed to it.’ (Whitehead 2002:213).  
He writes, that is, as if there was only one Zionist version of history.  ‘The people’ have 
always understood everything clearly; the leadership was corrupted and bought off by the 
enemies of the people. 
He also says that he is in favour of the ‘continuing resistance of Palestinians in Israel and 
the occupied territories to all the civil and military institutions that uphold Jewish 
supremacy’ (Massad 2003:450).  The apparently straightforward statement of solidarity 
also hides and glosses over the centrally important political distinctions in Palestine.  
Does Massad understand the suicide bombing of buses, restaurants and nightclubs to 
constitute ‘resistance’ to institutions that uphold ‘Jewish supremacy’?  Does he 
understand Hamas and Hizbollah, with their clearly antisemitic rhetoric, to be a part of 
that ‘resistance’?  Palestine is presented as a monolithic anti-colonialist nationalist 
struggle, although held back by corrupt leaders.  It is presented as though there were no 
politics in Palestine, no differences of attitude amongst Palestinians to the presence of 
Jews and to the presence of Israel in the Middle East.  There is only the authentic 
resistance of the Palestinian people and the pro-Zionist collaboration of their leaders.  
Later, Massad (2006) threw his political weight behind the openly antisemitic Hamas 
movement and he characterized the secular nationalist tradition of the Fatah leadership in 
Palestine as being a ‘collaborationist’ one, subservient to Israeli interest.  Since the 
Hamas coup in Gaza against the Palestinian Presidency, it is becoming more common in 
the UK, both on the far left but also in mainstream liberal opinion, to understand Hamas 
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as the single authentic voice of Palestine - and Fatah, therefore, as a pro-imperialist gang 
of Quislings.
28
 
Massad says that if Jews were to give up their ‘Jewish supremacist’ ideology and allow 
Palestinians the ‘right of return’, then any threat to Jews would disappear (Massad 
2003:449).  Terrorist threats to Jews, as well as antisemitism in the Middle East, and 
across the world, is thought of by many anti-Zionists as being a (legitimate? 
understandable? predictable?) response to Zionism.  In this paradigm ‘Zionism’ is 
responsible for the increase in antisemitism; antisemites are in this way, absolved of 
responsibility, as well as human agency.  Anti-Jewish racism is understood by anti-
Zionists as being a profoundly different sort of racism to other racisms.  Other racisms 
are not normally analyzed by antiracists in terms of what it is that the victims of those 
racisms are doing to make people hate them.
29
 
The assumption of Palestinian homogeneity is based on a romantic picture of the 
Palestinian national movement.  Yet in truth Palestinian nationalism has always been 
greatly influenced by the requirements of pan-Arab nationalist narratives and more 
recently, of the global Islamist movement.  And these narratives undergo further 
degradation and simplification before they become part of left commonsense in Britain.  
They become further removed from an achievable conception of Palestinian national 
interest.  Questions concerning a conflict of interest between Palestinian nationalism and 
Arab nationalism or Islamism, are regarded with suspicion.  One of the tropes of anti-
Zionism is a refusal to take seriously the conflicting interests of Palestinians and Arab 
states and an unwillingness to allow oneself to be moved by the history of exploitation, 
repression, killing, moving on, and instrumentalization of Palestinians by Arab regimes.  
It is understood in anti-Zionist circles that great suspicion should fall on anyone who asks 
questions about the treatment of Palestinians in Arab states.  Anyone who asks how it is 
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  ‘The stunning military victory by the Palestinian Hamas movement over the rival Fatah organisation in 
the Gaza Strip last week was a strike against imperialism in the Middle East.’  (Assaf 2007); ‘We should 
hope – that may be all we can now do – that moderate Islamist movements manage to navigate these 
turbulent times, in spite of European attempts to prevent Islamism, which is clearly now the dominant 
regional current, from reshaping Middle Eastern societies.’ (Crooke 2007) 
29
  Compare with this statement from the right wing antisemite, Holocaust denier and anti-Zionist, David 
Irving: “They [Jews] should ask themselves the question, ‘Why have they been so hated for 3000 years that 
there has been pogrom after pogrom in country after country?’” (Barkat 2006) 
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that Palestinians in those states have not been allowed to integrate into society but have 
been kept separate and rightless as refugees, is suspected of preparing a ‘Zionist’ denial 
which may hold Arab regimes or Arab nationalism at least partly responsible for the 
misery of Palestinians.  While anger with (American backed) Arab regimes may be 
appropriate in anti-Zionist circles, it is never allowed to disrupt the central truth, which is 
that Palestinians and Arabs in general are the victims of Israel and of America, and of 
nobody else.  When Palestinians have been victimized by other Arabs, it often turns out 
that imperialism was the moving force behind that victimization either through Zionist 
machinations or through American-backed puppets, or as a result of the legacy of 
European colonialism.  Hostility to Israel is such a deeply ingrained commonsense for 
many on the left that they often forget to ask what function anti-Zionism plays for the 
Arab ruling elites. 
There are more questions which are widely understood to be forbidden, in the anti-Zionist 
universe, which are excluded from the narrative.  We have already touched on the ways 
in which certain kinds of narrative of the Holocaust are suspect if they seem to be 
mobilized towards an effort to justify Israeli crimes or to construct ‘Zionism’ as some 
kind of a Jewish liberation movement.  If Holocaust narratives disrupt the simple Israelis-
as-oppressors, Palestinians-as-oppressed binary, then they become not quite respectable 
in the anti-Zionist imagination.  It is respectable to talk about how the Holocaust is 
abused by Israel as a discourse of legitimation.
30
  It is respectable to understand 
Holocaust Memorial Day as an attack on British Muslims (Sacranie 2005).
31
  But it is 
highly suspect in anti-Zionist circles to argue that it was the Holocaust which transformed 
the material condition of Europe such that ‘Zionism’ was transformed from a utopian 
minority idea among Jews into a majority one and, amidst the decline of Britain and the 
growing American-Soviet Cold War rivalry, into a nation state. 
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 Judith Butler in conversation with Jacqueline Rose, 22 September 2005, ‘Holocaust Premises: Political 
Implications of the Traumatic Frame’, Senate House, London 
31
  ‘So we said that our common humanity called upon us to also recognize the crimes perpetrated against 
other people, and we called for the establishment of an EU genocide memorial day. Such a day would help 
dispel the - frankly racist - notion that some people are to be regarded as being more equal than others.’  
Sacranie went on to claim that ‘Every year since the HMD [Holocaust Memorial Day] was inaugurated in 
2001, the MCB [Muslim Council of Britain] has been subjected to intimidating smears of antisemitism in 
the press. We have been accused of wanting to ‘scrap’ the HMD out of ‘hatred’ of the Jewish people. This 
is hysterical nonsense. (Sacranie 2005) 
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Another forbidden question is to ask how and why Jews were almost entirely pushed out 
of all the Middle Eastern states in the 1950s and 60s.  The forced movement of 
Palestinians from Israeli held territory in 1948 is the original sin which forever renders 
Israel uniquely illegitimate.  The forced movement of Jews from the whole of the Middle 
East to Israel, however, is often represented a more or less free choice; it is explained as 
the result of ‘Zionist’ agents provocateur manufacturing the antisemitism (or perhaps the 
justified anger with Israel?) which forced the Jews out of the great cosmopolitan cities of 
the Middle East, Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and the rest.  There is a right and 
justified anti-Zionist concern to disallow attempts to minimize or deny the suffering of 
Palestinians in 1948, and their subsequent partial exclusion from Israeli territory.  Yet 
this concern can lead anti-Zionists to turn their eyes away from the wholesale expulsion 
of Jews from the Middle East as part of the Arab nationalist consolidation of ethnically 
defined Arab nation states.
 32
  Sometimes there are attempts to square the circle by 
portraying Jews who were pushed out of the Arab states as being really Arabs, who are, 
alongside other Arabs, victims of Ashkenazi or ‘white’ Jewish supremacism.  In this 
narrative, the reality of the power divide in Israel between Jews of European and Middle 
Eastern descent is fitted into a binary worldview that raises the power differences 
between ‘white’ imperialism and the rest of the world to an absolute and which subsumes 
all other difference.  Many Jews of Middle Eastern descent who live in Israel would be 
astonished to learn that some people in the west regard them as Arabs who are oppressed 
by ‘white’ Jews. 
 Although I have referred to the myth of Palestinian homogeneity as a romantic 
nationalism it is actually, perhaps, more ‘orientalist’ (Said 1978) than it is benevolent.  A 
respectful way to relate to Palestinians is not to pretend that they all think the same thing 
but to consider the plurality of different ways of thinking and different politics and 
different choices that are evident amongst Palestinians.  The cosmopolitan project is 
precisely based on disrupting and challenging myths of national homogeneity (Hirsh 
2003; Fine 2007) rather than giving them a left-wing stamp of authenticity. 
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  There may well have been a few Zionist agent provocateurs and there were Zionists who wanted Jews 
from the Middle East to go to Israel; but it requires a willingness to stretch the facts hugely to give these 
factors such explanatory dominance; see for example, Shiblak (2005) on how Jews were pushed out of Iraq, 
and Hakakian (2004) on how Jews were pushed out of Iran. 
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Nothing is gained by infantilizing Palestinians.  For example, there is a problem of 
antisemitism amongst Palestinians.  Hamas, the most electorally popular party in 
Palestine, is explicitly founded on an Islamist version of the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion.  It is far from surprising that people who live under the occupation of an 
overwhelmingly Jewish army may be susceptible to antisemitism.  But to treat that 
antisemitism as though it was entirely unmediated by human agency or by political 
choices is looks rather orientalist.  Most Arabs are not under occupation, yet antisemitism 
in predominately Arab or Muslim countries is also excused or underplayed.  It is 
underplayed either by pretending that it is nothing but an epiphenomenon of the conflict 
and has no life or emergent properties independent of it; or by pretending that 
antisemitism is a European colonialist invention and import into the Middle East, and 
therefore, people in the Middle East bear no responsibility for it and are incapable of 
being authentically antisemitic.  Other patronizing defences are attempted: for example 
that Arabic is too simple a language to cope with the (complex) distinction between 
Israeli and Jew, and so when people express hatred for Jews, it is only because they are 
not capable of the clarity required to express their hatred of Israelis.
33
 
Anti-Zionism tends to treat Palestine as one entity with a simple unifying narrative.   It is 
common to hear anti-Zionists declare that the conflict is actually simple in spite of 
dishonest ‘Zionist’ attempts to introduce obfuscating complexity.  Campaigns of boycott, 
disinvestment and sanctions against Israel are inspired by a fundamentally nationalist 
view of the world.  They treat Israel and Palestine as single entities which must be either 
supported or punished.  They thereby seek to make the cosmopolitan project of relating to 
differences within those nations, and commonalities between groups in both nations, 
impossible.  Attempts to make alliances between democrats, antiracists and peace-seekers 
within each nation and against the racists and those who seek all out victory in both 
nations, are disrupted by good-nation / bad-nation nationalist worldviews. 
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  I have heard this defence made by a British academic in a debate about antisemitism. 
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(iii) A simple picture of oppressed and oppressors 
Since before it existed, Israel has been engaged in two struggles with its neighbours.  One 
is a just war, waged by Palestinian Arabs for freedom - which became a struggle for 
Palestinian national independence; the other is a genocidal war that aims to end, or at 
least subjugate, Jewish life in the Middle East.  It is my argument that a cosmopolitan 
framework should insist on the reality of this distinction and it should challenge those 
who recognize the reality of only one or other of these two separate wars. 
However in the summer of 2006, when Israeli tanks were stalking through the crowded 
streets of Gaza, when Katyusha rockets were slamming into a deserted Haifa, when 
Israeli F16s were blowing up buildings in the suburbs of Beirut and when Israeli soldiers 
were being held in underground dungeons waiting for their own beheading to be 
broadcast on al-Jazeera, the distinction seemed entirely notional. 
Many people believe the war for Palestinian independence is a pretend war which 
functions only to give a liberational facade to the real war of annihilation; many others 
believe the war of annihilation is an Israeli propaganda invention that functions only to 
allow Israel to thwart the just demands of the Palestinians - an invocation of the 
Holocaust as a blank cheque. 
An interesting feature of social reality is that if enough people believe something to be 
true, and act as though it is true, then it may indeed become the truth.  So if Israelis 
believe they are only ever fighting a war of survival, then they will use tactics and 
strategies which are appropriate to the war they believe themselves to be fighting.  If 
Palestinians, meanwhile, come to believe that they can win their freedom only by 
destroying Israel, then they may come to think of Hamas, Hizbullah, al-Qaeda and the 
Iranian regime as their allies. 
The way out is for cosmopolitan voices and political movements to insist on the reality of 
both wars and to separate them conceptually; to stand clearly for a Palestinian victory in 
the fight for freedom and equally clearly for an Israeli victory in the fight against 
annihilation. 
 49 
There is a left ‘common sense’ in the UK that sees only one struggle going on - a war of 
the oppressed against the oppressors.  This way of thinking denies that there is a 
substantial project to annihilate Israel and it insists that this is in any case not an 
immediate prospect because Israel is so heavily armed.  But there really is a set of serious 
global political movements which aim to kill or subjugate the Jews of Israel.  Such a 
movement rules in Iran and was elected into office in Palestine, it occupies southern 
Lebanon, it took power in Gaza, it has a foothold in Iraq and it has significant popular 
support across the Middle East and further afield. 
If some people on the left are relying on Israel’s military superiority to guarantee its 
survival, then they must, logically, if they are in favour of its survival, also be in favour 
of Israel’s allies, particularly the US, helping to maintain Israeli military superiority.  But 
it seems more likely that an atmosphere is building on parts of the British left that would 
lead many to respond to the annihilation of Israel by saying: ‘This second genocide of the 
Jews is genuinely tragic, but really, they have only themselves to blame.’  Israeli Jews 
would be making a mistake if they relied on the solidarity of the British left to protect 
them from those who say they would like to slaughter them. 
Meanwhile, the left in Israel is unable to insist on the reality of the just struggle for 
Palestinian independence.  Much of the Israeli left was convinced in 2000 that Palestine 
had rejected at least a partial victory in its war for statehood in favour of the hope for 
victory in the war for Israeli annihilation. But there are still those in Israel and Palestine 
who have not given up on the project of separating the two wars.  
The collapse of the peace process convinced many Palestinians that the war for 
independence could never be won and that their only option was to back the jihadi 
Islamist movements against the Jews.  Yet Palestinian nationalism, the movement for 
Palestinian independence, has not yet been entirely defeated by the jihadis Islamists. 
Even if events march on, and cosmopolitan perspectives continue to be defeated, it is still 
the job of the left to represent conceptually - even if it is unable to do so materially - a 
different possible direction. The wars of annihilation can only end in ever deepening 
horror; the struggle for peace and freedom can end in peace and freedom. 
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It is as necessary to keep challenging those who think that the only real war is an Israeli 
war of survival, as it is to challenge those who think that the only real war is against the 
Israeli oppressor. The cosmopolitan left needs to think differently, and it has to create a 
different reality.  It is on the side of the Palestinian struggle for independence and it is on 
the side of the Israeli struggle against the jihadists (not to mention the Palestinian, 
Iranian, Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese struggle against the jihadists, as well as the trade 
union, socialist, democratic, lesbian and gay, feminist and secular struggles against 
them). 
But that’s absurd, cries one camp: the jihadists are currently dictating the Palestinian 
struggle, and it is no longer a struggle for Palestinian independence.  Hasn’t it become 
one struggle?  Hasn’t it always been one struggle, Jews against Arabs? ‘We offered them 
peace and they chose war - then they started raining missiles down on our heads.’ 
And the other side insists: ‘Barak’s offer during the Oslo Peace process was to set 
Palestinian oppression in stone for ever, it was not an offer of Palestinian liberty.  He 
offered slavery, not freedom. You talk about the annihilation of Israel, but it is Palestine 
that is prevented from existing – Israel assuredly exists. It has destroyed the project of 
Palestinian liberation.’  
Is it a war of annihilation or a war of liberation? Both wars are real, even if only in our 
minds. But human beings have the capacity to make some impact on the world, to work 
for change, according to what is in our minds, and that is the cosmopolitan project in 
Israel and in Palestine. 
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PART II  ANTISEMITISM AND CRITICISM OF ISRAEL:  
DISCOURSE 
 
Part I looked at the context of anti-Zionist thought and movements and it looked at the 
assumptions, methodology and tropes of antiracist anti-Zionism in particular.  It critically 
engaged with the central concepts of this movement and it looked at how some currents 
of the left find themselves in a position where a politics of demonization appears to be a  
natural left-wing response to the Israel-Palestine conflict.  Section II moves on from a 
conceptual discussion to an empirical analysis of a number of actualizations of those 
concepts in public discourse.  The case studies are chosen because they illustrate 
particular tendencies which shed light on the actualization of anti-Zionism in a form 
which is related directly to antisemitism.  Part III then looks at boycott campaigns, which 
aim to transform conceptual and discursive texts into concrete exclusions of human 
beings. 
 
(i) Denying antisemitism: ‘Intensified criticism’ of Israel and the Zionist  
manufacture of the antisemitism charge 
Steven Beller (2007:223), relying on Tony Judt and Antony Lerman as authorities, states 
that ‘the claims of a sudden, horrendous burgeoning of antisemitism in Europe are 
incorrect.’  Antony Lerman (2007) articulates the position as follows: 
Pro-Israel and Zionist groups have interpreted intensified criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism as 
the expression of a ‘new antisemitism’.  The [Independent Jewish Voices] initiative leans towards 
the view that this charge is far too often used in an attempt to stifle strong criticism of Israeli 
policies. 
Part II presents an extensive survey and analysis of a number of key examples of what 
Lerman refers to as ‘intensified’ or ‘strong’ criticism of Israel.  These examples are not 
narratives of straightforward antisemitism but they do raise questions about what kinds of 
intensification of criticism we are seeing.  They are selected because they exemplify 
particular kinds of intensification; they are examples of discourse which take the form of 
exaggerated hostility to Israel.  The analysis aims to explore whether and how those case 
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studies mirror antisemitic discourse, rhetoric, images, texts or tropes.  The majority of 
these case studies relate to public social and political actors in predominately British 
public life, and nearly all of the contested narratives have already been discussed in the 
public sphere.  
Underpinning Lerman’s formulation of the problem are two assumptions.  First, that 
those who are concerned with antisemitism related to hostility to Israel are ‘pro-Israel’ or 
‘Zionist’ and second, that the articulation of this concern often constitutes a dishonest but 
collective attempt to ‘stifle strong criticism of Israeli policies’.  In other words the debate 
over contemporary antisemitism is congruent with the debate over how strongly Israel 
should be criticized for its abuses of human rights.  If you are very strongly critical of 
Israeli human rights abuses then you will also believe that concern about a ‘new 
antisemitism’ is misplaced because this concern blunts and ‘stifles’ deserved criticism.  
If, on the other hand, you are worried about ‘new antisemitism’ then you will also be 
‘pro-Israel’ or ‘Zionist’ and therefore, it is thought, reluctant to criticize or recognize 
Israeli human rights abuses. 
These are strange underpinnings for a discussion of the danger of racism against Jews.  
Firstly because they assume that criticism is something purely quantitative.  How 
strongly critical are you of Israel on a scale of one to ten?  But criticism contains both 
qualitative and quantitative components.  The nature of a criticism is as important as its 
intensity.  The Hamas Covenant (Hamas 1988) articulates a strong critique of Israel but it 
is also antisemitic; moreover the Hamas critique of Israeli human rights abuses, given its 
own politics and practice, is unconvincing.  At the time of the invasion of Jenin by Israeli 
forces in 2002, there was much ‘strong’ and ‘intense’ criticism; people screamed that 
there was a massacre and a genocide and a Holocaust being perpetrated by Israel.  Such 
overblown claims that Israel was killing for the sake of killing and that Israel was just 
like the Nazis, allowed the Sharon government to plead, in good faith, not guilty.  
Criticism was strong and intense but it lacked truth and it lacked political clarity.  It was 
ineffective not because it was ‘strong’ or ‘intense’ but because of its quality.  And one 
aspect of its quality was that it relied upon and it reproduced a view of Israel (and the 
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Jews who do not sufficiently distance themselves from it) as being uniquely evil in the 
world.
34
 
Antisemitic opposition to Israel does not constitute ‘strong’ or ‘intense’ criticism of 
Israeli human rights abuses.  On the contrary, such criticism harms those who fight for 
peace and against racism; it does damage to the Palestinian struggle for independence, 
freedom and democracy.  It is the quality of intensification of criticism rather than the 
intensification itself that is crucial to the discussion of the relationship between hostility 
to Israel and antisemitism.  Howard Jacobson (2007) puts it like this: 
Critical - as though those who accuse Israel of every known crime against humanity, of being 
more Nazi than the Nazis, more fascist than the fascists, more apartheid than apartheid South 
Africa, are simply exercising measured argument and fine discrimination.  
I know a bit about being critical. It’s my job. Being ‘critical’ is when you say that such-and-such a 
book works here but doesn’t work there, good plot, bad characterisation, enjoyed some parts, 
hated others. What being critical is not, is saying this is the most evil and odious book ever 
written, worse than all other evil and odious books, should never have been published in the first 
place, was in fact published in flagrant defiance of international law, must be banned, and in the 
meantime should not under any circumstances be read. For that we need another word than 
critical. 
One wonders whether the fatwa calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie could be 
considered to be literary criticism. 
                                                 
34
  For an account of some of the things that Israeli forces actually did during the invasion, see (Yeheskeli 
2002): ‘Difficult? No way. You must be kidding. I wanted to destroy everything. I begged the officers, over 
the radio, to let me knock it all down; from top to bottom. To level everything. It’s not as if I wanted to kill. 
Just the houses. We didn’t harm those who came out of the houses we had started to demolish, waving 
white flags. We screwed just those who wanted to fight.  … No one refused an order to knock down a 
house. No such thing. When I was told to bring down a house, I took the opportunity to bring down some 
more houses; not because I wanted to - but because when you are asked to demolish a house, some other 
houses usually obscure it, so there is no other way. I would have to do it even if I didn’t want to. They just 
stood in the way. If I had to erase a house, come hell or high water - I would do it. And believe me, we 
demolished too little. The whole camp was littered with detonation charges. What actually saved the lives 
of the Palestinians themselves, because if they had returned to their homes, they would blow up. … For 
three days, I just destroyed and destroyed. The whole area. Any house that they fired from came down. And 
to knock it down, I tore down some more. They were warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house before 
I come, but I gave no one a chance. I didn’t wait. I didn’t give one blow, and wait for them to come out. I 
would just ram the house with full power, to bring it down as fast as possible. I wanted to get to the other 
houses. To get as many as possible. Others may have restrained themselves, or so they say. Who are they 
kidding? Anyone who was there, and saw our soldiers in the houses, would understand they were in a death 
trap. I thought about saving them. I didn’t give a damn about the Palestinians, but I didn’t just ruin with no 
reason. It was all under orders.’
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So there follows a discussion of a number of contested cases.  They are not necessarily 
examples of antisemitic criticism of Israel – such examples are easy to find, for example 
in the official ideology of Hamas, Hizbollah and the current Iranian presidency, and they 
pose no analytic ambiguity.  Rather, the examples that follow are examples of what 
Lerman refers to as ‘intensification’ of criticism.  The particular forms that intensification 
takes are more relevant than the degrees of intensification. 
 
(a) The Mayor of London: deny antisemitism, cry Israel 
In September 2006 the report of the British Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism was 
published.  Norman Finkelstein (2006) responded to this publication with a piece on his 
website in which he alleges that the Parliamentary report was published as a response to 
the Israel-Hezbollah war in order to deflect attention from Israel’s ‘murderous destruction 
of Lebanon’.
35
  It is difficult to see how this claim could be true, since the report was 
being planned, written and researched before the war began; if true, it must rely on the 
premise that an all-party committee of British MPs was acting pre-emptively to protect 
Israel from criticism of a war which had not yet started.
36
  Finkelstein is articulating the 
claim that the issue of antisemitism is raised dishonestly in order to de-legitimize Israeli 
human rights abuses.  This thought is communicated by four expressive words which 
constitute the title of his piece: ‘Kill Arabs, Cry Antisemitism’.  This charge is frequently 
made by anyone who is accused of failing to be careful about antisemitism and its very 
invocation is itself almost inevitably an indication of a failure to take antisemitism 
seriously. 
I will refer to the claim that people are accused of antisemitism in order to de-
legitmize their criticisms of Israeli human rights abuses as the Livingstone formulation, 
                                                 
35
  ‘…predictably, just after Israel faced another image problem due to its murderous destruction of 
Lebanon, a British all-party parliamentary group led by notorious Israel-firster Denis MacShane MP 
(Labor) released yet another report alleging a resurgence of antisemitism’  (Finkelstein (2006) 
36
  Later in this piece, Finkelstein sneeringly wonders whether Israel could organise a Berlin ‘Berlin airlift’ 
of gefilte fish to Jewish students.  This is his response to a recommendation in the parliamentary report that 
Jewish students ought not to be excluded from events due to the lack of kosher food.  The piece is 
illustrated by a picture of a can of gefilte fish attached to a parachute.   
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since, in the story that follows, the Mayor of London employed it most effectively.  The 
Livingstone formulation often expresses a reversal of the truth.  Ken Livingstone accuses 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews of ‘crying antisemitism’ as a response to his own 
criticism of Israel, but in reality, he himself ‘cried Israel’ in response to criticism of his 
own, albeit trivial, late-night antisemitic insults – and his perhaps less trivial refusal to 
acknowledge them or to apologize for them.  His insults were entirely unconnected to 
Israel or to its human rights abuses.  The interesting thing about Ken Livingstone’s 
brushes with antisemitism is that they apparently do him no damage, either in terms of 
popular support or in terms of the support of the antiracist left. 
Oliver Finegold, a journalist for the Evening Standard, approached the Mayor as he left a 
party, late at night, at City Hall, 8 February 2005.   
Finegold: Mr Livingstone, Evening Standard. How did tonight go?
37
 
Livingstone: How awful for you. Have you thought of having treatment?  
Finegold tries again. 
Finegold: How did tonight go?  
Livingstone: Have you thought of having treatment?  
Finegold tries a third time: 
Finegold: Was it a good party? What does it mean for you? 
Mr Livingstone: What did you do before? Were you a German war criminal?  
Finegold: No, I’m Jewish, I wasn’t a German war criminal and I’m actually quite offended by 
that. So, how did tonight go?  
At this point the Mayor understands that Finegold is Jewish and that he finds being 
compared to a ‘German war criminal’ offensive.  And he has a tape recorder running.  So 
how does Livingstone react?  He thinks he’s onto something clever, so he clarifies his 
point: 
Mr Livingstone: Arr right, well you might be [Jewish], but actually you are just like a 
concentration camp guard, you are just doing it because you are paid to, aren’t you?  
                                                 
37
  This transcript comes from the website of the Evening Standard, www.ThisIsLondon.co.uk, 
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-16539119-
details/Who+said+what+when+Ken+clashed+with+reporter/article.do;jsessionid=NjTNFgBNyY7yGVy6S
xGyvCpgV321w3WPyvhfh29jJXGNB0TxpTLT!-749300803!-1407319224!7001!-1, 11 February 2005, 
downloaded 24 February 2007. 
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Finegold is hanging around outside City Hall trying to get a comment from the Mayor 
because it is his job.  This, according to Livingstone, is ‘just like’ someone who 
participated in the Nazi genocide of Jews during the Second World War.  The Mayor 
thinks that being a journalist for the Evening Standard is ‘bad’ in an analogous way as 
taking part in genocide is ‘bad’ – and both are done by people who are only doing their 
jobs.
38
 
Finegold: Great, I have you on record for that. So, how was tonight?  
Mr Livingstone: It’s nothing to do with you because your paper is a load of scumbags and 
reactionary bigots.  
Maybe Ken is drunk?  He later denied it.  Ken Livingstone has, in his time, dealt with all 
the newspapers, owned by all kinds of ‘scumbags and reactionary bigots’.  He has 
worked for The Evening Standard and he has worked for the notorious left-baiting 
Murdoch tabloid, The Sun. 
Finegold: I’m a journalist and I’m doing my job. I’m only asking for a comment.  
Mr Livingstone: Well, work for a paper that doesn’t have a record of supporting fascism.  
So Livingstone goes home and the story breaks the next day.
39
  Why does he not just 
apologize? ‘Sorry I was a bit drunk, I was tired, it was late, I was fed up with being 
chased around by reporters, and I said some silly things.’  This would have solved the 
problem.  But Livingstone decided not to apologize.   
What if it had been a black journalist?  ‘What did you do before, were you a plantation 
owner?’ ‘No, I’m black, I wasn’t a plantation owner, and I’m quite offended by that.’ 
‘Well you might be black but actually you’re just like a plantation owner…’ 
After Livingstone has had two weeks to think about it, he insists (Livingstone 2005) that 
his responses to Finegold were appropriate.  He says The Evening Standard, as well as 
Associated Press, which owns it, have treated him badly in the past and it has now 
overstated this story in order to damage him politically.  He points out that in July 1992 
(13 years ago) there was a party at the Daily Mail where people dressed up in Nazi 
                                                 
38
  For a full discussion of Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological analysis of the relationship between 
instrumental rationality and the decision to commit a crime against humanity in Modernity and the 
Holocaust, see Hirsh (2003) chapter 2. 
39
  It is not broken by Finegold because he feels insulted but by someone else who heard the conversation. 
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uniforms as fancy dress and Associated Press has not apologized for that.  He says that 
the Daily Mail campaigned to bar Jews from entering Britain before 1905 (100 years 
ago).  And the Daily Mail supported the British Union of Fascists in the 1930s (70 years 
ago).  He says that in 1933 (72 years ago), the owner of the Daily Mail supported Hitler. 
In 1938 and 1940, the Daily Mail articulated antisemitic policies.  And in 2001, a 
parliamentary sketch in the Daily Mail referred to someone in antisemitic language. 
I, says Ken Livingstone, am much less antisemitic than the Daily Mail and Associated 
Press as though that was an appropriate standard for the antiracist left.  I, says Ken, have 
always fought racism and antisemitism.  ‘I’, says Ken ‘regard the positive contribution of 
the Jewish people to human civilisation as unexcelled’.  ‘The public’ says Ken, 
‘understand that what is being attempted is a frame up orchestrated by racist sections of 
the press against someone with a long record of fighting against racism’.  But he adds: 
‘Over the last two weeks my main concern has been that many Jewish Londoners have 
been disturbed by this whipped up row.’  Not by Ken’s own behaviour. And then: 
I do believe that abdicating responsibility for one’s actions by the excuse that ‘I am only doing my 
job’ is the thin end of the immoral wedge that at its other extreme leads to the crimes and horrors 
of Auschwitz, Rwanda and Bosnia.  (Livingstone 2005) 
Livingstone reacted to criticism by publishing an article in The Guardian under the title 
‘This is about Israel, not antisemitism’ (Livingstone 2005a), in which he sought to 
change the topic of discussion by insisting that the problem is not antisemitism but 
Israel’s human rights abuses.  This represents a reversal of the now standard anti-Zionist 
claim that Jews ‘cry antisemitism’ in order to de-legitimize those who criticize Israel.
40
  
The Livingstone formulation: 
‘For far too long the accusation of antisemitism has been used against anyone who is critical of the 
policies of the Israeli government, as I have been.’  (Livingstone 2006) 
                                                 
40
  EG Norman Finkelstein (2005) ‘…. the book’s real purpose will now come into focus: Israel’s 
horrendous human rights record in the Occupied Territories and the misuse of antisemitism to delegitimize 
criticism of it.’ 
EG David Duke (2004a): ‘It is perfectly acceptable to criticize any nation on the earth for its errors and 
wrongs, but lo and behold, don’t you dare criticize Israel; for if you do that, you will be accused of the most 
abominable sin in the modern world, the unforgivable sin of antisemitism!’ 
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Here, Livingstone was ‘crying Israel’ in order to de-legitimize those who were concerned 
about his antisemitic remark.  He followed this up with an argument that normalized 
Palestinian suicide bombing against Israeli civilians.  He had unreservedly condemned 
the suicide attacks on the London transport system on July 7 2005
41
 but he found suicide 
attacks on the Israeli transport system to raise more complex moral and political issues.  
‘Palestinians don’t have jet fighters,’ he said at his press conference two weeks later, 
‘they only have their bodies to use as weapons.  In that unfair balance, that’s what people 
use’ (quoted in Lappin 2006).
42
 
The Finegold incident, the ‘crying Israel’ as a response to an accusation of antisemitism, 
and the equivocation over the campaign to kill Israeli civilians were followed a sustained 
campaign by Livingstone to host and promote the Muslim cleric Yusef al-Qaradawi as a 
progressive religious figure and a leading Islamic moderate.  It should be remembered 
that in the 1980s Ken Livingstone was widely recognized as a leading figure in municipal 
rainbow alliance politics, the movement which the political right shrilly and apocryphally 
denounced as ‘political correctness gone mad’. 
Now, Livingstone was hosting Qaradawi, a man who supported the indiscriminate killing 
of Israeli civilians in the name of Muslim anti-Zionism.  Participation in ‘martyr 
operations’ in Palestine, he had claimed, ‘is one of the most praised acts of worship’.  He 
also taught that ‘apostates’ from Islam ought to be killed, that a ‘Muslim husband is to 
order his wife to wear hijab’; that a man may admonish his wife ‘lightly with his hands’; 
                                                 
41
  Livingstone (2005b) ‘This was a cowardly attack… It was an indiscriminate attempt to slaughter, 
irrespective of any considerations for age, for class, for religion, or whatever.’ 
42
  ‘First, [Livingstone] treats ordinary Israelis as unique in excluding them from the status of non-
combatants accorded to civilians in any other conflict. But if the obvious asymmetry between the Israeli 
army and Palestinian irregulars is the basis for this move, then why are British and American civilians 
exempt from being construed as legitimate targets of terror attacks launched by opponents of the 
occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, where powerful armies battle militarily weak insurgency forces? In 
short, what basis is there for Livingstone’s resolute condemnation of Islamist terror in London, which can 
be excused and understood on grounds similar to those invoked in the case of Palestinian suicide bombing? 
 
‘Passing over the fact that political expediency (more accurately, political survival) would prevent the 
Mayor from applying his views consistently, even if he chose to do so, the effect of his exceptionalist 
treatment of Israeli civilians is to reinforce the idea that it is not simply Israel’s policies which are worthy 
of opposition, but its existence as a country that is intolerable. The behaviour of the Israeli government has 
deprived its people of any collective legitimacy. Hence they are understandable (and so, ultimately, 
acceptable) targets of violence.’  (Lappin 2006) 
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that the appropriate state punishment for homosexuality is death (Tatchell 2005)
43
.  When 
leader of the Greater London Council in the 1980s it would have been inconceivable that 
Livingstone would have hosted such a figure.  In praising Mel Gibson’s ‘The Passion of 
the Christ’ a year later, Qaradawi said: 
In this film there is an important positive aspect. The positive aspect lies in its exposing the Jews’ 
crime of bringing Jesus to the crucifixion…. More than 30 years ago, the Vatican issued a 
document, exonerating the Jews of [spilling] the blood of Jesus. Not all Christians accepted this 
document. The Pope in the Vatican and the Catholics are the ones who exonerated them. They 
exonerated them under political pressure. …, I say that the Jews of the 21st century adopt what the 
Jews of the first century did. They adopt what [their forefathers] did to Jesus, and so they bear 
responsibility for it, unless they renounce it, saying: This was a crime, and we ask Allah to absolve 
us of it. But they have not said this, and therefore, the Jews of today bear responsibility for the 
deeds of the Jews of yesterday.’ (Al Qaradawi 2006). 
The London Assembly and the Culture Secretary called for Livingstone to apologize for 
the Finegold incident.  Livingstone insisted that he ‘stood by his remarks’. 
(news.BBC.co.uk 2005)
44
  Following Livingstone’s refusal to apologize,
45
 the Board of 
                                                 
43
  City Hall published a glossy brochure to defend Livingstone’s links with Qaradawi (Mayor of London 
2005).  The brochure defends Qaradawi against charges of antisemitism, quoting him as follows: ‘we do 
not hold any enmity towards the Jews’.  The brochure argues that ‘In contrast to claims that he makes ‘no 
distinction between Jews and Israelis’ … and ‘uses sermons to call for Jews – not Israelis but specifically 
Jews – to be killed’…, Qaradawi has repeatedly emphasised that ‘we do not fight Israelis because they are 
Jews but because they took our land, killed our children and profaned our holy places’’.  But this defence is 
not convincing.  Whether the Mayor of London’s Office’s defence of Qaradawi was in good faith or not is 
unknown; it has not responded to Qaradawi’s subsequent exegesis of classic antisemitic blood libel. 
 
One method of responding to criticism of Qaradawi by the Mayor’s brochure, has been to attack MEMRI, 
the Middle East Media Research Institute, which has produced some of the translations of Qaradawi’s 
views from the original Arabic.  MEMRI is run out of Washington DC by a former member of the Israeli 
security services, Yigal Carmon.  Its translations are therefore easily ignorable as ‘Zionist’ or ‘Mossad’ 
propaganda.  Whitaker (2002) argues that MEMRI’s translations are highly selective and therefore 
unrepresentative; Yigal Carmon (2002) responds in The Guardian.  The Guardian carries an email debate 
between the two in 2003 (Carmon & Whitaker 2003).   
 
Qaradawi’s position on Jewish-Muslim dialogue is also clear enough:  ‘There is No Dialogue between Us 
and the Jews Except by the Sword and the Rifle’.  Also: ‘The iniquity of the Jews, as a community, is 
obvious and apparent. Let me explain: The West, I can say about some of them [i.e., Westerners] who are 
iniquitous, and others who are not iniquitous. And it is possible. But iniquity on the part of the Jews is great 
iniquity, grave iniquity, iniquity that is incomparable and overt. Therefore, when it was suggested to me 
that Jews would be participating in the dialogue in the upcoming interview, I rejected this. I said no, we 
should not conduct a dialogue with these [people] while their hands are stained with our blood.’ (MEMRI 
2004) 
44
  Livingstone: ‘If I could in anything I say relieve any pain anyone feels I would not hesitate to do it but it 
would require me to be a liar. …I could apologize but why should I say words I do not believe in my heart? 
…Therefore I cannot. If that is something people find they cannot accept I am sorry but this is how I feel 
after nearly a quarter of a century of their behaviour and tactics.’ (News.BBC.co.uk 2005) 
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Deputies of British Jews referred the case to the Standards Board for England, a body set 
up in the wake of the ‘sleaze’ scandals in British public life in the 1990s.  The Standards 
Board eventually ruled that Livingstone’s ‘treatment of the journalist [had been] 
unnecessarily insensitive and offensive’ and, since it judged that this contravened the 
Code of Conduct for Standards in Public Life, it decided to suspend him from office for 
four weeks. 
A few days after the judgment, Livingstone (2006) responded with a piece in The 
Guardian in which he portrayed himself as the victim of an undemocratic coup.
46
   Who 
was behind the coup?  Livingstone’s attack shifted during the time of the judgment from 
Associated Press to the Board of Deputies for British Jews.  The Board of Deputies, 
Livingstone argued at his press conference, was pursuing a vendetta against him because 
he is critical of the Israeli government 
There are a number of elements to his case against the Board of Deputies.  First, they use 
a charge of antisemitism instrumentally.  They do not really believe that Livingstone has 
done anything antisemitic nor that he has ever behaved in such a way that may have 
contributed to the propagation of an antisemitic way of thinking.  They use the charge 
disingenuously in order to silence legitimate criticism of Israeli human rights abuses.  
This charge, of ‘crying antisemitism’ is necessarily a charge of dishonesty and also of 
conspiracy.  Conspiracy, because to believe otherwise would mean that all of the diverse 
political currents, campaigns, lobbies and writers who make accusations of antisemitism 
are being dishonest independently but in the same way. 
Second, the Board of Deputies, by referring Livingstone to the Standards Committee was 
responsible for the action that was taken by the Standards Committee. 
                                                                                                                                                 
45
  From the judgment of the Adjudication Panel of the Standards Board: ‘[The Mayor’s] representative is 
quite right in saying, … that matters should not have got as far as this: but it is the Mayor who must take 
responsibility for this. It was his comments that started the matter and thereafter his position seems to have 
become ever more entrenched.’ 
http://www.adjudicationpanel.co.uk/documents/notice_of_decision_ape_0317_revised_copy1.pdf  
46
  ‘The fundamental issue’ he wrote, ‘in this whole affair is not whether or not I was ‘insensitive’, it is the 
principle that those whom the people elect should only be removed by the people or because they have 
broken the law.’ 
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Third, that Livingstone’s long history of hostility to Israel and to ‘Zionism’ could be 
reasonably understood as mere criticism.  Worries connected to antisemitism are often 
raised in response to conspiracy theory, to the demonization of Israel, to those who claim 
that Israel is uniquely an apartheid or a Nazi state, essentially racist, not a nation but an 
outpost of imperialism; the Livingstone formulation conflates all of these possibilities 
into mere criticism. 
Livingstone does more than ‘criticize the policies of the Israeli government’.  For 
decades, he has been part of a movement in the UK that sees Israel as a pariah state with 
a menacing and malign influence well beyond its borders.  In the 1980s Livingstone was 
associated with the Workers Revolutionary Party, an extreme anti-Zionist group, and was 
the editor of one of its front organizations, Labour Herald (Matgamna 2003). 
This exaggerated hostility to Israel perhaps, is connected to the fact that Livingstone 
treats the antisemite Qaradawi as an honoured guest; and to the fact that Livingstone is 
content to employ low-level racist abuse against a Jewish journalist even when he has 
been told that the journalist finds this offensive; and to the fact that he chose to make a 
big issue out of this story rather than to back down pragmatically; and to the fact that he 
reacted with a critique of Ariel Sharon to claims that his own conduct had been offensive.  
His exaggerated hostility to Israel is, connected to the fact that he opposes the suicide 
bombing of buses in London but equivocates about the suicide bombing of buses in Tel 
Aviv. 
Livingstone appealed his suspension to the High Court and won.  The judgment went out 
of its way to give an official stamp of authority to the ‘Livingstone formulation’.  The 
High Court judged that Livingstone’s subjective feeling of opposing antisemitism was 
sufficient basis for it to conclude that he has never ‘been anti-Semitic’ – and it could not 
‘sensibly’ be suggested otherwise.  The judgment says that Livingstone has ‘not approved 
of some of the activities of the State of Israel’ but ‘that has nothing to do with’ 
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antisemitism.’
47
  Livingstone’s snide insults against Finegold had a connection to Israel 
or ‘Zionism’ only inside his own head. 
 
(b) Comment Is Free: anti-Zionist rhetoric goes mainstream 
Comment Is Free (Cif) was a new initiative started by The Guardian newspaper in 
February 2006.  It is a website which brings together the opinion pieces from the printed 
version of the paper with a large number of pieces written by newly recruited bloggers.  
Readers are free anonymously to post comments onto any article on Cif, whether they 
were written by journalists employed by the paper or by bloggers who work without 
pay.
48
  Bloggers are free to submit pieces of writing to the website at any time and they 
will, in general, appear on the site some hours later. 
Cif is interesting in that it allows an unprecedented freedom of expression in a Guardian 
left/liberal space.  In the 1980s many of us grew up politically in an environment where 
there was a strict unwritten code about what may or may not be legitimately said in any 
left/liberal space.  In the summer of 2006 a wave of absolute freedom washed over 
political discourse in the UK.  Racist, sexist and homophobic comments attached 
themselves to every article on the website that was in any way relevant to these issues.  
With the anonymity of the medium came a splitting of text from author.  Pure text was 
laid down, line after line, attached to the work of Guardian journalists and Cif bloggers.  
Where it came from and what it represented were unanswerable questions.  Who was 
responsible for it?  What was the responsibility of The Guardian and the Cif editors?  
Were these commenters to be thought of as ‘authentic’ Guardian readers or were they 
‘trolls’ from outside, coming in mischievously to muddy the debate and to pollute the 
space? 
                                                 
47
  ‘12. The Assembly resolution recognized the role played by the appellant in opposing racism and 
antisemitism.  It could not sensibly be suggested that he is or ever has been anti-Semitic. He has not 
approved of some of the activities of the State of Israel and has made his views about that clear. But that 
has nothing to do with antisemitism.’  
http://www.adjudicationpanel.co.uk/documents/livingstone_v_the_adjudication_panel_2006.pdf 
48
  The bloggers are paid £75 for an article only if it is chosen to appear in the ‘Editors Picks’ section of the 
website or if it is commissioned by the editor. 
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The editors struggled to keep up with the commenters who were breaking their rules.  
The high volume of material on Cif means that it would be a huge task to monitor 
everything in advance.  The editors were reluctant to monitor everything in advance 
because this would have radically changed the ambitiously open character of the new 
project. 
But more interesting than those commenters who clearly break the boundaries of open 
sexism, racism and homophobia, are those who take care to remain within the formal 
boundaries and who thereby protect themselves with the principle of free speech.   Let me 
present just a couple of examples from the summer of 2006 of the kind of comments that 
were attaching to Jewish or ‘Zionist’ journalists and bloggers on Cif.  It should be 
remembered that there is nothing unique about these examples.  This kind of comment 
would inevitably attach itself to all such articles. 
Jonathan Freedland (2006) posted a piece on the arrest of Lord Levy in July 2006.  He 
argued that the scandal of loans-for-peerages went to the heart of New Labour’s 
relationships with corporate power and that Levy would not (and should not) be the fall-
guy or the scapegoat for this political problem.  Freedland referred to the danger of an 
antisemitic undercurrent lurking around this story: ‘In the routine descriptions of him as a 
“flamboyant north London businessman” many in Britain’s Jewish community have long 
detected old-fashioned prejudice.’  Traditional English antisemitism is gentle and 
unspoken. It operates through a nudge here and a wink there. So Freedland mentioned it, 
but it was not the central point of his piece.  I will look at just a few responses. 
The first is a commenter
49
 by the name of ‘Rodi’, who, at 0323 UK time, offers a Jewish 
conspiracy story.  He links Freedland, who is Jewish, with Levy, who is Jewish, by 
means of ‘Israel Lobby’ rhetoric. 
Is it really a ‘lazy scapegoating’? I do not think so. Let us not forget that Jonathan Freedland was a 
strong supporter of the war (and of Bus& Blair narratives for its justification) on Iraq until it began 
to go even worse. He has then tried to distance himself. So I myself will be a little suspicious of 
what he writes on a subject as this, Lord Levy’s dealings with Blair and the British government at 
such a critical time. I sense that there is another side of the story, which will hopefully emerge, 
                                                 
49
   Some of these comments were later deleted by the Cif editorial staff.  The text of the comments were 
recorded in Hirsh (2006i). 
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even partially. All the records of Lord Levy need a very careful study. The question: is there a 
strong ‘Israel lobby’ in Britain as well and Lord Levy, a prominent agent of it? The recently 
published excellent paper on the US Israel lobby by two American professors may provide an 
example: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html   
‘Rodi’ is wrong about Freedland being a supporter of the war and a supporter of Bush 
and Blair’s arguments for the war.  In fact Freedland was, from the beginning, an 
outspoken opponent of the war.  ‘Rodi’ uses the respectable language of the ‘Israel 
lobby’ rather than the discredited language of Jewish conspiracy.  S/he explicitly relies on 
Mearsheimer and Walt (2006a) for legitimation and authority.  ‘Rodi’ impatiently awaits 
the emergence of the evidence that will link Lord Levy and his financial dealings to 
Freedland, the ideological scribbler for the ‘lobby’. 
‘Ancientpistol’ pops up at 0435: ‘I’m with Rodi on this’.  ‘ForeverPalestine’ adds his or 
her analysis:  
Britains Jewish community, when they arent peddling open prejudice against Muslims or 
supporting zionist facism, are apt to see ‘long detected old-fashioned prejudice’ in any comment 
about someone who happens to be jewish which isnt ars* kissing of the highest order. 
‘MayorWatch’ then weighs in with a misreading of Freedland, saying  
Sorry Jonathan but it’s all a bit too easy to hurl claims of ‘old-fashioned prejudice’ just because a 
Nu Labour acolyte is in a spot of bother. 
But Freedland isn’t trying to ‘use’ a charge of antisemitism to protect Blair, he is trying 
to prevent a cloud of antisemitism from helping to rescue Blair.  Then more from 
‘ForeverPalestine’:  
...find an extreme anti-Muslim writer/commentator and they will invariably be either jewish or a 
strong supporter of Israel.’  
And up pops a new character by the name of ‘Enlight’, recommending that we read more 
about ‘Lord Schmooze’. Enlight has spotted another tentacle underpinning the British 
war effort: 
I would also like to see an investigation into the activities of another Jew, Lord Goldsmith and 
how he legalised the war on iraq thereby allowing our troops to die for Israel. 
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‘Ruthe’ also likes conspiracy theory, but a version not linked to Jews (yet).  Ruthe 
believes that the separation of powers between the Metropolitan Police and the 
Government is nothing but a charade: 
I think the dramatic arrest of Lord Levy was the ultimate manipulation to stop the Select 
Committee starting their investigation again. 
 But no, conspiracy theory always seems to link to ‘the Jews’ eventually. It only takes 
‘Ruthe’ another 12 minutes to come up with this:  
I can’t really understand how somebody who is Jewish could be a special envoy for the Middle 
East. How could he show partiality? 
‘Tox06’ re-presents another classic element of antisemitic rhetoric. Those Jews are so 
touchy, aren’t they?  
I really dislike the knee-jerk suggestion that all this is motivated by mere antisemitism.
50
 
Nobody suggested that ‘all this’ is motivated by antisemitism , certainly not Freedland.  
‘Beslam’ then decides that it is important that we know what Levy’s middle name is: 
‘Michael Abraham Levy’, not Lord Levy.  ‘Precon’ wants to make something else clear, 
that those at the heart of the Guinness insider dealing scandal in the 1980s,  
weren’t the scapegoats but the leading lights.... Most but not all were Jewish but if you look at 
Federal Court records for the 1980’s the majority of people caught & prosecuted for this type of 
Financial crime were Jewish.’  
Thirteen minutes later ‘Precon’ comes back with a quote from Tam Dalyell, a believer in 
the dangerous effects of Jewish advisors around Tony Blair (Brown and Hastings 2003).  
‘Downsman’ introduces another ‘corrupt’ rich New Labour Jewish Lord into the 
discussion, Lord Sainsbury (except, ironically, Lord Sainsbury is not Jewish):  
There is a separate conflict issue about his business affairs and his science portfolio, but this has 
nothing to do with his ethnicity. We need some clear thinking here otherwise the antisemitism 
label gets easily slapped over all discussions of any prominent person who happens to be jewish.’ 
                                                 
50
  Seymour (2006): ‘Apparently, the biggest criticism being leveled against the Jews is that you cannot 
criticize the Jews.  Or, more exactly, you cannot criticize Israel because in so doing, Jews think that you are 
criticizing them and, as we all know, you cannot criticize Jews.  Of course, not so heavily concealed in this 
argument is a wealth of antisemitic imagery and assumptions.’ 
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‘Enlight’ then brings to our attention two more murderers:  
What about the Jewish Albright when she said that the death of half a million Iraqi children was a 
price worth paying (sanctions on Iraq). As for the mass murderer Kissinger… 
‘Antiscensorship’: 
I suppose Jonathan Freedland is also Jewish… Spare me your pathetic attempts at sarcasm. its just 
a matter of public record that organized Jewry are extremely influential in banking, the law, media 
and in politics. This is not a matter for debate its a demonstrable fact. Your lame attempts at 
playing the anti semitism card will fail. Its always the way with Zionists. They attempt to play the 
anto semitism card like an old man who forgets he has told the same war story a thousand times 
already. 
What can be said about this collection of text?  This is a collection of edited highlights of 
comments from people with different ideas and making different points. Not all are 
antisemitic and not all are making the same points. I am interested in the shape of the 
swirling discussion as a whole, not in making a case against any particular commenter.  I 
am interested particularly in the character of a swirl which is created by the mixing of 
entrenched anti-Zionist commonsense with a little open antisemitism. 
One point is interesting in relation to the Levy story in particular.  This is perfect material 
for an allegation of ‘classic’ or ‘old’ (or ‘real’) antisemitism.  It is a story of somebody 
who in his public persona is thought of as a nouveau-riche and tasteless Jew, (with the 
title ‘Lord’!) who is accused of playing the middleman for the powerful, selling off 
peerages.  It is fascinating, then, that many of the commenters used the language and the 
images of the ‘new antisemitism’ – even though the story has nothing to do with 
criticisms of Israel or of Zionism.  Nowadays, even the gauche tasteless middleman Jew 
apparently caught with his hand in the till is denounced as a ‘Zionist’.  After a long and 
detailed police investigation, no charges were, in fact, brought against the entirely 
innocent Levy – or against anybody else. 
It seems reasonable to assume that most of these commenters think of themselves as 
being liberal or on the left, whatever that might mean to them.  The comments thread is a 
Guardian space, not a fascist BNP space or a jihadi Islamist space or a right-wing 
conservative Daily Telegraph space. 
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Nearly all of the antisemitic commenters misread Jonathan Freedland’s piece.  Jonathan 
Freedland has, as anyone who reads The Guardian knows, a long record of opposing the 
policies of Israeli governments towards the Palestinians as well as the policies of George 
Bush and Tony Blair regarding the war in Iraq.  It is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that some of the commenters got this wrong because they believed that Freedland was 
ethnically, rather than politically, neocon. 
Without knowledge of who these commenters are it is difficult to know what kind of 
strands of opinion this represents.  And so we are faced simply with text, which 
represents nothing but itself and which was to be found all over the most important and 
influential left/liberal webspace in the UK in 2006.
51
 
Much of the worrying material is material about whose legitimacy there is no consensus.  
Some observers will understand talk, for example, about ‘Zionist’ influence of 
Hollywood and the news agenda, about ‘Zionist’ responsibility for starting the Iraq war, 
about the relationship between ‘Zionism’ and Nazism, as being a legitimate side of a 
legitimate debate.  Others will argue that it is precisely these kinds of positions, which 
use respectable terminology but which propagate antisemitic notions, which are the most 
threatening to the health public discourse.  At any rate, these are the kinds of ideas which 
cannot be simply deleted by the editors because there is no broad agreement amongst 
Guardian readers as to their illegitimacy. 
When a Jew who does not identify as an anti-Zionist writes a piece on Comment is Free, 
on any topic, they tend to attract comments challenging them to denounce Israeli human 
rights abuses.  This mirrors the test that many leftist Jews have experienced in wider left 
and liberal circles. What’s your position on Israel?  Jews are not considered acceptable in 
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  There is scope for further qualitative and quantitative investigation of Comment Is Free, its blogs and its 
commenters.  It would be interesting to know whether the bigotry that appears against women and feminist 
writers was of equal intensity and volume to the bigotry against Jewish and ‘Zionist’ writers, and against 
Muslim writers and against Palestinian writers and supporters of Palestinian rights, and against gay and 
lesbian writers.   
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some sections of the left and the labour movement until they have answered this question 
to the satisfaction of the anti-Zionists.
52
   
When Nick Cohen (who is actually significantly less Jewish than his name) writes on any 
topic, his piece is littered by comments such as this:  
I’ve noticed you avoid commenting on international issues when the situation presents difficulties 
for your point of view. Well, Cohen, will you condemn Israel, or are you completely morally 
bankrupt? 
Here is a comment from Nick Cohen’s column on the week that I happen to be writing 
this passage, in which he defends Salman Rushdie.  ‘JusticeIsMine’ writes:   
‘Cohen just can’t help yourself can you?  The first chance to attack Muslims, you are there like a 
randy terrier trying to hump our leg.  This is all about ISRAEL isn’t it Nick?  I bet you can’t wait 
for the next terrorist event so you and your mates can start ranting and raving again.  Don’t worry 
I’m sure the CIA and Mossad will come up with lots for you to rail against over the next year, in 
time for the US election.’ (Cohen 2007)
53
 
When Norman Geras writes on cricket (2006) he is denounced for not having written 
about Israeli brutality.
54
  And whenever Maureen Lipman wrote anything in the summer 
of 2006, she was denounced as a racist.  When she wrote a piece about buying a white 
dress, someone responded, ‘Given her views I’m surprised she didn’t have a spare brown 
shirt to put on.’ (Lipman 2006)
55
  When she writes about dogs (Lipman 2006a)
56
, 
someone responds, ‘Maureen’s ‘conscience’ is concerned about dogs, but is perfectly 
clear when it comes to those of the ‘wrong’ race.’ When she writes about showbiz, 
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  The Natfhe conference of 2006 tried to apply this test to Israeli scholars as a condition of being accepted 
as part of the academic community.   
The international trade union website, LabourStart was denounced by Sue Blackwell as not being a genuine 
part of the labour movement because it contained ‘Zionists’.  Sue Blackwell (2005b): ‘I thought this was a 
bona-fide trade union website supporting workers’ struggles. However, it emerges that Eric Lee, who runs 
the site, is a supporter of the ‘Engage’ anti-boycott site. Until a few years ago he actually ran Labourstart 
from Israel and even had a link to the IDF homepage!’ 
53
  The Cif editorial staff have since removed this comment but have left references to it by other 
commenters (6 November 2007) 
54
  The Cif editorial staff have since removed a number of these comments. 
55
  The Cif editorial staff have since removed this comment. 
56
  The Cif editorial staff have since removed this comment. 
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someone comments ‘It’s amazing that all the chaos, suffering and violence in the Middle 
East seems to have gone unnoticed by Maureen.’ 
This abuse followed an accusation that was made against Lipman, that she made a racist 
comment.  She was having a discussion on a TV current affairs programme with Michael 
Portillo, Diane Abbott and Andrew Neil at the time of the beginning of the Israel-
Hezbollah war of the summer of 2006.  Portillo was talking about the fact that Hizbollah 
and Hamas are jihadi Islamist organizations of the same kind that were responsible for 
suicide bombing around the world.  Abbott then raised the question of proportionality, 
arguing that the Israeli response to the attack on its soldiers could be seen as being 
disproportional.  Maureen Lipman replied,  
What’s proportion got to do with it, though, Diane? It’s not about proportion, is it? I mean human 
life is not cheap to the Israelis, and human life on the other side is quite cheap... 
It appears from the context of the discussion that by ‘the other side’ Lipman meant 
Hizbollah, Hamas, and the other jihadi Islamist organizations.  CAABU, the Council for 
the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding complained to the BBC that this was a 
racist comment, because it understood Lipman to have meant that ‘Arabs, whether 
Palestinians or Lebanese, do not value human life as much as anyone else’.(CAABU 
2006) 
Lipman had gone on to clarify what she meant: ‘... and human life on the other side is 
quite cheap because they strap bombs to people and send them to blow themselves up’.  
She seems to have been arguing that Israelis value life more than those who ‘strap bombs 
to people and send them to blow themselves up’ - that is, the jihadi Islamist terrorist 
organizations.  It is they who send out suicide bombers, not Arabs, Palestinians, Lebanese 
or Muslims in general. 
Whether Lipman was right or wrong to claim that Israelis value human life more than 
jihadi Islamists is a question that might be discussed.  But it seems clear that while one 
may agree or disagree, it is a misreading to claim that it is a racist comment. 
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(ii) Antisemitic themes mirrored in anti-Zionist text 
In section i, I looked at the Ken Livingstone’s claim that he is accused of antisemitism 
only because he criticizes Israel, and I looked at what appears to be a proliferation and 
normalization of anti-Zionist and antisemitic bigotry on The Guardian website.  Both of 
these seem to represent a mainstreaming of the most demonizing anti-Zionist discourses 
combined with a denial that there was a problem; indeed more than a denial; a counter-
allegation against those who suggested that antisemitic ways of thinking were detectable 
coming from left and liberal sources.  Section ii presents more examples of Lerman’s 
‘intensified criticism’, more examples of the mainstreaming of absolute anti-Zionism and 
of antisemitism, and examples which mirror the themes and rhetoric of older anti-Jewish 
movements.  Two themes which re-occur in discourses that demonize Jews, over the 
centuries, and across the globe, are the blood libel and the charge of Jewish conspiracy.  
Section ii of Part II analyzes case studies of anti-Zionist text and discourse which mirror 
themes from (a) blood libel and (b) conspiracy theory.   
(a) Blood Libel 
Image 1 (see bibliography for a list of numbered images) shows a wholesome Jaffa 
orange, cut in half, out of which blood is dripping.  The Slogan reads: ‘Boycott Israeli 
Goods:  Don’t squeeze a Jaffa, crush the occupation’.  The combination of Jews, food and 
non-Jewish blood creates a graphic, emotive and powerful image.  If you eat the Jaffa 
oranges that the ‘Zionists’ are trying to sell you, you will metaphorically be drinking the 
blood of their victims. 
How does such an image get produced?  There are three possible kinds of explanations.  
The first is that the similarity with the old themes is purely coincidental.  If this is the 
case, such coincidences seem to happen often.  The second possible explanation for the 
‘blood orange’ image is that the designer of the poster is an antisemite who is consciously 
drawing on antisemitic tradition.  This is unlikely and is of course strenuously denied.  
Antiracist anti-Zionists who campaign for a boycott of Israel say quite clearly that they 
are not antisemites.  They do not appear to be conscious Jew-haters and they are not 
knowingly drawing on older antisemitic themes. 
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The third possible kind of explanation is that there is some sense in which antisemitic 
themes are deeply embedded in the culture, and elements present themselves 
unconsciously to people looking for emotive images which can drive us to act against 
Israel.  The mechanism of this cultural unconscious, how and why it works, how and why 
it is so often repeated, is one element of the relationship between hostility to Israel and 
antisemitism which requires further research and rigorous thinking-through.  But many 
anti-Zionists are not prepared to think it through.  Frequently the response to the 
observation that some of their imagery mirrors old antisemitic themes is disdainful denial 
followed by a counter-allegation of bad faith. 
Ariel Sharon was caricatured eating a baby in The Independent newspaper, 27 January 
2003 (Image 2).  Dave Brown, the cartoonist, won the ‘political cartoon of the year 
award’ for this image.  Perhaps this image of a corrupt, violent and bullying Jew eating 
an innocent child is only coincidentally analogous to classic blood libel imagery.  ‘Brown 
insisted he had never intended this meaning and that his cartoon was inspired by the 
Goya painting Saturn Devouring one of His Children.’ (Byrne 2003) 
Norman Finkelstein hosts an extensive gallery of cartoons on his website by the Brazilian 
artist ‘Latuff’.
57
  Latuff won second prize in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Tehran 
competition for cartoons which illustrate Holocaust denial.  This, incidentally, is a clear 
example of the ways in which elements of rhetoric circulate around the different anti-
Zionist movements.  Norman Finkelstein, who considers himself to be an antiracist and a 
scholar, hosts Latuff, who in turn is happy to compete in Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial 
art festival.  One image (Image 3) shows a swimming pool, the shape of the Gaza strip, 
filled with blood.  The image shows Uncle Sam luxuriating in the blood, Ehud Olmert 
covered in the blood and using an Israeli flag as a towel, and a UN waiter bringing a 
drink of blood to the two swimmers.  The world is pictured sitting in the sun, refusing to 
be concerned.  There are a number of other images by Latuff, hosted by Finkelstein, 
which mirror themes of the blood libel.  There is one which shows an innocent child who 
is either Lebanese, or who represents Lebanon itself, being doused in Israeli petrol 
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   http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=11&ar=176, downloaded 19 June 2007 
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(gasoline).  Another shows an Israeli soldier washing the blood off his hands using an 
American tap.  Another image shows Ariel Sharon with vampire fangs. 
Sue Blackwell (2005), while campaigning for the exclusion of academics who work in 
Israel from British campuses, wrote that the ‘sins of Bar-Ilan University and other Israeli 
universities are certainly as red as blood’.  On being challenged about this image, she 
responded (2005b) with a piece entitled ‘Bloody Ridiculous’, writing ‘OK chaps, I know 
you are desperate to pin the ‘anti-semitic’ label on me but just how low can you sink? 
Just carry on, you’re doing a good job of digging yourselves deeper’. 
The theme of Israel as a child-killing state is increasingly common.  Any incident of an 
under-age Palestinian being killed during the conflict is liable to be understood and 
presented as a manifestation of Israel’s essentially child-killing nature.  The slippage 
from particular incidents to a generalized commonsense notion is a common 
characteristic of much anti-Zionist discourse.  The particular truth is often essentialized 
as the necessary truth. 
Blood libel always goes hand in hand with antisemitic conspiracy theory.  If ‘the Jews’ 
kill children then certainly they conspire to hide the crime (Julius 2006).  If Israel is 
based on child-killing and genocide, then certainly there must be a Zionist conspiracy or 
an Israel Lobby which has the power to keep the fact out of the global media. 
The most explicit and complete version of antisemitic conspiracy theory is the ‘Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion’, a late 19
th
 century Russian forgery which purported to constitute a 
report of a meeting of the Jewish conspiracy in Prague.  Contemporary echoes of the old 
theme of Jewish conspiracy take the form of an argument that there is a Zionist lobby 
with such huge global influence and power that it is able to send the United States of 
America to war in its interests and to de-legitimise any narrative of Israel and Palestine 
which it does not like, as antisemitic.  The Protocols and more contemporary charges of 
Zionist influence come together in the Hamas Covenant (1988), the founding document 
of the party which won the January 2006 election in Palestine and which has made a 
successful coup against the Palestinian Presidency in Gaza.  The Hamas Covenant 
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explicitly plagiarizes from, and endorses, the original Protocols forgery and holds ‘the 
Jews’ responsible for all the revolutions, wars and imperialism of the modern era. 
Ilan Pappe (2006) argues that Israeli forces are committing genocide in Gaza.  The charge 
that Israel commits genocide, in Gaza or the West Bank, or in Lebanon, is a charge 
commonly made by anti-Zionists.  At first sight, such a characterization would appear to 
be entirely counter-productive, since while Israeli forces are regularly responsible for 
serious human rights abuses, they can easily show themselves to be not guilty of 
genocide.  When there is no genocide in Gaza why do anti-Zionists like Pappe continue 
to assert that there is?  These repeated allegations have the effect of demonizing Israel, of 
implanting and reinforcing the notion that Israel is a unique evil.  It simplifies: Israel is 
the ‘oppressor’, Palestine is the ‘oppressed’ and anything more complicated only serves 
to confuse this central issue. 
The genocide charge is a particular kind of demonization.  Genocide has a particular 
relevance to Israel, which was created three years after the end of the Holocaust.  The 
contemporary claim that there is a genocide in Gaza is related to the claim that Israel uses 
the Holocaust instrumentally to justify its violence.  The charge that Israel is like Nazi 
Germany functions to neutralize this alleged instrumentalization of the Holocaust.  In 
order to neutralize the Holocaust in this way, it is necessary to normalize it and to distort 
its reality.
58
  So anti-Zionists often push a number of myths: (a) what happens in Gaza 
today is, in some sense, the same as the Holocaust, which is the point of naming it 
‘genocide’; (b) ‘Zionists’ collaborated with the Holocaust and so were partly responsible 
for it;
59
  (c) ‘Zionism’ is ideologically akin to nazism.
60
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  For more on left versions of Holocaust denial, see Rich (2007) and Ezra (2007). 
59
   See Korneyev (1977) for the classic Soviet version:  ‘Together with the Nazis, the Zionists bear 
responsibility for the destruction of Jews in 1941-1945 in Europe. The blood of millions of victims is on 
their hands and on their conscience.’  Jim Allen’s 1980s ‘Trotskyist’ version has his hero in Perdition 
making the following claims:  ‘The simple terrible truth is that the Jews of Hungary were murdered not just 
by the force of German arms, but by the calculated treachery of their own Jewish leaders’ (p. 156); the 
Zionists worked ‘hand in glove’ with the Adol f Eichman (p103);  it was ‘the Zionist knife in the Nazi fist’ 
that had murdered the Jews (p. 156).  The first remained in the final published version and the second and 
third were cut.  They are taken from the version released by the Royal Court Theatre in 1987.  Allen said in 
an interview that Perdition was ‘…the most lethal attack on Zionism ever written, because it touches on the 
heart of the most abiding myth of modern history, the Holocaust. Because it says quite plainly that 
privileged Jewish leaders collaborated in the extermination of their own kind in order to bring about a 
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Pappe (2006) writes: ‘Nothing apart from pressure in the form of sanctions, boycott and 
divestment will stop the murdering of innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip.’  Perhaps his 
wish to advocate for this campaign is what has led him to make the over-blown claim of 
genocide; he does not use the term ‘genocide’ to describe events in 1948, which is his 
area of historical expertise.  Yet his proposed remedy today does not seem to fit the 
alleged disease.  If there was really genocide occurring in Gaza, surely a more urgent, 
powerful and desperate response would be appropriate than carrying on the long, slow 
campaign for sanctions, boycott and divestment.  Pappe finishes by exhorting the world 
‘not to allow the genocide of Gaza to continue’.  He precedes this exhortation with the 
words: ‘in the name of the holocaust memory’.  The irony is that so long as Pappe 
employs this kind of political rhetoric, then it is unlikely indeed that it should 
communicate successfully with the majority of Israelis and Jews.  But perhaps he is not 
writing for Israelis.  Perhaps he has given up on building a peace movement and he has 
given up on Israelis as potential agents for progressive change: ‘There is nothing we here 
in Israel can do against [the genocide in Gaza]’, writes Pappe.  Shortly after writing this 
piece, Pappe accepted a job at Exeter University in England. 
(b) Conspiracy Theory  
Conspiracy theory features in each of the four examples that we have looked at so far; the 
Livingstone formulation,
61
 which holds that critics of Israel are silenced by a conspiracy 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zionist state, Israel, a state which is itself racist.’  In 2007, the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign held 
a reading of Allen’s play and hosted Lenni Brenner, in order to use Holocaust Memorial Day to make their 
points about the connection between Zionism and Nazism. 
60
  Mazin Qumsiyeh  puts it like this on Mona Baker’s website, 
http://www.monabaker.com/conflictfacts2.htm, in ‘Ten Zionist Obfuscations’: ‘Zionism and Nazism were 
twins in their narrow nationalism and even collaborated against the public.  The Zionists thus found no 
reason not to collaborate with the Nazis in the mid-thirties to rid Europe of its Jews.’  For an extreme right-
wing version of the claim, see Chiappalone (1997): ‘Zionism and Nazism actually have a great deal in 
common. They are a desire for national identity, national socialism, ‘self-determination’, and ‘freedom’ 
from those who might be called ‘troublemakers’. In fact, they are both philosophies of imagined racial 
superiority and purity, which have rationalized all of their actions in the name of some greater ‘good’. And, 
they each conceal a deeper evil at their core.’ 
61
  Another example of the use of the Livingstone formulation: on the day that David Miliband was made 
Foreign Secretary, the BBC website ran a profile of him written by Paul Reynolds, World Affairs 
correspondent: ‘David Miliband’s Jewish background will be noted particularly in the Middle East. Israel 
will welcome this - but equally it allows him the freedom to criticize Israel, as he has done, without being 
accused of antisemitism.’  (Reynolds 2007)  The clear assumption here is that anyone who criticizes Israel 
should be afraid of being denounced as an antisemite and that that there is a hugely powerful ‘Zionist’ 
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to make mendacious accusations of antisemitism; Livingstone’s view that the Board of 
Deputies is capable of fixing a desired result from a public investigation; the routinization 
of conspiracy theory on Cif; conspiracy theory as the necessary twin of blood libel. 
In March 2006, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published a paper in two different 
forms.  ‘The Israel Lobby’ (2006a) was published in the London Review of Books and 
‘The Israel lobby and US foreign policy’ (2006b) was published as a Faculty Research 
Working Paper by Harvard University and the Kennedy School of Government.  I do not 
offer here a detailed critique of the text of the paper, a straightforward task which was 
carried out more or less satisfactorily within a few weeks of its publication (Morris 2006; 
Herf & Markovits 2006; Dershowitz 2006)
62
.  Rather I am interested in the way that the 
paper provided a language for the discussion of ‘Zionist’ conspiracy and in the way in 
which this language was enthusiastically, quickly and widely adopted by many who 
found it natural to think within this framework. 
Robert Fine (2006a) uses the concept of ‘slippage’ to examine the problem.  The paper 
itself starts with something real and it asks answerable questions.  What is the nature and 
influence of various lobbying and campaigning organisations which relate to Israel and 
Jews in the USA, such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), the ADL 
(Anti Defamation League), AJC (American Jewish Committee)?  How do these different 
organisations operate, what do they want, and what effect do they have?  But even within 
the Mearsheimer and Walt paper itself, the focus on particular and differing 
organisations, and concrete questions, begins to slip into a conception of ‘the lobby’ 
which is discussed as though it was a hugely powerful, coherent, covert and therefore 
conspiratorial political agent.  The particular claim made by Mearsheimer and Walt, 
which shows that they were discussing an extremely powerful and threatening world-
                                                                                                                                                 
‘lobby’ which is capable of intimidating a senior government minister into muting his legitimate criticism 
of Israel.  When challenged, reports a commenter on Engage, who had received a reply from Reynolds to 
his complaint to the BBC, Reynolds referred to a piece by Anthony Julius and Alan Dershowitz (2007) 
which argued that the academic boycott of Israel was antisemitic, as an example.  Reynolds thereby relies 
on the claim that ‘criticism’ is the same as a proposal to exclude Israeli academics from campuses, journals 
and conferences.   
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  More references are to be found on the Engage website, 
http://www.engageonline.org.uk/archives/index.php?id=17, collated by Jeff Weintraub. 
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straddling agent, is that the ‘Israel Lobby’ was held to be responsible for ensuring that the 
USA went to war against the Saddam regime in Iraq.  Robert Fine (2006a) writes:  
Their argument runs along the classic lines of conspiracy theory. There is the initial explanandum: 
the ‘unwavering’ material, diplomatic and military support the US grants to a foreign country, 
Israel. Two possible explanations for this policy are considered and rejected: one is the foreign 
country’s strategic value to the US; the other is compelling moral imperatives to support this 
country’s existence …. 
Disposal of these two explanations paves the way for the Only True Explanation which explains 
why the US has been willing to sacrifice its own security to the interests of another state. It is the 
Lobby. They characterize it as the de facto agent for a foreign government. They maintain it 
makes Israel virtually immune to criticism in Washington. They say it quashes debate in the public 
sphere through the power of its money, its control of the media, its policing of academia and not 
least its exploitation of the charge of antisemitism against anyone who criticizes Israel’s actions or 
the Lobby’s own influence. They argue that, thanks to the Lobby, the US has come into line with 
Israeli positions rather than Israel come into line with US interests. The lobby, we are told, took on 
the President of the United States and triumphed. Sharon wrapped Bush ‘round his little finger’. 
The demonic tail is wagging the gullible dog.  
Finally, this explanation is extended to explain all manner of other phenomena beyond the initial 
explanandum. The Lobby, we are told, was the critical factor behind the US decision to impose 
sanctions on Iran and Libya, to go war on Iraq and overthrow Saddam, and now to take on Israel’s 
other enemies such as Syria and Iran. While the US does the fighting, dying and paying, they 
write, Israel is the beneficiary.  The Lobby’s influence increases the danger of terrorism, fuels 
Islamic radicalism, raises the spectre of further wars in Syria and Iran, makes impossible any 
resolution of Palestinian suffering, undercuts US prestige abroad and its efforts to limit nuclear 
proliferation, and erodes democracy within the US. All for Israel. What is needed is ‘candid 
discussion of the Lobby’s influence’, a return to reality and the advancement once more of US 
interests.  
Slippage from criticism of American foreign policy to wild eyed conspiracy theory punctuates this 
whole narrative. 
 
At a public event organised by the London Review of Books in New York, John 
Mearsheimer said: ‘The Israel lobby was one of the principal driving forces behind the 
Iraq War, and in its absence we probably would not have had a war.’ (Stoll 2006)  The 
accusation that a Jewish conspiracy pushes the world into unnecessary wars in the 
interest of the Jews is an old staple of antisemitic conspiracy theory.  For example Claire 
Hirshfield (1980) tells how some who opposed the Boer war blamed it on a Jewish 
diamond lobby manipulating the British empire:  
If it could be demonstrated that the … government had been tricked into war by the machinations 
of shady Jewish capitalists and that the public had been intentionally misled by omnipotent Jewish 
presslords, then sufficient pressure might indeed be generated to end what its opponents 
considered an immoral war. That the pursuit of this worthy aim involved an appeal to a base and 
discreditable prejudice seems to have little troubled the various socialists, radicals and labourites 
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who utilized the shorthand of ‘Jewish finance’ as a convenient means of epitomizing the dark 
underside of British imperialism.’  
 
Charles Lindbergh (1941) blamed un-patriotic Jewish power for trying to draw the USA 
into World War II against its own interests: 
I am not attacking either the Jewish or the British people. Both races, I admire. But I am saying 
that the leaders of both … for reasons which are as understandable from their viewpoint as they 
are inadvisable from ours, for reasons which are not American, wish to involve us in the war. 
 
Interestingly Lindbergh also makes use of an early variant of the Livingstone formulation 
in the same speech:   
The terms ‘fifth columnist,’ ‘traitor,’ ‘Nazi,’ ‘anti-Semitic’ were thrown ceaselessly at any one 
who dared to suggest that it was not to the best interests of the United States to enter the war. 
 
Conspiracy theories have been circulating on the internet ever since 11 September 2001, 
trying to blame 9/11 on ‘Zionists’, claiming that the Jews in the World Trade Centre were 
warned not to go to show up that day, claiming that Israeli agents had been seen 
celebrating in New Jersey as the twin towers collapsed.  The Hamas Covenant (1988) 
explicitly blames Jews for every war and upheaval since the French and Russian 
revolutions.  In a notorious speech to the Reichstag, Adolf Hitler held the Jews 
responsible for the for the First World War: 
 In case the Jewish financiers... succeed once more in hurling the peoples into a world war, the 
result will be... the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.
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Other Claims which were made within the Mearsheimer and Walt paper which slipped 
into more explicit and less nuanced ones in a more political forum.  Mearsheimer claimed 
that terrorist ‘animus’ against America was the result of US policy towards Israel, which 
itself is a result of the machinations of the ‘lobby’.  He added, employing his version of 
the Livingstone formulation, that this ‘simply can’t be discussed in the mainstream 
media.’ (Stoll 2006) 
The tendency for this kind of slippage to occur accelerated outside of the hands of the 
authors themselves, and manifested itself in the uses people made of the paper.  Anybody 
who wanted to talk about Jewish or Zionist power now had a Harvard and Kennedy 
School stamp of respectability with which they could inoculate their own ideas against 
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 Adolf Hitler’s announcement to the Reichstag in 1939 http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/g/goebbels-
joseph/goebbels-1948-excerpts-02.html 
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the spurious and disingenuous charges of antisemitism which would be sure to follow.  
The idea of disproportionate and dangerous Jewish power, and particularly its covert 
application in steering states towards war, was not new; but Mearsheimer and Walt 
offered a legitimate vocabulary with which to make these kinds of claims.  And the offer 
was taken up enthusiastically by many people in the summer of the Israel-Hizbollah war 
which followed the publication of the ‘Lobby’ paper. 
Philip Roth was one of the first to sense the paranoid zeitgeist that was on its way, under 
the surface of public discourse, in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  ‘The Plot 
against America’ (2005) was his counter-factual story of what might have happened in 
America during the early 1940s if Charles Lindbergh, an antisemite and campaigner to 
keep the USA out of the war, had been elected President.  It is a picture of a seemingly 
entirely normal world under the surface of which lies the menacing narrative of 
antisemitic conspiracy theory which holds Jews responsible for trying to drag America 
into World War Two.  The central characters in the novel feel the menace, while many 
others regard them as paranoid, backward-looking, tied to outdated notions of Jewish 
identity, and unpatriotic.   
Conspiracy theory in Britain existed Before Mearsheimer and Walt.  For example, in 
May 2003, respected Labour MP Tam Dalyell accused the Prime Minister Tony Blair of 
‘being unduly influenced by a cabal of Jewish advisers’ (Brown & Hastings 2003).
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Paul Foot (2003), well known journalist and leading member of the Socialist Workers 
Party leapt to Dalyell’s defence: ‘obviously he is wrong to complain about Jewish 
pressure on Blair and Bush when he means Zionist pressure’.  Foot knew how to interpret 
an antisemitic statement as an anti-Zionist one.  But after Mearsheimer and Walt came 
along, everybody knew how to do it and the specific terminology of the ‘Lobby’ became 
ubiquitous in anti-Zionist discourse. 
The theoretical journal of the supposedly antiracist Socialist Workers Party, Socialist 
Review, now writes things like this, about the 2007 UCU decision to back the boycott 
campaign: 
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  Dalyell had then employed the Livingstone formulation: ‘The trouble is that anyone who dares criticize 
the Zionist operation is immediately labelled anti-Semitic…’ (Marsden 2003) 
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A very powerful pro-Israel lobby has gone to work to denounce these decisions with the support 
of the pro-war “left”.  Meanwhile arch Zionist and Harvard lawyer Alan Dershowitz has 
threatened to “devastate and bankrupt” any organisation which commits to a boycott of Israel.  
These figures want to block discussion of Israel’s actions. We must defend the right of trade 
unions to democratically pass resolutions and hold political debates without being subjected to 
such threats. (Harman 2007) 
A whole number of elements of conspiracy theory are here packed into one seemingly 
innocent paragraph.  Firstly the use of the term ‘pro-Israel lobby’ as a single unvariegated 
and therefore dishonest conspiracy; secondly its designation as ‘very powerful’; thirdly 
the lobby’s association with the ‘pro-war’ (pseudo) ‘“left”’, an allegation of the further 
dishonesty of pretending to be “left”, while not really being left,  and an association of 
the ‘pro-Israel lobby’ with support for war; Alan Dershowitz, a name universally 
recognized by decent people to connote pure evil or ‘arch’ Zionism; Dershowitz’s threat 
to ‘devastate and bankrupt’ resonates with the menace and power of ‘the lobby’; ‘these 
figures’, Dershowitz the arch-Zionist, the Harvard lawyer, the pro-war pseudo left, the 
pro-Israel lobby, the sum of all that is bad in the struggle against imperialism, want to 
block discussion of Israel’s actions – a remarkable allegation, given that it is the 
boycotters who insist on discussing not ‘Israel’s actions’ but instead the plan to exclude 
Israelis from British public life; next there is a substitution of the right to have debates for 
the right to support the exclusion of Israelis; then the right for trade unions to be free 
from criticism; then ‘such threats’, referring to one rather idle threat made by Alan 
Dershowitz is constructed as being something from which we must defend ourselves 
against the powerful, dishonest, pro-war, pseudo left, lobby.  Even after the elements 
which go to make up a paragraph like this are explained in detail, some people will look 
blankly and say, ‘it all seems perfectly innocent to me’.   
Richard Ingrams (2007), a columnist in The Independent newspaper, reviewed the book 
version of the Mearsheimer and Walt thesis when it was published in Britain in 
September 2007.  Ingrams could not resist the temptation to make explicit that in his 
reading of the Lobby thesis, it was covert Jewish influence and not only ‘pro-Israel’ 
lobbying which was decisive in sending the only superpower to war, not in its own 
interest, but in the interests of a foreign power: 
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[Mearsheimer and Walt] demonstrate that the American invasion … not only had the support of 
Israel but also that the overriding aim of those (mostly Jewish) neocons who were urging Bush to 
invade was to assist Israel…   
Whereas Mearsheimer and Walt have repeatedly denied that their thesis has anything to 
do with Jews, arguing that many Jews do not support ‘the lobby’ and that many 
constituents of ‘the lobby’ are not Jewish, Ingrams interprets their book for a wider 
public in precisely the way that opponents of antisemitism had feared and predicted that it 
would be read and understood.  In 2003 Ingrams (2003) wrote in The Observer 
newspaper that he had developed a practice when ‘confronted by letters to the editor in 
support of the Israeli government to look at the signature to see if the writer has a Jewish 
name.’  If so, he says, he tends not to read it.  Ingrams, then, had a pre-existing opinion 
that British Jews had nothing of interest to say about Israel since their views would be 
explicable only by reference to their ethnicity and not to their experience, knowledge or 
judgment; the ad hominem argument par excellence.  Inevitably, Richard Ingrams (2005) 
also makes use of the Livingstone formulation: ‘The board [of deputies of British Jews] 
…thinks nothing of branding journalists as racists and anti-semites if they write 
disrespectfully of Mr Sharon….’  Some may find that blaming Jews for the war in Iraq 
and finding it appropriate to leave letters to the editor written by people with Jewish 
sounding names unread, are not precisely the same kinds of things as writing 
disrespectfully of Ariel Sharon.  It is routine now that any accusation of antisemitism is 
responded to by demanding freedom of speech for criticism of Israel.  Ingrams’ writing 
exemplifies the process of slippage to which the Mearsheimer and Walt thesis lends 
itself.  It again raises uncomfortable questions about the notion of political responsibility 
with which Mearsheimer and Walt operate.  We should also note that it has become 
common and apparently normal for mainstream liberal ‘antiracist’ newspapers like The 
Independent, The Observer and The Guardian to give space to people like Richard 
Ingrams to opine on ‘The Jewish Question’. 
Another outrider for Mearsheimer and Walt is Anatol Lieven.  The flagship morning 
radio news show of the BBC, The Today Programme, carried a report by its Washington 
correspondent, Justin Webb which gave publicity to the Mearsheimer and Walt book on 
10 October 2007.  Webb said: 
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Anatol Lieven of King’s College, London, who worked recently in Washington was accused of 
antisemitism for doing little more, he says, than suggesting that America should put pressure on 
Israel to close the settlements. 
[Lieven’s voice:] ‘This accusation of antisemitism has no basis in evidence or rationality. It’s not 
the kind of accusation which in any other circumstances would even be allowed to be printed. It is 
simply being used as a way of trying to terrify, to frighten, critics of Israel and of American 
support for Israel into silence.”  (Hirsh 2007a) 
Webb accepts Lieven’s account of what has happened but he slips in the scare-phrases. 
‘Little more ... than’, what, exactly, more? ‘He says’, but is it true?  Did Webb check? Or 
did Webb simply accept the claim? ‘Suggesting’? Did he really respectfully ‘suggest’?  
But Webb doesn’t know because he evidently did not check.  
There may be people in the US who would make an accusation of antisemitism against 
somebody simply for arguing for the dismantling the settlements.  But here the apparent 
behaviour of one supporter of the settlements is held to illustrate the behaviour of the 
whole ‘lobby’.  So Lieven claims: ‘This accusation of antisemitism has no basis in 
evidence or rationality.’  He is not referring to this particular accusation but is now 
talking generally about the ‘accusation of antisemitism’.  The discourse has slipped from 
a particular but undefined and uncorroborated incident to a general claim.  Leiven now 
claims: ‘It’s not the kind of accusation which in any other circumstances would even be 
allowed to be printed.’  Moving into the passive, he doesn’t specify who would normally 
disallow a charge of racism.  But it is understood that he thinks that it is the ‘lobby’ 
which is in a position to legislate an exception to this rule: ‘It is simply being used as a 
way of trying to terrify, to frighten, critics of Israel and of American support for Israel 
into silence.’  So now we learn that such an accusation is not made in good faith; it is not 
a mistake.  We learn now that such an accusation is part of a common plan and a secret 
plan.  The verb trying could not signify anything other than a concerted planned attempt 
to do something. To ‘frighten’. To frighten ‘critics of Israel’ into silence. 
Later in the same report we hear the following [beginning with the voice of Ralph 
Nader]: 
‘The Israeli puppeteer travels to Washington, the Israeli puppeteer meets with the puppet in the 
White House and then moves down Pennsylvania Avenue and meets with the puppets in Congress 
and then takes back billions of taxpayer dollars.’ 
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[Back to the voice of Justin Webb:]  Ralph Nader is a consumer rights advocate who has run for 
the Presidency and makes the case against the Israel lobby with great gusto and in a manner that 
many Jewish Americans find deeply offensive. Mearsheimer and Walt also make the case that the 
Israel lobby is overly powerful but again, John Mearsheimer’s language is careful and his point 
nuanced:  
 
[The voice of John Mearsheimer:]  ‘We’re not making the argument that this is a cabal or 
conspiracy. The American political system, as you know, has interest groups at its heart and 
interest group politics is what life is like in the American political system. And the Israel lobby is 
just like the National Rifle Association, the farm lobby, the American Association of Retired 
People and other lobbies. Small numbers of people who are deeply committed to a particular 
policy and are smart and energetic can influence policies in ways that are out of synch with what 
most people in the United States want.’ 
Nader articulates conspiracy theory using the traditional antisemitic vocabulary of the 
‘puppeteer’.  Webb describes this as making the ‘case against the Israel lobby’ with 
‘great gusto’.  Webb tells us that Nader does it in a manner that many ‘Jewish Americans 
find deeply offensive’ but he does not explain why.  He does not tell us whether the 
listeners, ordinary people who aren’t Jewish or American, should be offended.  He 
doesn’t tell us why this might be offensive.  The politics of racism are reduced to the 
politics of trying not to give offence. Webb is operating with a notion that only Jews 
should be, or are, concerned about Nader’s conspiracy theory.  And then Webb goes on to 
say that Mearsheimer makes the same case as Nader - but that his ‘language is careful 
and his point nuanced’.  Webb has, perhaps, stumbled onto the exact truth here, but he 
seems not to understand the importance of the word ‘also’ in the sentence, ‘Mearsheimer 
and Walt also make the case that the Israel lobby is overly powerful but again, John 
Mearsheimer’s language is careful and his point nuanced....’  The case is the same, it is 
heard as the same and it is used as authority for the same, but it is done more carefully 
and in a nuanced way.  So we have a claim that Mearsheimer articulates careful and a 
nuanced version of the “Jew as puppet” narrative.  And because it is ‘careful’ and 
‘nuanced’ then it is given airspace on BBC Radio 4.  
 
Stephen Rose’s use of ‘The Lobby’ rhetoric 
When Steven Rose, a leading proponent of the campaign for an academic boycott of 
Israel, appeared on Radio 4’s Today programme (Hirsh 2006f) to comment on the report 
of the parliamentary inquiry into antisemitism (2006), he relied heavily on the concept of 
the ‘lobby’.  Rose admitted that there had been a rise in antisemitism but he argued that 
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this was primarily the result of the criminal actions of Israel in Palestine.  The interviewer 
responded: 
Interviewer But that is Israel, that is the country, the government of Israel, it’s not Jewish people.  
 
Rose That is precisely the point but the problem is always that the Israel Lobby insists that 
Judaism and Zionism, Judaism and support of Israel, are identical and while they go on insisting 
that, and while they go on attacking those of us who actually oppose the policies of Israel as being 
antisemitic or being, in my case, a self-hating Jew, then they actually build this rod for their own 
backs... (Hirsh 2006f) 
Rose introduces the term ‘Israel Lobby’ and he claims that it is responsible for this false 
identity between Judaism and ‘Zionism’ (Rose translates ‘Zionism’ as ‘support for 
Israel’).  Here, Rose is broadening out the claim that antisemitism is the fault of Israel, 
into a claim that it is the fault of a global ‘Israel lobby’.  Immediately he conflates the 
multiplicity of campaigns and individuals who oppose his anti-Zionism and his boycotts 
into one shadowy and undefined term.  The ‘lobby’, argues Rose, insists on this identity 
between ‘Zionism’ and Jews and it attacks those who ‘oppose the policies of Israel’ as 
being antisemitic or self-haters.  So another shift: now it is not Rose’s demonization and 
his boycotts that the ‘lobby’ wants to suppress with its trumped up charge of 
antisemitism, but it is actually criticism of Israeli policies. 
Rose himself conflates ‘Israel lobby’ with ‘Jews’ by arguing that ‘they’ build a rod for 
thier own backs. The ‘Lobby’ builds the rod but it is Jews in general (‘their own backs’) 
that get hit by it.  So the ‘lobby’ has already become, in the way that Rose uses the term, 
a code-word for of Jews in general.  Rose does not think it important to discuss who is 
doing the hitting with this rod that ‘the lobby’ has built for ‘their own backs’.               He 
is not interested in the responsibility of antisemites for antisemitism, or in the 
responsibility of Jews and antiracists to oppose and confront the antisemites.  Rose goes 
on: 
We’ve received death threats for actually daring to discuss the idea of a boycott of a racist 
university system within Israel itself. And so in fact the rise in antisemitism is precisely because 
this equation of being Israeli and being Jewish. We don’t say that but the Israelis do. 
Rose is clearly implying here that it is ‘the Israel Lobby’ that sends out death threats to 
him and his colleagues. And he is right. Because his understanding of the term ‘lobby’ 
includes everyone from AIPAC, the ADL, the AJC, Campus Watch, Melanie Phillips, to 
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the UJS, the Board of Deputies, the All-party Parliamentary Committee, to Engage, 
Workers’ Liberty, Jonathan Freedland, David Aaronovitch, Meretz USA - to loony late 
night green-ink letter-writers who send death threats. All those who stand against Rose’s 
characterization of Israel as apartheid and illegitimate speak, in his imagination, with one 
voice, say one thing, adopt one tactic, have one politics.  In other words, the ‘lobby’, in 
the way that Rose uses the term, is a global Jewish conspiracy.  Nearly all newspapers, 
TV stations, websites, publishing houses, Hollywood itself, oppose his focus on Israel as 
a uniquely racist centre of global imperialism. And Rose can not just be wrong; the fact 
that most people disagree with him needs to be explained; and it is explained with 
reference to the existence of a vast conspiracy.  
Robert Fisk, the United States of Israel, and ‘the lobby’ 
The Independent newspaper on 27 April 2006 carried a four-page piece by Robert Fisk 
(2006) headlined ‘United States of Israel?’  It was illustrated by a full-page, full-colour 
image of the Stars and Stripes with Stars of David replacing the usual stars (Image 4).  
The piece profiles Stephen Walt as a hero who bravely stood up to the ‘Lobby’ and its 
malicious and dishonest accusations of antisemitism. 
The image used by The Independent of the Jewish Stars and Stripes says that Jews 
control America; these are Jewish symbols, not Israeli symbols.  The premise is that Jews 
are not patriotic Americans; Jews care more for their own narrow community than the 
wider national or human community.  The same device of merging Jewish stars with the 
American flag has long used by neo-Nazis, conspiracy theorists and Jihadi Islamists.
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The Fisk article offers no evidence to back up the strong version of the thesis, the one that 
is illustrated by the flag, and there is little evidence to back up a weaker or more 
sophisticated version, that the ‘Zionists’ tricked or coerced the US to spill the blood of its 
citizens in a war that was against its own interests.   There is some overblown rhetoric 
about AIPAC, ‘the agent of a foreign government [that] has a stranglehold on Congress - 
                                                 
65
  Examples of antisemitic versions of the ‘Stars of David & Stripes’ can be found here: 
http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=653 (downloaded 25 July 2007). 
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so much so that US policy towards Israel is not debated there’.
66
  Fisk tells us that ‘the 
lobby’ monitors and condemns academics who are critical of Israel.  Fisk repeats 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s version of the Livingstone formulation (quoted from 
Mearsheimer & Walt 2006b), that ‘[a]nyone who criticizes Israel’s actions or argues that 
pro-Israel groups have significant influence over US Middle East policy ... stands a good 
chance of being labelled an anti-semite’. 
Fisk does not give an example of anyone claiming that Mearsheimer and Walt are 
antisemites or are motivated by antisemitism.  He quotes Alan Dershowitz as saying that 
‘the two scholars recycled accusations that “would be seized on by bigots to promote 
their antisemitic agendas”’.  Fisk claims that Noam Chomsky is prevented by ‘the Lobby’ 
from having a column in an American newspaper.  He asserts that ‘the Lobby’ prevented 
a repeated showing of a film that Fisk had made for Channel 4.  He writes that an ‘Israel 
support group’ (unnamed, although apparently part of ‘the lobby’) insulted Fisk.  He says 
that ‘the lobby’ prevented the showing of ‘I am Rachel Corrie’ in New York.  ‘The 
lobby’ is presented as an un-opposable unstoppable force. It tells Presidents and members 
of Congress what to do and what to say.  Its tentacles reach into theatres, TV stations and 
newspapers.  Americans would like to resist but are forced to act against their own 
interest by the ‘lobby’.  In the 1950s the conspiracy theorists insisted that ‘the 
Communists’ controlled America; now ‘the Lobby’ has replaced ‘the communists’ as the 
hidden puppet master.  Seymour (2007) argues that it is not a coincidence that there is a 
marked decline in UFO sightings which coincides with a marked increase in more 
‘realistic’ conspiracy theories. 
Fisk claims that the US changed its policy towards Israel after 1967 ‘in response to 
lobbying by the American-Jewish community’.  He does not consider the alternative 
possible explanation that Americans were concerned that Israel might be militarily 
defeated, and that this might not be a good thing.  Neither does he consider an 
explanation in terms of US interest in the context of the Cold War.  Events, politics, 
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War:  ‘As I have said, these war agitators comprise only a small minority of our people; but they control a 
tremendous influence. Against the determination of the American people to stay out of war, they have 
marshaled the power of their propaganda, their money, their patronage.’  (Lindbergh 1941) 
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campaigns and disagreements are presented in the world-view of the conspiracy theorist 
as being controlled by the vice-like grip of ‘the Jews’ (in some versions, the ‘Zionists’ or 
the ‘Lobby’). 
Tony Judt: Jewish conspiracy and reasons for believing in it 
On 12 October 2007 there was a conference at Chicago University on ‘academic 
freedom’ and in defence of Norman Finkelstein.  The assumption of the conference was 
that academic freedom in general and Finkelstein in particular have come under 
illegitimate and powerful attack by the Israel Lobby.  Tony Judt (2007) spoke the 
following words:
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If you stand up here and say, as I am saying and someone else will probably say as well, that there 
is an Israel lobby, that there is… there are a set of Jewish organizations, who do work, both in 
front of the scenes and behind the scenes, to prevent certain kinds of conversations, certain kinds 
of criticism and so on, you are coming very close to saying that there is a de facto conspiracy or if 
you like plot or collaboration to prevent public policy moving in a certain way or to push it in a 
certain way – and that sounds an awful lot like, you know, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and 
the conspiratorial theory of the Zionist Occupational Government and so on – well if it sounds like 
it it’s unfortunate, but that’s just how it is.  We cannot calibrate the truths that we’re willing to 
speak, if we think they’re true, according to the idiocies of people who happen to agree with us for 
their reasons. 
It may well be true – I know this because I have received an email from him – that David Duke 
thinks he has found allies in John Mearsheimer or Stephen Walt or myself.  But I remind you what 
Arthur Koestler said in Carnegie Hall in 1948 when he was asked, ‘Why do you criticize Stalin – 
don’t you know that there are people in this country, Nixon and what were not yet called 
McCarthyites, who also are anti-Communist and who will use your anti-Communism to their 
advantage?’   And Koestler’s response was the response that I think we should keep in mind when 
we are faced with the charge that we are giving hostages to crazy antisemites or whatever, and that 
is you can’t help other people agreeing with you for their reasons – you can’t help it if idiots once 
every 24 hours with their stopped political clock are on the same time as you.  You have to say 
what you know to be true and be willing to defend it on your grounds and then accept the fact that 
people in bad faith will accuse you of having defended it or aligned yourself with the others on 
their grounds – that’s what freedom of speech means -  it’s very uncomfortable.  It puts you in bed 
sometimes with the wrong people. 
Judt’s response to the charge that he, and Mearsheimer and Walt, provide a respectable 
vocabulary for the articulation of antisemitic conspiracy theory, is a surprisingly candid 
and flat denial of political responsibility and an explicit refusal to ‘calibrate’ claims in 
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  These words were transcribed from a sound file of his speech which was posted online (Judt 2007) 
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such a way as to make them unhelpful to antisemites.  There are a number of elements to 
this defence which are worthy of discussion.   
First, Judt admits that he comes ‘very close to saying that there is a de facto conspiracy or 
… plot or collaboration’ and that ‘that sounds an awful lot like… the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion and the conspiratorial theory of the Zionist Occupational Government 
(‘ZOG’) and so on’.  He seems to imply that it is not just he who thinks this, but the 
others too, who are on the platform, including perhaps Tariq Ali, Noam Chomsky (by 
video), John Mearsheimer and Norman Finkelstien.  He then says that antisemites 
‘happen to agree with us’ (but for the wrong reasons) – they agree fundamentally on the 
claim that there is (something very close to) ‘a de facto conspiracy or … plot or 
collaboration ‘that sounds an awful lot like the Protocols’ or the ZOG.  He admits that the 
antisemitic conspiracy theorists say fundamentally the same as he and his collaborators 
(but for different reasons) a third time, when he says: ‘you can’t help it if idiots once 
every 24 hours with their stopped political clock are on the same time as you.’ 
Second, Judt makes an analogy with Koestler’s criticisms of Stalin in 1948.  Koestler 
thinks that the gulag exists and he thinks that one has a responsibility to say so, even if 
this appears to vindicate anti-Communists who also think that the gulag exists and who 
say so loudly.  So Judt thinks that a de facto Jewish conspiracy exists, and that he has a 
responsibility to say so even if antisemites, who also think that a Jewish conspiracy 
exists, are thereby apparently vindicated.  The difference, however, is obvious.  The 
gulag existed.  A Jewish conspiracy, of the kind which has sufficient covert muscle to 
send the only super-power to war against its own interest, and to expel critics of Israel 
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from the American academy, does not exist.  Indeed the McCarthyites were also 
conspiracy theorists who believed that America was falling under the spell of a Moscow 
plot which encompassed every liberal schoolteacher and every ‘red’ Hollywood actor.  
Koestler did not believe in the conspiracy, nor did he believe ‘anything very close’ nor a 
‘de facto conspiracy’ nor a ‘plot’ nor a ‘collaboration’.  Koestler was not like Judt.  In 
fact Judt’s anti-Zionism (although not the rest of his worldview) comes from the political 
tradition of those who did remain silent about the gulag on the grounds that to speak up 
would play into the hands of the imperialists.  It is a political tradition which currently 
remains overwhelmingly silent about the crimes of any political movement or state which 
embraces anti-Zionist or anti-imperialist rhetoric.  The left anti-Stalinists, Trotsky, 
Draper, Arendt, Koestler, Orwell, and the others, spoke out against the left commonsense 
of their day - that one should not criticize Stalin.  Judt fails to speak out against the left 
commonsense of his day - which holds Israel, and the Jews who ‘support it’, to be both 
uniquely evil and uniquely powerful. 
Third, Judt argues that the crucial factor distinguishing him from the antisemitic idiots is 
the reasoning behind the analysis.  The analysis is fundamentally the same, but he 
believes in the existence of (‘something that sounds an awful lot like’) a ‘de facto 
conspiracy’ because it exists, whereas David Duke believes in it because he is an 
antisemite.  Duke’s antisemitism has, on this one occasion, just by chance, led him to a 
true conclusion concerning the global threat of Jewish power and its responsibility for 
war.  Judt’s problem seems to be that he is unable – or unwilling - to show how what he 
believes is different from what the idiot antisemites believe.  He is only able – or willing 
– to show that he has better reasons for believing it.  While Duke (2004) believes that a 
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global conspiracy based on the theory of ‘Jewish supremacism’ is responsible for all 
wars, Judt believes only that it is responsible for this war and that the antisemitic 
conspiracy theorists were wrong about the other wars. 
Fourth, Judt says: ‘You have to say what you know to be true and be willing to defend it 
on your grounds and then accept the fact that people in bad faith will accuse you of 
having defended it or aligned yourself with the others on their grounds… It puts you in 
bed sometimes with the wrong people’.  Judt accuses his accusers of acting in bad faith – 
he relies on an ad hominem argument.  In this way he puts motivation at the centre of his 
defence.  He is a good guy, he is on the left and he is motivated by the search for truth 
and justice (for the Palestinians).  David Duke, who happens on this occasion to have 
stumbled onto the truth about the Israel lobby and its responsibility for war, has done so 
out of a malignant motivation.  Those who ask why Judt and Duke have been discovered 
together in the bed of (de facto) Jewish conspiracy theory, claims Judt, do so in bad faith.  
The bad faith is that of the Israel lobby mendaciously playing the antisemitic card in 
order to de-legitimize Judt’s unmasking of the lobby by portraying it as similar to Duke’s 
unmasking of the lobby. 
My argument about the potential danger of Judt’s conspiracy theory is not an ad hominem 
argument.  It does not rely on an accusation of bad faith nor of malicious motivation.  It 
does not accuse Judt of being secretly or unconsciously motivated by antisemitism.  But 
it does point to the suggestion that Judt is insufficiently concerned about saying the same 
thing, using the same language and drawing on the same images as generations of 
antisemitic conspiracy theorists.  Judt’s response is ‘it’s unfortunate, but that’s just how it 
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is’.  But it is not a coincidence which puts Judt in David Duke’s political bed.  He is there 
because Duke is saying the same as Judt and Judt refuses to ‘calibrate’ his claims such 
they become useless to Duke.  If we are ‘telling a truth’ which puts us in bed with David 
Duke then perhaps it is reasonable to conclude that we are telling it wrong - or at least in 
an incomplete way.  Judt does not find himself in this predicament because he is, like 
Duke, motivated by antisemitism.  Judt is not motivated by antisemitism.  But perhaps 
motivation is not the key here.  The key is what Judt says and what he does; not what 
motivates him.  The danger of licensing antisemitic claims and world-views, of acting as 
midwife to an antisemitic movement, is not neutralized by the fact that Judt is an 
antiracist and a respected intellectual.  Indeed the fact that Judt is widely thus recognized 
exacerbates the danger. 
(iii) The diminishing caution over the expression of antisemitism 
We have seen case studies which illustrate the tendency to deny any particular 
manifestation of antisemitism which is related to hostility to Israel, and we have seen 
case studies which show how the imagery and the rhetoric of contemporary antiracist 
anti-Zionism tends to mirror older antisemitic imagery and rhetoric.  We now move 
beyond denial and beyond the replication of antisemitic tropes to more explicit 
articulations of antisemitic claims, but which are still made using the language of anti-
Zionism. 
Jenny Tonge and control of the Western World 
The Liberal Democrats are the centre party in UK politics, generally understood to be 
politically to the left of the Conservatives and to the right of Labour.  Notwithstanding 
the complexities of such a characterization, they are a mainstream party in British 
political life and could not be understood as either an extreme left wing or an extreme 
right wing party.  Jenny Tonge was fired as a Liberal Democrat spokesperson in January 
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2004 after having said that if she had been a Palestinian, she would have considered 
becoming a suicide bomber.
68
 
There are two senses in which these remarks are interesting.  Firstly they demonstrate an 
ignorance of conditions in Palestine and of Palestinian politics and of Palestinian 
paramilitary capability.  Palestinians respond to the world in which they live in a whole 
number of different ways; some respond politically, as nationalists, as socialists, as 
Islamists; some try to look after their communities, as doctors, as teachers, as leaders; 
some struggle to look after themselves and their families; some are involved in peace 
organizations and in groups which aim to bridge the divide; some argue for a boycott of 
Israel; some engage in forms of armed resistance.  It is not empirically true that 
Palestinians have no choice other than to blow themselves up near Israelis.  The 
overwhelming majority of Palestinians find other ways to live and other ways to respond.   
Yet Tonge’s premise is that ‘if she were Palestinian’ then she would think differently 
from the way that she does, being British.  It is difficult to escape the conclusion that at 
the bottom of such a sentiment is an ‘orientalist’ (Said 1978) othering of Palestinians.  I 
am British, so I am a Member of Parliament, I think, I act politically, I speak.  But if I 
were Palestinian then I would not think and reflect and act politically or ethically, but 
rather I would be driven by rage to the only course open to me, which would be suicide 
bombing.  I would be forced to extinguish my life in a drama of anger and despair 
because no other form of expression would be open to me, if I was a Palestinian.  But the 
truth is that most Palestinians do not act as though reading from the script of a twentieth 
century orientalist movie; they do not act the part of the irrational emotional anger-driven 
Arab, who has no choice and who cannot think beyond their fury.  Tonge misrepresents, 
de-politicizes and essentializes Palestine. 
                                                 
68
  This is a sentiment that has been expressed by a number of other high profile people, for example Cherie 
Blair (News.BBC.co.uk 2002), who said: ‘As long as young people feel they have no hope but to blow 
themselves up, we’re never going to make progress, are we?’  And Ken Livingstone, who said: 
‘Palestinians don’t have jet fighters, they only have their bodies to use as weapons. In that unfair balance, 
that’s what people use’ (Lappin 2006). 
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Having been sacked from her job by the Liberal Democrat leadership, and then ‘elevated’ 
to the House of Lords, by the nomination of the same leadership, Tonge said the 
following on 20 September 2006: 
The pro-Israeli lobby has got its grips on the Western World; its financial grips.  I think they’ve 
probably got a certain grip on our party.
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It seems unlikely that Tonge’s use of Mearsheimer & Walt’s (2006a & 2006b) 
terminology is accidental.  In Tonge’s hands the term ‘lobby’ slips and slides off all the 
way back to antisemitic conspiracy theory.  She is not describing a social phenomenon, a 
powerful lobbying organization, a well-funded political campaign, because the word 
‘grips’ is incompatible with any of these possible interpretations.  Something that has in 
its grips, the western world no less, has gone beyond anything that the international 
relations professors could conceivably have been describing.  How does the ‘lobby’ grip 
the western world? Tonge is explicit: financially. 
One kind of slippage to which the ‘lobby’ rhetoric lends itself is in implying that different 
campaigns with different aims and different politics are all, really, one.  For Tonge, the 
term ‘pro-Israel lobby’ conflates all of the different campaigns into a strong enough 
centralized leadership to get a ‘grip’ on, not only political parties, but the whole of the 
‘western world’.  She is talking about a conspiracy with sufficient power to dominate on 
a global scale.  Financial power.  Another old antisemitic theme is the connection of Jews 
to money and finance.  Tonge’s language is not appropriate to describe a situation where 
‘pro-Israel’ campaigns have won support; it is only appropriate to describe a situation 
where there is a huge financial conspiracy to corrupt and to lie. 
Jenny Tonge may be unaware of what the language that she uses means and the 
secondary meanings that it connotes.  She is not a naïve newcomer to these debates.  And 
she did not backtrack or apologize when the problem was pointed out to her.  Instead she 
defiantly responded with her own version of the Livingstone formulation: ‘I am sick of 
being accused of antisemitism when what I am doing is criticizing Israel and the state of 
Israel.’ (www.InMinds.co.uk 2007) 
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  This part of her speech was broadcast on Radio 4’s Today programme the morning after the remarks 
were made, and transcribed by Hirsh (2006e)   
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Chris Davies: Jews, oppressors, Auschwitz and apartheid 
The meeting at which Tonge made her ‘Lobby’ comments was organized by Chris 
Davies, who had been the leader of the Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament 
until some months earlier, when he had also been forced to resign.  On returning home 
from a trip to Gaza, Davies expressed his anger and his horror at conditions there on his 
website and in the press.  One comment he made was: 
I visited Auschwitz last year and it is very difficult to understand why those whose history is one 
of such terrible oppression appear not to care that they have themselves become oppressors.
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This was a classic example of the ‘Jews should know better’ argument.  The Jews ‘appear 
not to care that they have themselves become oppressors’.  He could only mean ‘the 
Jews’.  He is talking about ‘those whose history is of such terrible oppression’, who came 
to his mind when he visited Auschwitz.  Jews used to be oppressed; now they are 
oppressors, and they don’t even care (apparently). 
This generalization, that the Jews have become oppressors, goes to the heart of that 
current of contemporary antisemitism which is connected to anger with Israel. Davies 
shifts focus from acts which he understands as oppressive to those people who he holds 
responsible for them and he calls them ‘oppressors’. And then he adds that they 
(apparently) don’t care. As though Jews spoke with one voice (or cared with a single 
conscience). 
The overwhelming majority of the Jews who were at Auschwitz (where Davies visited as 
a tourist, or perhaps as a VIP) left that place through the chimney.  Many of them, one 
may assume, did not have time to sit down and ponder the lessons that they were 
supposed, by this Member of the European Parliament, to have been learning there.  
What were the lessons being taught to at Auschwitz?  What should ‘the Jews’ have learnt 
from the Shoah experience?  It would seem that the lesson learned by many Jews from 
Auschwitz is ‘next time, have more tanks and fighter planes’; ‘Have more powerful 
friends’ perhaps, too.  Many Jews learnt the central lesson that the twentieth century 
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  These words did appear on Chris Davies’ website but do not appear there now (June 07).  They are cited 
in Hirsh (2006g) 
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seemed to go to such lengths to teach so many people: ‘If you don’t have a nation state of 
your own, then you have no rights’.  It is hardly a surprise or a sign of a moral deficiency 
if this lesson was taken on board.  The corollary to this lesson is that ‘if you don’t look 
after ‘your own’ then nobody else will look after you’.  Many Israelis seem to be more 
attached to these lessons than to the ‘Jews should know better than to oppress others’ 
lesson that we might think they ought to have learnt. 
It was, of course not just ‘the Jews’ who learnt this lesson in the twentieth century but 
many others too.  The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires taught people across 
central and Eastern Europe, as well as across the Middle East, the same lesson.  And so 
the fall of these two Empires in 1918 was followed by upsurges of ethnic nationalism and 
bloody struggles to carve out nation states in Czech and Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria Turkey and throughout the region.  Following the Second World War, 
the big European Empires faced nationalist opposition throughout Africa and Asia, and 
were pushed out by people who also had learnt the lesson of the twentieth century, ‘If 
you don’t have a nation state of your own, then you have no rights’.  Following the 
break-up of the Soviet Empire in 1989, many more people learnt the lesson that history 
had taught them. And so in Croatia, Serbia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech and 
Slovakia, there were struggles for ‘national’ independence, often trampling on the rights 
of minorities who were held not to be part of the nation that was to be self-determined 
(Arendt 1975; Fine 2001). 
Before Hitler came to power many Jews rejected this narrow politics of nationhood, 
‘national liberation’ and ‘self-determination’.  Most Jews chose, either through political 
commitment or through inertia, not to go to Palestine to build a Jewish state.  Zionism 
was an eccentric, utopian, minority project amongst Jews.  It was only during the 1930s 
and 1940s, when the Nazi plan to sweep Europe clean of Jews came together that 
nationalist politics really began to take hold amongst Jews.  The European labour 
movement and the European left had been defeated and the Jews who had put their faith 
in it were killed or were running for their lives.  Jews from the great cosmopolitan cities 
of the Middle East were later pushed out of their homes by Arab nationalist regimes 
which had also been busy learning the ‘gotta have a state’ lesson.  A million Russian 
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Jews came in the 1990s after enduring decades of Soviet antisemitism, which had come 
packaged in the language of hostility to Zionist imperialism. 
And of course many Palestinians have learnt the lesson of the twentieth century too: no 
state, no rights. Without a state of their own, they have been treated appallingly both by 
Israel and by a number of Arab states.None of this is to support the politics of 
nationalism. But analysis begins with the world as it is and this is a world structured by 
the fact that human rights, in the absence of a nation state to guarantee them, have often, 
under pressure, turned out to be worthless promises.  So the cosmopolitan task, in 
Israel/Palestine and also further afield, is to find a politics that creates a different truth for 
the 21st century.   (Hirsh 2003; Fine 2007) 
Jews straggling out of Europe in the late 1940s can hardly be blamed if most of them 
didn’t set changing the world in a cosmopolitan direction as their immediate goal.  Most 
of them wanted to feel safe and many believed that the only way they could feel safe was 
in a state of their own.  But Chris Davies divides the world into ‘oppressed’ peoples and 
‘oppressor’ peoples.  ‘The oppressed’ are the Jews who arrived in Israel after being 
pushed out of Europe, the Middle East and more recently the Soviet Union.  ‘The 
oppressors’ are those Jews a few years or decades later, along with their children and 
grandchildren. 
In truth Chris Davies’ confusion as to whether Jews are ‘oppressed’ or ‘oppressors’ is far 
from new.  Jews have often been treated by parts of the left as either one or the other, 
good or bad, on ‘our side’ or on ‘their side’.  Jews have been much more comfortably 
understood by some only as victims or as global threat.  Much analysis on the topic of 
Israel and Palestine deals with entirely abstract notions: evil ‘Zionism’ that stands for 
global imperialism and good Palestinian revolutionaries who represent the vanguard of 
the global intifada.  For many commentators, Israel and Palestine, as well as Iraq, are not 
important or interesting in themselves but are only interesting inasmuch as they represent 
the good and evil of the global struggle.  Darfur does not have this emblematic status, 
neither does Congo; hence the millions of deaths there are not big issues on the European 
and American left. 
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Jews do not all think the same thing. Some Jews learnt different political lessons from the 
Holocaust to other Jews.  It was neither evil nor stupid to think, after the Holocaust, that 
Jews would have been in less trouble if they had a state and an army.  It is the Israeli 
government that is responsible for Israeli policy, not ‘the Jews’ who used to be 
‘oppressed’ and are now ‘oppressors’.   
Davies did resign as the leader of the Liberal Democrat group in the European 
Parliament. He was not sacked because he criticized Israel or because the ‘Jewish lobby’ 
forced him out.  A constituent criticized him for comparing current Israeli policy to the 
Holocaust.  He replied with a one-line e-mail: ‘Sounds like racism to me. I hope you 
enjoying wallowing in your own filth.’ 
She responded that this was a disgraceful way to reply to a constituent’s e-mail. Rather 
than apologize, he wrote back to her denouncing Israeli policy and the ‘Jewish lobby’.  
When he was asked to comment by a local Jewish newspaper, he said that at the time he 
had received a number of abusive emails.  He then offered to enter into a dialogue with 
his constituent on the condition that she first detail her own disagreements with Israeli 
policy. 
 Was this an example of the pro-Israel lobby forcing the resignation of a critic of 
Israeli human rights abuses by employing a dishonest charge of antisemitism?  Let us 
analyze carefully how ‘the lobby’ achieved this.  Firstly, Jewish News reported Chris 
Davies’ comments which he had already put on his own website.  Then a number of 
people sent abusive emails to Davies.  Then the Jewish News reader sent him an email 
criticizing him for comparing Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank with the 
Holocaust.  In the meantime, I myself had written a piece on The Guardian website (Cif) 
criticizing Davies’ use of the clichéd Jews-should-know-better argument (a re-working of 
which appears above).  Jewish News went to the leadership of the Liberal Democrats for 
a comment, and Menzies Campbell, then the leader of the party, fired Chris Davies (by 
mutual agreement). 
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One free weekly newspaper; a number of angry people sending abusive e-mails; at least 
one more considered e-mail writer and a sociology lecturer with access to The 
Guardian’s website.  This constellation of mighty influence was predictably presented as 
a manifestation of the power of the global ‘lobby’ which smoothly moved into action to 
have this critic of Israel punished. 
Chris Davies was not forced to resign because he criticized Israel but he did say a number 
of things that one could argue made him an unsuitable person to hold the post of Liberal 
Democrat leader in the European Parliament.  None of these things include criticizing 
Israeli policy which is an entirely reasonable thing to do. 
Firstly he made use of two analogies which are routinely used not to shed light on the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, but to demonize Israel and to foster a commonsense popular 
loathing of Israel.  The Israel/Palestine conflict is a nasty and long-running dispute over 
(on a global scale) a small amount of territory, in which neither party is entirely right or 
wrong.  The Israeli occupation of the West Bank relies on organized daily violence, 
repression and humiliation of Palestinians.  But the occupation is not the result of an 
Israeli wish to dominate or of a particularly Israeli cruelty.  It is the result of a long and 
violent dispute between Jews and Arabs, and Israelis and Palestinians in which those who 
have argued for peace and reconciliation on both sides have usually been defeated 
politically.  Many Palestinian responses to the occupation (and to the presence of Jews in 
Israel) have been murderous and self-defeating.  But the idea that Israel is a Nazi state is 
absurd and offensive. There is not, and there never has been, a genocide of Palestinians; 
there are no Israeli gas-chambers, concentration camps or Einsatzgruppen; the numbers 
of deaths on both sides throughout the conflict are analogous to the number of murders 
that the Nazi regime routinely committed every few minutes.
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  When it is pointed out to anti-Zionists who use the Zionism-Nazi analogy that the analogy is not 
appropriate, they often respond with something like the following :  “The Gazans, you tell us, are not facing 
genocide. Indeed. We must really give Israel high marks for not killing all of them? They are facing 
starvation, in plain and simple English - food, medicines, electricity and fuel are being stopped at the 
border, not to mention students who cannot leave to study. So all that is not important, as long as there is no 
genocide? I cannot believe that you are comfortable with this…. Are you really comfortable with Israel’s 
continued barbarities? If so, please tell us.”  This was written a well known boycott supporter on the 
internal UCU activists list under the heading ‘Not yet enough hell in Gaza’.  As well as giving readers a 
 98 
The use of the apartheid analogy is designed to isolate Israel as South Africa previously 
had been, as an illegitimate state.  The analogy is not designed to shed light but to act as a 
short-cut to the boycott conclusion.  The analogy could be used, honestly, to illuminate 
some aspects of the occupation, but when used politically it often functions as a method 
of demonizing rather than of explaining.  Many other analogies are more appropriate, for 
example analogies with nationalist movements in the Balkans or in other fragments of the 
old empires.  There is a serious situation in the West Bank, where Jewish settlers, backed 
by Israel, do live in a legally privileged relationship with Palestinians which does have 
some resemblance to apartheid.  They do enjoy privileged legal rights, democratic rights, 
rights of movement, rights to resources, rights to water.  But it is because the situation is 
not the same as the former South Africa that most Israelis think that the Jewish settlers 
ought to go home to Israel; a peace between Israel and Palestine will not be forged in a 
unitary state (like the new South Africa). It is much more likely to be a two state solution 
precisely because this is a struggle between two national communities, not a struggle 
against an apartheid system of racism.
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So Davies made use of two demonizing analogies. He also claimed that Jews had now 
become ‘oppressors’ and that they don’t seem to care. This claim, that the Jews are 
oppressors, is particularly inflammatory in the context of the North West of England, 
which he represents in the European Parliament, where the BNP (the neo-Nazi British 
National Party) is trying to organize the ‘white’ vote and the Islamists are trying to 
organize the ‘Muslim’ vote.  To characterize Jews as oppressors in this context is not 
trivial.  And then Davies insulted his constituent who criticized him by denouncing her as 
a racist (because he assumed she was a ‘Zionist’) and writing ‘I hope you enjoying 
wallowing in your own filth.’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
small taste of the quality of the boycott debate within the union, it is also an example of a standard anti-
Zionist form of argument.  It concedes that the Nazi analogy is inappropriate but then insists that the one 
can infer that the one who said it was inappropriate therefore thinks that there is no problem in Gaza.  
Either Gaza is like the Warsaw Ghetto or it is like North London – there can be no middle position.  Anti-
Zionism often sets up spurious binary oppositions and insists that we choose one or the other.  Notice that 
in this case, it also presents a false picture of events (there is no starvation in Gaza), and, particularly since 
it is repeated again and again and with authority, many people accept that picture of events as true. 
72
  See Strawson (2006) for an excellent legal analysis of the Zionism-apartheid analogy. 
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He denounced what he called the ‘Jewish lobby’ which, he claimed, has too much 
influence.  He later said that he stood by this comment, but admitted that he did not 
understand the distinction between the claim that there is a ‘Jewish lobby’ and the claim 
that there is a ‘pro-Israel’ lobby.  The Mearsheimer and Walt paper had only been 
published for a few months at this time, and Davies had not yet learned the terminology 
he ought to have used to express his conspiracy theory while protecting himself from a 
charge of antisemitism. 
Chris Davies is not an anti-Semite in the sense that it is unlikely that he was motivated by 
Jew-hatred, but he was guilty of negligence.  Davies went out of his way to intervene in 
the Israel/Palestine conflict and he took an extremist position which he fiercely defended. 
But he did not educate himself with any seriousness about the conflict and he did not 
educate himself about the nature of contemporary antisemitism.  When he was publicly 
challenged over the potentially antisemitic discourse that he seemed to be buying into 
through ignorance, instead of stopping to think about it, he angrily refused to consider the 
possibility.  It is unlikely that he is similarly careless, thoughtless or ignorant when it 
comes to anti-black racism or anti-Muslim racism. Liberals and politicians on the left do 
not make the same kind of mistakes when emailing their black or Asian constituents. 
There is not necessarily a choice to be made about whether to oppose Islamophobia or 
anti-Jewish racism; it is possible and democratic to oppose both.  If we fail to stand 
against both then we become partisans for the extreme end of one nationalism, or 
fundamentalism, or the other.   
How antisemitism can become acceptable amongst antiracists 
The two Liberal Democrat politicians, Tonge and Davies, seem to have stumbled into 
antisemitism without understanding what they were doing and without understanding the 
significance of what they were doing or saying.  True, they refused to take the possibility 
of antisemitism seriously, even after the problems were pointed out to them, but they are 
not people who think of themselves as antisemites. 
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Gilad Atzmon does not think of himself as an antisemite either, but he is much more self-
conscious and knowing when he plays with antisemitic formulations, ideas and rhetoric.  
The Socialist Workers Party and the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign are not put 
off by Atzmon’s use of antisemitic language and they continue proudly to host him at 
their events.  He is a former Israeli paratrooper, a well-known jazz saxophonist, a 
campaigner for Palestine and someone who is comfortable employing openly anti-Jewish 
rhetoric.  For example: ‘I would suggest that perhaps we should face it once and for all: 
the Jews were responsible for the killing of Jesus who, by the way, was himself a 
Palestinian Jew.’ (Atzmon 2003).  For example: 
American Jewry makes any debate on whether the ‘Protocols of the elder of Zion’ are an authentic 
document or rather a forgery irrelevant. American Jews (in fact Zionists) do control the world.’ 
(Atzmon 2003) 
For example: 
 To regard Hitler as the ultimate evil is nothing but surrendering to the Zio-centric discourse. To 
regard Hitler as the wickedest man and the Third Reich as the embodiment of evilness is to let 
Israel off the hook.  To compare Olmert to Hitler is to provide Israel and Olmert with a 
metaphorical moral shield.  It maintains Hitler at the lead and allows Olmert to stay in the tail….   
Israel has already established a unique interpretation of the notion of wickedness that has managed 
to surpass any other evil.  It is about time we internalise the fact that Israel and Zionism are the 
ultimate Evil with no comparison. … Now is the time to stand up and say it, unlike the Nazis who 
had respect for other national movements including Zionism, Israel has zero respect for anyone 
including its next door neighbours. The Israeli behaviour should be realised as the ultimate vulgar 
biblical barbarism on the verge of cannibalism. Israel is nothing but evilness for the sake of 
evilness. It is wickedness with no comparison.  (Atzmon 2006a)  
In November 2006, Atzmon spoke and played music at an event in Edinburgh organized 
by the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign entitled Zionist Control.  His argument 
(Atzmon 2006b) at that event was that the clean distinction which anti-Zionists make 
between ‘Zionists’ and Jews, anti-Zionism and antisemitism is largely fictional.  He 
argued that Israel is a ‘fascist state’ supported by ‘the vast majority of Jewish people 
around the world’.  Anti-Zionist Jews in the Palestine solidarity movement, therefore, 
play a Jewish role there, as gatekeepers who try to control the Palestinian narrative: 
As soon as anyone identifies the symptoms of Zionism with some fundamental or essential Jewish 
precepts a smear campaign is launched against that person. (Atzmon 2006b) 
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Atzmon fights for explicitly anti-Jewish politics within the Palestine solidarity movement 
and in order to win, it is necessary first for him to defeat the anti-Zionist Jews and their 
antiracist allies: 
I would use this opportunity and appeal to our friends amongst the Jewish socialists and other 
Jewish solidarity groups. I would ask them to clear the stage willingly, and to re-join as ordinary 
human beings. The Palestinian Solidarity movement is craving for a change. It needs open gates 
rather than gatekeepers.  It yearns for an open and dynamic discourse.  The Palestinians on the 
ground have realised it already. They democratically elected an alternative vision of their future.
73
 
(Atzmon 2006b) 
Atzmon’s central problem with the Jewish anti-Zionists is that they, even though they 
themselves treat Israel as though it was demonic, also oppose openly antisemitic 
expression in the Palestine solidarity movement.  He particularly opposes those who do 
this ‘as Jews’.  Atzmon is trying to lead an antisemitic purge of the anti-Zionist 
movement and one that will ditch the formal anti-racism onto which many anti-Zionists 
still cling.  In spite of opposition to Atzmon, in which anti-Zionist Jews are active,
74
 the 
Socialist Workers Party, as well as parts of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign,
75
 continue 
to treat Atzmon as an antiracist and as a legitimate member of the Palestine solidarity 
movement. 
The week after the Edinburgh event, Atzmon spoke at a Respect Party event, advertised 
in Socialist Worker, entitled ‘Jazz Racism and Resistance’.  Socialist Worker (2006), the 
following week, brought us the news that Gilad Atzmon was to feature in ‘one of the 
biggest cultural events Socialist Worker has put on for many a year.’ The report went on: 
                                                 
73
  Presumably the ‘democratically elected ... alternative vision’ that he refers to is the racist antisemitism of 
Jihadi Islam as set out in the Hamas Covenant (1988) 
74
  The Jewish Socialist Group (2006) wrote an open letter in which it attempted to warn the Scottish 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign and the Socialist Workers Party what Atzmon was trying to do. Despite this, 
both of these organisations gave him a platform. 
75
  At least one local PSC group, the Bucks. and Berks branch, sent out Atzmon’s Edinburgh speech to its 
membership, in its mailing of 27 November, with the following introduction:’Gilad Atzmon argues that the 
Palestine solidarity movement should focus soley [sic] on the Palestinian cause and urges Jewish 
sympathizers to support the Palestinians for what they are rather than expecting them to fit into a Jewish 
worldview.’  Bucks and Berks PSC, here, is adopting Atzmon’s antisemitic language, for example ‘Jewish 
worldview’, relating to ‘Jewish sympathisers’ within the Palestine Solidarity Campaign. 
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‘Gilad declared, “I will be playing at the Cultures of Resistance concert because I support 
the Socialist Worker appeal.”’ 
Atzmon’s writing regularly appears in Counterpunch (EG 2003a; 2006a) which thinks of 
itself as an antiracist journal.  There are links to his writing on the PSC Gymru-Wales 
website,
76
 The Jerusalemites
77
 website, Middle East Online,
78
 Dissident Voice
79
, and 
many more ‘respectable’ Palestine solidarity publications. 
Some Jewish and antiracist anti-Zionists have flirted with Holocaust denial by defending 
the appropriateness of comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany.  Some have 
routinely minimized antisemitism, often finding excuses for the rhetoric of Jewish 
conspiracy, Jewish domination of the media, Jewish power.  Some have found excuses 
for movements that wish to wipe Israel off the map.  Some have gone along with the 
‘truism’ that people who talk about antisemitism do so dishonestly because they are part 
of a conspiracy to hide the crimes of ‘Zionism’.  Some have routinely fought for the 
commonsense notion that Israel is a uniquely serious human rights abuser.  Atzmon 
shows how a charismatic leader could begin to harvest the antisemitic potential of these 
kinds of anti-Zionist staples into a concrete movement.  There must be a possibility that 
antisemites may push the antiracist anti-Zionist leadership out of the way and may take 
over the anti-Zionist movement.  The antiracist anti-Zionists are ripe for take-over if they 
do not understand their own part in the creation of this new current and if they don’t 
know how to respond politically.  They are being victimized by antisemites and they do 
not know how to defend themselves effectively.  Atzmon wrote the following to an anti-
Zionist Jewish blogger who has for years been churning out pieces that demonize Israel 
as a uniquely racist state: 
                                                 
76
  Palestine Solidarity Campaign Gymru-Wales, 
http://psccymru.org.uk/index.php?option=com_weblinks&catid=23&Itemid=49, downloaded 28 February 
2007 
77
  Jerusalemites, http://www.jerusalemites.org/articles/english/2006/November/23.htm, downloaded 28 
February 2007 
78
  Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=17604, downloaded 28 February 
2007 
79
  Dissident Voice, http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Feb06/Atzmon07.htm, downloaded 28 February 2007 
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You are now presented ‘as being a manifestation of Jewish exclusivity or supremacy on a par with 
the State of Israel’ on every left and pro Palestinian site around the world ... may I suggest that it is 
never too late, you can still join humanity. Chicken soup is not a political argument. 
Atzmon is not satisfied with demonizing Israel.  He demands also that anti-Zionist Jews 
cease to define themselves as Jews and only then may be accepted into the human 
community and the Palestine solidarity movement.
80
   And Atzmon’s antisemitism is 
found acceptable by people who think of themselves as antiracists.  Indeed, Atzmon was 
given space on the ‘antiracist’ Guardian’s website to denounce me as an ‘ultra-Zionist’, 
as a dishonest academic, as a ‘Zionist ideologist’, as someone who ‘needs antisemitism’.  
‘Antisemitism (rather than anti-Israel political reaction) exists solely in the Zionist’s 
mind’, he assures us (Atzmon 2006c). 
In November 2007 Atzmon was quoted as follows in The Morning Star, a newspaper 
which thinks of itself as anti-racist: 
I know deep inside me that the Hebraic identity is the most radical version of the idea of Jewish 
supremacy, which is a curse for Palestine, a curse for Jews and a curse for the world. It is a major 
destructive force….  For an Israeli to humanise himself, he must de-zionise himself. In this way, 
self-hating can become a very productive power. It's the same sense of self-hating I find, too, in 
Jews who have given the most to humanity, like Christ, Spinoza or Marx. They bravely confronted 
their beast and, in doing so, they made sense to many millions.  (Searle 2007) 
 
                                                 
80
 Atzmon is not a unique figure.  He has a coterie of supporters, for example on the ‘Peace Palestine’ blog, 
http://www.peacepalestine.blogspot.com/.  Also there are others in the Palestine solidarity movement who 
are increasingly comfortable with openly antisemitic rhetoric, such as Paul Eisen and Israel Shamir. 
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Part III  Concept and discourse become concrete  
exclusion: Boycott 
 
In parts I and II, I have been analyzing concepts and discourse.  Part III turns to the 
actualization of concept and discourse as a concrete exclusion.  There is a campaign to 
exclude Israelis, and only Israelis, from universities, sports stadia, theatres, concert halls 
–  from the cultural and economic life of the world. 
 
i A chronology of the campaign for a boycott of Israel 
In Medieval times, Christians were not allowed to enter a Jewish synagogue; they were not 
allowed to celebrate a holiday with Jews; they were not allowed to go as guests to Jewish banquets 
and anyone thus ‘defiled by their impieties’ was in turn to be shunned by Christians (to quote from 
a canonical collection). It would be wrong to have ‘fellowship with God’s enemies’. Medieval 
England was especially active in excluding or ‘boycotting’ Jews. For example, at the 1222 
Canterbury Council, Archbishop Langton threatened with excommunication any Christians who 
had any familiar dealings with Jews or even sold them provisions. In his first pastoral circular 
following election as Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste enjoined his archdeacons, ‘as far as 
you are able, study to prevent the dwelling of Christians with Jews’.  (Julius and Dershowitz 2007) 
Boycotts against Jews and exclusions of Jews are not new.  In 1904 there was a boycott 
of Jewish businesses in the city of Limerick in Ireland organized by the Catholic priest, 
the Rev. Father Creagh.  Currently supporters of the campaign to boycott Israel are in the 
habit of marshalling the rhetoric of free speech.  They portray those who are reluctant to 
discuss whether or not Israel is a unique evil, whether or not to exclude Israelis from our 
campuses, whether or not ‘Zionists’ control US foreign policy, as people who threaten 
free debate.
81
  The Limerick Leader expressed similar sentiment regarding the campaign 
to boycott the Jews in 1904, in a piece entitled ‘Hear all sides’: 
                                                 
81
 For example Jacqueline Rose (2007), in a letter to The Guardian also signed by eight others: ‘The recent 
decision of the University and College Union congress was to organise a debate on whether an academic 
boycott of Israeli academic institutions would be an appropriate response to the occupation of Gaza and the 
West Bank. It was not a decision to inaugurate such a boycott. We are perplexed at the suggestion that there 
is something improper or undesirable about such a debate.  The opponents of the boycott debate argue that 
a boycott is inimical to academic freedom, yet they are engaged in a campaign of vilification and 
intimidation in order to prevent a discussion of this issue. While defending academic freedom, therefore, 
they seem only too willing to make an assault on the freedom of speech. The UCU congress and its 
members have a right, and arguably a duty, to confront the ethical and political challenge represented by 
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In another column of our issue this evening we insert Mr. Davitt’s letter to the Freeman’s Journal 
on the subject of the Rev. Father Creagh’s recent remarks on the Jewish community in Limerick. 
In giving the letter publicity we are not to be taken as adopting his views, our desire being merely 
to show all sides fair play.  
The Leader is certainly not antisemitic, and it warns its readership that their opponents 
are in the habit of exaggerating any sniff of antisemitism in order to increase the 
campaign of vilification against the boycotters; 
It has come to our knowledge that the Jews for the past few days have been subjected to ill-
treatment and assault while passing through our public thoroughfares. We regret that such has 
been the case. We are living in critical times when every advantage is taken by unscrupulous 
opponents to misinterpret our acts and the cause of our religion. In such a crisis it is not wise to 
give a handle to vilification. If the people do not want the Jews, then leave them severely alone. 
Above all things have no recourse to violence. Such a policy only shows weakness, if not foolish 
vindictiveness, and will never succeed in accomplishing that which is, or may be desired. (Both 
quotations from The Limerick Leader, Monday evening, January 18 1904, quoted in Keogh and 
McCarthy 2005) 
Father Creagh was also quite ‘prepared to admit that there are many [Jews] who are 
irreproachable’.  His boycott was only aimed at those Jews who ‘grind and oppress those 
who are unfortunate enough to get into their power’ (Reverend Father Creagh, 8 February 
1904, Northern Whig, Belfast, quoted in Keogh and McCarthy 2005).  In these short 
passages we have represented a number of extremely contemporary themes: boycotters’ 
reliance on the rhetoric of free speech; the Jews as exaggerating and manipulating 
antisemitism to vilify the boycotters; the fact that the boycott is not against all Jews; the 
possibility of a test for good Jews who may be exempted from the boycott.   
The Limerick boycott was organized at the height of the campaign against Jewish 
immigration into Britain which culminated with the passing of the Aliens Act in 1905.  
The British Trades Union Congress supported this Act, which constituted a nationalized 
boycott of Jews, and many trades unions supported a boycott of Jewish members.  There 
                                                                                                                                                 
the repression in the occupied territories.’  Note the classic slippage in the last sentence from a debate as to 
whether Israeli academics – and only Israeli academics – should be excluded from the academic 
community to a debate on how to ‘confront the … challenge represented by the repression in the occupied 
territories’; as though criticism of state policy and exclusion on the basis of nationality were the same thing.  
The accusation that opponents of the boycott are engaged in a campaign of ‘vilification and intimidation’ is 
Jacqueline Rose’s version of the Livingstone formulation.  The letter is also based on the false claim that 
Motion 30 at the 2007 UCU congress mandated a debate.  In fact it mandated UCU to campaign for an 
academic boycott and to treat the PACBI argument for a boycott as a ‘call’.  It did not mention the 
circularity of asking British academics to ‘respond’ to the PACBI ‘call’ which was itself a response to the 
call of Stephen and Hilary Rose to issue a ‘call’. 
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were also boycotts of Jewish businesses which were argued for by some who thought of 
themselves as being on the left as a stand against sweatshop labour and for trade union 
rates of pay (Cohen 2005). 
A boycott of Jewish businesses was one of the tools in Hitler’s armoury during the early 
days of Nazi rule in Germany and it was followed by a campaign to exclude Jews from 
the professions, the universities and then from any public or cultural space, transport, 
entertainment, arts, film and theatre.  The contemporary campaign for a boycott of Israeli 
academic institutions situates itself in the tradition of the boycott against South African 
apartheid.  It is perhaps worth remembering that there is also a less heroic strand to the 
boycott tradition. 
A few months after the final defeat of German Nazism, on 2 December 1945, the newly 
formed Arab League Council declared the beginning of the Arab boycott:  ‘Jewish 
products and manufactured goods shall be considered undesirable to the Arab countries.’ 
All Arab ‘institutions, organizations, merchants, commission agents and individuals’ 
were called upon ‘to refuse to deal in, distribute, or consume Zionist products or 
manufactured goods.’ (Bard 2007)   The Arab boycott of Israel was supported by the 
Soviet Union, which invented contemporary left anti-imperialist anti-Zionism and which 
used it as a cover for antisemitism (Crooke 2004). 
In April 2002 Steven and Hilary Rose ‘initiated’
82
 the call for a moratorium on European 
research collaboration with Israel.  Later they participated in setting up BRICUP
83
, the 
British Campaign for the Universities of Palestine and PACBI
84
, the Palestinian 
Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel.  It subsequently became an 
important element of their political rhetoric that they are not initiators of the boycott call 
but are, rather, responding passively to a call from within Palestine. 
                                                 
82
  Steven and Hilary Rose did ‘initiate’ the call for a moratorium on European research collaboration with 
Israel in April 2002, according to Steven Rose’s own account in his profile on The Guardian’s website, 
Comment Is Free, http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/steven_rose/profile.html, downloaded 14 February 
2005.  It was later that they portrayed themselves as answering a Palestinian call rather than themselves 
initiating action. 
83
  BRICUP, British Campaign for the  Universities of Palestine, http://www.bricup.org.uk/ 
84
  PACBI, Palestinian Campaign for the Cultural and Academic Boycott of Israel, http://www.pacbi.org/ 
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In May 2002 Mona Baker, an academic at UMIST
85
, fired two Israeli academics, Miriam 
Shlesinger from the board of her journal, The Translator and Gideon Toury from the 
board of her journal, Translation Studies Abstracts because of their institutional 
connections to Israeli universities.  Both have long and distinguished records as 
campaigners for human rights and for peace in Israel and Palestine.
86
 
In May 2003, Sue Blackwell proposed a motion 
 
(Woodward 2003) at AUT (Association 
of University Teachers) Council asking members to sever ‘any academic links they may 
have with official Israeli institutions, including universities.’ AUT Council discussed the 
motion and it was comfortably defeated. 
In June 2003, Andrew Wilkie rejected
87
 the application of an Israeli PhD student to study 
at Oxford University because he was Israeli and had therefore served in the armed forces. 
In April 2005 Sue Blackwell came back to AUT council with what she said
88
 was a more 
sophisticated and tactical attempt to win a boycott.  She proposed to boycott three 
                                                 
85
  UMIST, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, subsequently merged with 
Manchester University 
86
  Mona Baker’s ‘personal statement’ is available on her website at 
http://www.monabaker.com/personalstatement.htm (downloaded 14 February 2007), together with links to 
the correspondence she had with the woman who had been her friend, Miriam Shlesinger, and her letter to 
Gideon Toury.  She writes: ‘In May 2002, following the sharp rise in the level of atrocities committed 
against the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza, I decided to join the call to boycott Israeli 
academic institutions. The boycott was conceived along the same lines as the sanctions which ultimately 
led to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The call was initiated by Professor Steven Rose 
(Physics, Open University) and Professor Hilary Rose (Bradford University). … I first wrote to Miriam 
Shlesinger (Bar Ilan University, Israel) on 23 May explaining my decision and asking her to resign from 
the Editorial Board of The Translator. She refused. I also wrote to Gideon Toury (Tel Aviv University, 
Israel) on 8 June along the same lines, asking him to resign from the panel of Consulting Editors of 
Translation Studies Abstracts. He too refused. I removed them both from the boards of the respective 
journals.’ 
87
  ‘Andrew Wilkie, the Nuffield professor of pathology and a fellow of Pembroke College, is under 
investigation after telling Amit Duvshani, a student at Tel Aviv university, that he and many other British 
academics were not prepared to take on Israelis because of the ‘gross human rights abuses’ he claims that 
they inflict on Palestinians.  Prof Wilkie made the comments after Mr Duvshani, 26, wrote to him 
requesting the opportunity to work in Prof Wilkie’s laboratory towards a PhD thesis. Mr Duvshani, who is 
in the last months of a master’s degree in molecular biology, included a CV detailing his academic and 
outside experience, including his mandatory three-year national service in the Israeli army….In a reply sent 
by email on June 23, Prof Wilkie wrote: ‘Thank you for contacting me, but I don’t think this would work. I 
have a huge problem with the way that the Israelis take the moral high ground from their appalling 
treatment in the Holocaust, and then inflict gross human rights abuses on the Palestinians because they [the 
Palestinians] wish to live in their own country.  I am sure that you are perfectly nice at a personal level, but 
no way would I take on somebody who had served in the Israeli army. As you may be aware, I am not the 
only UK scientist with these views but I’m sure you will find another lab if you look around.’ (Henry 2003) 
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particular Israeli Universities.  She also said that she now had a ‘clear call from 
Palestinians’.  There was a truncated debate at Council which did not include speeches 
against the motion.  AUT Council voted to boycott Bar-Ilan University, citing its links 
with Ariel College in the occupied West Bank.
89
  It voted to boycott Haifa University on 
the basis of allegations concerning academic freedom there centering on the Teddy Katz   
case and on claims made by an anti-Zionist academic at Haifa, Ilan Pappe.
90
  And AUT 
council voted to ‘refer back’ proposals to boycott Hebrew University, Jerusalem, on the 
basis of a claim that the university was building a new dorm block on Palestinian land.
91
 
About 300, mainly Jewish, academics resigned from AUT (see for example Lappin 
2005).  More might have resigned but for a group who formed the Engage network and 
website,
92
 which argued that the vote could be reversed only if academics remained 
within the union (see Geras 2005 for the opposite case). 
Jon Pike, a founder of Engage and a Philosophy lecturer at Open University, organized 
the required signatures of Council members to force the union to hold a Special Council 
to re-examine the issue of the boycotts.  Debates were held up and down the country in 
AUT local associations.  The boycotters did not win their position in any of these 
debates.  
In May 2005 there was a five hour debate at the Special Council meeting on the issue. 
This meeting was better attended than any routine council meeting and it was connected 
to the opinions of members by the preceding debates. Special Council decided to rescind 
the boycotts and to set up a Special Commission to work out a policy.  In April 2006, 
                                                                                                                                                 
88
  ‘It’s a tactical attempt to get it through,’ admits Birmingham’s Sue Blackwell, one of the motion’s 
authors. ‘We’ve got to be a bit more sophisticated. We are now better organised. One of the reasons we 
didn’t win last time was that there was no clear public call from Palestinians for the boycott. Now we have 
that, in writing.’ (Curtis 2005) 
89
  For a presentation of the case against Bar-Ilan University, see Avnery (2005).  For a discussion of the 
issue and of Avnery’s case, see Hirsh (2005). 
90
  For a presentation of the case against Haifa University see Zalman (2005).  For Haifa University’s 
response through its solicitor Anthony Julius, see the Haifa University website at 
http://boycottnews.haifa.ac.il/html/html_eng/AUT.pdf, downloaded 14 February 2005. 
91
  For the case against Hebrew University see Yamada (2004).  For Hebrew University’s reply, through its 
lawyer Anthony Julius, see www.EngageOnline.org.uk at 
http://www.engageonline.org.uk/archives/index.php?id=46.   
92
  www.liberoblog.com (no longer operational) and later www.EngageOnline.org.uk  For more on the birth 
of Engage, see Hirsh (2005a). 
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AUT’s Special Commission, in part directly elected by union members, proposed a 
consistent and thought-through policy
93
 which related to international ‘greylisting’ and 
boycotts.  It was a policy that left open the possibility of boycotting universities but 
which set forward a consistent procedure to be followed.  Crucially, a university, it 
recommended, can only be boycotted if the academic union at that institution calls for it.  
The AUT Council in 2006 adopted these recommendations as policy but the policy fell 
shortly afterwards, when AUT merged with Natfhe, the National Association of Teachers 
in Further and Higher Education.
94
 
At its last conference, three days before the merger, Natfhe voted for a motion at its 
conference to boycott those Israeli academics who do not ‘publicly dissociate 
themselves’ from ‘Israel’s apartheid policies’.  The leadership of AUT and Natfhe 
responded by saying that this policy did not stand in the new union. 
In May 2006, Richard Seaford of Exeter University refused to review a book for an 
Israeli journal saying: ‘I have, along with many other British academics, signed the 
academic boycott of Israel, in the face of the brutal and illegal expansionism, and the 
slow-motion ethnic cleansing, being practised by your government.’ (Halkin 2006) 
In April 2007, the conference of the National Union of Journalists passed a motion that 
instructed its executive committee to: 
…continue to support the work of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign including the organisation of 
boycotts of Israeli goods, similar to those boycotts in the struggle against apartheid South Africa.
95
 
Following that decision by NUJ conference, many journalists and institutions protested at 
the decision, often calling for a ballot of members:  the editor of The Guardian;
96
 the 
Foreign Press Association;
97
 The Guardian leader;
98
 petitions of NUJ members at BBC 
                                                 
93
  See Document, Association of University Teachers (2005) 
http://www.aut.org.uk/circulars/html/la7753.html, downloaded 14 February 2007. 
94
  Jon Pike (2005; 2006b), who was a member of the Special Commission, discusses the issues underlying 
the debates around ‘greylisting’ policy, and defines his distinction between boycott as solidarity and 
boycott as punishment, or voluntary and non-voluntary boycott. 
95
  Text of NUJ motion is here, on the Engage website:  
http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=967 
96
  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/849987.html 
97
  http://www.fpa.org.il/?categoryId=14190 
98
  http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,,2061527,00.html 
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News
99
 and ITN
100
; Jon Snow, news anchor at Channel 4 news;
101
 BBC London NUJ 
branch;
102
 NUJ chapel at Reuters;
103
 NUJ Manchester branch.
104
  What took the wind out 
of the sails of this campaign to reverse the boycott decision in NUJ, however, was the 
decision made at UCU (University and College Union) Congress in June. 
In June 2007, the first congress of the new merged union, voted to support the 
boycott campaign.  It instructed the National Executive to: 
• circulate the full text of the Palestinian boycott call to all branches/LAs for information 
and discussion 
• encourage members to consider the moral implications of existing and proposed links 
with Israeli academic institutions 
• organise a UK-wide campus tour for Palestinian academic/educational trade unionists;  
• issue guidance to members on appropriate forms of action 
It also passed its version of the Livingstone formulation: ‘…criticism of Israel cannot be 
construed as anti-semitic.’  Congress affirmed this after a delegate had read out the 
following example of antisemitic ‘criticism’ of Israel during the debate, from Hassan 
Nasrallah, leader of Hezbullah: 
If we searched the entire world for a person more cowardly, despicable, weak and feeble in 
psyche, mind, ideology and religion, we would not find anyone like the Jew. Notice, I do not say 
the Israeli. (this quote comes originally from Saad-Ghorayeb 2002:170) 
High profile Jewish supporters of the boycott campaign played an important role.  Their 
repeated assurances that antisemitism was not a relevant issue succeeded in neutralizing it 
as a factor in the debate.  From the Independent Jewish Vocies initiative in February, to 
the BRICUP fringe meeting at Bournemouth, to the debate itself at UCU Congress, 
respectable and senior Jewish academics, intellectuals and political activists repeated 
again and again, when considering the plan to boycott Israeli academia – and only Israeli 
academia – that antisemitism was relevant only insofar as it was a spurious charge that 
‘Zionists’ or the ‘pro-Israel lobby’ would throw at ‘critics of Israel’.  The message was 
                                                 
99
  http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=985 
100
  http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=991 
101
  http://www.totallyjewish.com/news/national/?content_id=6186 
102
  http://stopnujboycott.blogspot.com/2007/05/london-branch-calls-for-ballot.html 
103
  http://www.engageonline.org.uk/fighting/article.php?id=39 
104
  http://www.engageonline.org.uk/fighting/article.php?id=40 
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repeated by Jacqueline Rose, Jonathan Rosenhead, John Rose, Rosemary  Bechler, 
Steven Rose, Hilary Rose, Michael Cushman, Haim Bresheeth, Ilan Pappe, Jews for 
Justice for Palestinians, Independent Jewish Voices, Brian Klug, Antony Lerman – and 
the message was repeated by these people and groups not just on the basis that they think 
it to be true, but on the basis that they speak ‘as Jews’.  When these well respected and 
high profile antiracist Jews reassure the British intelligentsia that there is not a 
contemporary threat of antisemitism, we should not be surprised that they are believed.  
Not all of the above individuals and organizations support boycotts.  But they all argue 
that it is legitimate to have an on-going debate about whether Israelis should be excluded; 
and they agree that allegations of antisemitism are wildly and dishonestly exaggerated.  
The role they played in helping to win the UCU to support the boycott campaign was not 
to make the argument for a boycott; it was to help to neutralize the issue of antisemitism. 
The slogan that ‘criticism of Israel cannot be construed as antisemitism’ should be 
reversed, because in truth, antisemitism cannot be construed as criticism of Israeli actions 
or policies.  Antisemitism is not critical, it is necessarily mendacious, cannot help 
Palestinians and it demands no critical response from those against whom it is directed. 
UNISON
105
, the biggest union in Britain before the merger of AMICUS and the 
T&G (Transport and General Workers Union) to form UNITE, decided to make its 
support for the boycott campaign clear on June 20 2007: ‘Conference believes that 
ending the occupation demands concerted and sustained pressure upon Israel including an 
economic, cultural, academic and sporting boycott.’  Tony Greenstein, an anti-Zionist 
activist who had been steadfastly making the same speeches for 30 years, that Zionism is 
racism, that the Zionists collaborated with the Nazis, that Israel must be dismantled, 
                                                 
105
  In UNISON the hunt to root out ‘Zionism’ began even before the vote to support the boycott campaign.  
Labourstart is an international trade union network and website, which carries news and publishes calls for 
trade union solidarity and reports on activity.  UNISON had asked Eric Lee, the editor of Labourstart, what 
it could do to help, so Eric asked for a donation of £2000.  The international affairs committee agreed and 
the decision to ratify this went to the national executive.  Eric Lee: ‘A member of the executive said they 
had three questions for me: was it true that I was a Zionist?; does Labourstart censor Palestinian news?; and 
had I supported the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year?’   Mr Lee responded: ‘It is no secret that I am a 
left-wing Zionist, as are many Israelis. Labourstart has links to Palestinian sites and they take many of our 
news items, and I took the same view of Lebanon as did Tony Blair and the Labour government.  ‘The 
[question of the] donation was then sent back to the first [international affairs] committee.’ The issue of the 
donation went back to the executive a second time, ‘but they decided it was too controversial so they turned 
it down.  http://www.thejc.com/home.aspx?ParentId=m11s18&SecId=18&AId=53345&ATypeId=1 
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suddenly found himself being given a standing ovation by UNISON Conference for a 
speech in favour of the boycott.  ‘I was overwhelmed by the reaction of delegates’ he 
said.
106
  The T&G section of UNITE also passed policy supporting the boycott campaign 
in July 2007. 
(ii) A critical examination of the debate over an academic boycott of Israel 
At the 2005 AUT conference where the decision was made (later to be reversed) to 
boycott Bar-Ilan and Haifa universities, the case for boycott was made in a very 
straightforward way.  Advocates for the boycott stood up and made emotional speeches 
about how difficult life is in Palestine under Israeli occupation.  They pointed to ways in 
which the human rights abuses committed against Palestinians are legal under Israeli law 
and they therefore declared that Israeli institutional racism constitutes apartheid.  ‘We 
know what to do with an apartheid state,’ say the boycott advocates, ‘we boycott it.’  ‘We 
are academics so we are therefore under an obligation to boycott Israeli colleagues as a 
gesture of solidarity with Palestine.’ 
The PACBI case for a boycott relies heavily on the analogy with apartheid South Africa.  
Emphasis is thus taken off the case for boycott itself, because the case for boycotting 
apartheid South Africa, including its academics, is taken as a given truth by the majority 
of the antiracist audience of the boycott campaign.  So once PACBI succeeds in 
characterizing Israel as ‘apartheid’ then support for the boycott follows automatically.
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(a) The Political Test 
One difficulty for the boycott campaign is how to respond to criticism that an academic 
boycott would exclude opponents of Israeli human rights abuses, Jewish, Christian or 
Muslim, who work at Israeli universities.  One way of solving this problem is to offer a 
political test which, if the academic passes, would lead to immunity from the boycott.  
The 2006 Natfhe motion offered such a test when it suggested that the union should 
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backlist members who ‘do not publicly dissociate themselves’ from Israel’s ‘apartheid 
policies’ (Pike 2006).  The problem with this method is that the boycott campaign then 
lays itself open to criticism that it is undermining academic freedom with a ‘McCarthyite 
test’.  The boycott would be targeted against people who were not ready to sign up to the 
required beliefs in public and under threat.  Steve Cohen (2006) argues as follows: 
Loyalty tests have a particular significance when forced on Jews. The significance is the 
assumption of collective responsibility, of collective guilt.  Intrinsic to this is the requirement to 
grovel.  Groveling, the humiliation of Jews, is fundamental to all antisemitism…. 
What was important [under MacCarthyism] was naming names – the degradation ceremony.  
Likewise the deep antisemitism behind the NATFHE resolution is not the boycott principle.  It is 
the loyalty test on which it is based.  It is the loyalty test more than anything else which 
exceptionalises Israel….  It may be that the loyalty test was clumsily added as a ‘compromise’ 
against a blanket boycott. So what? It doesn’t make it any less anti-semitic in its consequences. 
The boycott campaign was always reluctant to say what kind of bureaucracy it was in 
favour of setting up to oversee exceptions on political grounds.  In the steadfast absence 
of such a proposal, it is reasonable to assume that the idea was that the decent people who 
were implementing the boycott would simply know who should be made an exception to 
the exclusion.  It seems unlikely that a boycott with a political test, therefore, would have 
been implemented against non-Jews or against anti-Zionist Jews at Israeli universities.  
The boundary might have been drawn in a particularly haphazard way, on a case by case 
basis.
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The political test would have functioned as a net with which to catch Israeli ‘Zionists’ 
and would have been based on the assumption that being a ‘Zionist’ is not compatible 
with being a decent, ethical academic.  One logical extension, which the Natfhe motion 
allowed, although presumably through bad drafting more than through design, was the 
possibility of extending the campaign against ‘Zionist’ academics outside Israel.  If the 
principle is established that we don’t do business with Israeli Zionists, then some may be 
tempted to extend the reach of the boycott to ‘Zionists’ who happen to work outside of 
Israel.  This prospect is less remote when we remember that there have been campaigns 
to ‘no platform’ ‘Zionists’ as though they were racists, from student unions; also when 
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we remember that a boycott policy would not always be implemented by people as 
sophisticated as the antiracists who run the boycott campaign. 
An academic who comes originally from Poland and who now lives and works in the UK, 
said that the rhetoric of the boycotters reminded him of events in Poland in March 1968, 
the year following the beginning of the Israeli occupation.  Under the cover of solidarity 
with Palestinians and using the rhetoric of anti-Zionism, the Polish state had purged the 
Jewish intelligentsia.  Jewish intellectuals were challenged to declare themselves anti-
Zionist.  Most of them refused, and many left the country; Poland lost a large number of 
its thinkers, teachers, writers, and researchers.  For this individual at least, the current 
boycott proposals resonated strongly with echoes of older antisemitic campaigns.
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(b) Institutional Boycott 
The political test, therefore, tends to create more problems for the boycott campaign than 
it solves.  Another way around the problem, then, is to sacrifice the ‘exceptional Israelis’; 
exceptional Israelis being defined by the set of Israelis who will, anyway, be happy to 
make the sacrifice, and to argue for an ‘institutional boycott’.  
This is an attempt to de-personalize the issue.  It is an attempt to make it more difficult 
for opponents to characterize the boycott as a campaign against Israeli Jews or as an 
exclusion from campuses, journals or conferences.  It becomes a campaign against 
institutions and not against individuals.  Israeli individuals will continue to be welcome 
members of the academic community so long as they do not appear in the name of their 
institutions, are not funded by their institutions, and do not attempt to host events at their 
institutions. 
Jon Pike’s (2006a) rebuttal of this institutional turn makes two central points.  Firstly, it 
is rare for academic institutions to produce research outputs; papers are written by 
individuals, presentations are made by individuals, conferences are attended by 
individuals.  So, he argues, the reality of an institutional boycott would still be an 
exclusion of individuals.  Further, in an argument reminiscent of one against the political 
                                                 
109
  Personal correspondence with the author – 13 May 2005, 16 May 2005. 
 115 
test, he asks how the distinction between institutions and individuals will actually be 
made in practice: 
[The] covert boycott (a ‘quiet stand’ according to BRICUP) is, of course, denuded of a political 
message. But also, there is no mechanism of accountability for their actions. They claim that there 
is a difference between an institutional boycott and an individual boycott, and I think that there’s 
no difference. But we won’t be able to know whether or not there is an operable distinction, 
because the operation is now conducted in secret. We won’t be able to know whether people 
engage in Wilkie type actions (without the incriminating email). And I guess, the boycotters who 
think it’s OK to adopt an ‘institutional’ rather than an ‘individual’ boycott simply think we should 
trust them on that one. (Pike 2006a) 
Sue Blackwell, an outspoken supporter of the boycott campaign has threatened to sue 
people involved in Engage for defamation, because they wrote that that she is an 
‘outspoken supporter of the campaign to exclude Israeli academics from UK campuses’. 
She responded: 
...you know very well that while I am certainly an outspoken supporter of the campaign to boycott 
Israeli institutions, I have NEVER campaigned to ‘exclude Israeli academics from UK campuses. 
Interestingly, she goes on to admit that such a campaign would indeed, be illegal: 
Considering that such an action would be illegal (discrimination on the grounds of nationality) and 
that you are thereby accusing me of advocating a course of action which would be in breach of the 
law, I consider your remark defamatory. 
Blackwell was referring to an email from Jon Pike which publicly made an analogy 
between a case of institutional discrimination at Birmingham University, where the 
closure of courses had impacted disproportionately on ethnic minority staff, and 
Blackwell’s proposed ‘institutional’ boycott, which, he argued, would also act 
disproportionately against Israelis and against Jews. So is it reasonable to describe Sue 
Blackwell as ‘an outspoken supporter of the campaign to exclude Israeli academics from 
UK campuses’ when she claims that she is only for boycott of Israeli institutions, not for 
a boycott of any human beings?  
Sue Blackwell has supported campaigns for exclusions of individual Israeli academics 
from global academia. Blackwell carries on her website
110
 a number of articles about, and 
by, both Andrew Wilkie (Layfield 2003) and Mona Baker
111
, under the title ‘Academic 
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and cultural boycott of Israel, divestment etc.’  It is already clear that Blackwell 
understands the actions of these two people, who did want exclude individual Israelis, 
one from his campus and the other from her journal, as being part of the general 
campaign which she supports.  In another part of her website
112
 Blackwell outlines her 
tactical disagreement with Mona Baker as follows: 
...I try to draw a distinction between institutions and individuals: the target is the Israeli 
government, not ordinary citizens. Of course it’s a slippery distinction, as Mona Baker herself 
points out: in fact it’s impossible to boycott an institution without in some way affecting the 
individuals who work for it. I take her point, but nonetheless I try not to target individuals as far as 
possible. So I draw the line in a different place from Mona; all the same I respect her right to draw 
her own line where her conscience tells her to, and I think the witch-hunt against her is disgusting. 
Blackwell is very clear. The ‘institutional boycott’ does affect individuals, the distinction 
is ‘slippery’ and impossible to maintain clearly in the real world, and an ‘institutional 
boycott’ does exclude individual Israeli academics.  Blackwell is also clear that she sees 
herself as being part of the same campaign as Mona Baker (i.e. the campaign to exclude 
Israeli individuals from UK campuses, journals, conferences) and that she supports Baker 
against the ‘disgusting’ ‘witch-hunt’ which was the response to Baker’s exclusion of 
individuals.  Now Blackwell admits that the sacking of individuals because of their 
nationality ‘would be illegal (discrimination on the grounds of nationality)’.  At the time 
when Baker was sacking Israelis, she called the angry response to the discrimination a 
‘witch-hunt’.  Blackwell says that she supports only an ‘institutional’ boycott. But when 
somebody sacks individuals because they are Israeli, she supports them.  
Blackwell then goes on to explain that she believes Baker’s exclusion of Israeli 
individuals does, anyway, constitute only an ‘institutional boycott’: 
She is not boycotting all Israeli academics, let alone all Jewish academics; she is boycotting 
people who are employed by Israeli institutions, whatever their nationality, ethnicity or religion. 
In 2005 Blackwell supported the AUT motion which proposed the exclusion of 
academics from global academia who worked at three Israeli institutions. ‘Conscientious 
Israeli academics and intellectuals opposed to their state’s colonial and racist policies’ 
were to be recognized as exceptional and excused from the boycott – the political test is a 
weapon aimed at individuals, not at institutions.  It is true that Blackwell is not for the 
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exclusion of all Israeli academics – only the ones who work in Israel; and it is true that 
she is not for the exclusion of only Israeli academics – she says that she is for the 
exclusion of any academic who is connected to an Israeli institution.  Although it is 
difficult to imagine a Palestinian or Arab academic, with an institutional affiliation to an 
Israeli university, being targeted by the boycott campaign in the UK.  They may well be 
targeted by the boycotters in Palestine, as collaborators, but that is a different issue.  
In defending herself against the charge of promoting a policy that is racist in effect if not 
in intent, a policy that in reality would exclude Israeli Jewish academics vastly more than 
anybody else, she does not make a convincing case. Which is where this discussion 
started – Blackwell showed herself to understand full well the concept of unintended or 
institutional racism against black and other minority staff at her own university, but she 
rejects the same way of thinking if it involves the unintended or institutional exclusion of 
Israelis or Jews.  
(c) Academic Freedom 
The standard liberal argument against a boycott of Israeli academia is based on the 
principle that such a boycott would violate the norms of academic freedom.  Blakemore 
et al (2003) published a general articulation of this argument against scientific boycotts
113
 
in Nature, arguing that such a boycott would be illegitimate except for in the most 
extreme cases.  Michael Yudkin (2007), one of the authors of the Nature article updated 
the argument in 2007, broadening it out to cover academic boycott in general rather than 
just scientific, and also focusing it on the question of Israel in particular.  He argues: 
The principle of the Universality of Science and Learning – that academics do not discriminate 
against colleagues on the basis of factors that are irrelevant to their academic work (such as race, 
religion, nationality etc.) – is well established and almost universally respected. To boycott 
academics by reason of their country of residence breaches this principle and harms the interests 
of the academics concerned. 
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In this article Yudkin goes beyond a straightforward defence of academic freedom to 
challenge a number of the arguments put forward by those who support an academic 
boycott of Israel. 
 Howard Jacobson (2007) tells that a supporter of the boycott campaign wrote to 
him denying that they threatened the academic freedom of Israelis.  He was not in favour 
of gagging or silencing Israeli voices but merely of refusing to listen to them.  Jacobson 
argues that refusing to listen, closing your ears, is not primarily an act of violence against 
the speaker but is in the first place an act of violence against oneself: 
To say you intend knowingly and purposefully and on principle ‘not to listen’ is to say you are 
waging a sort of war on your own faculties, because listening, if you are a reasoning person, is 
chief among the tools you reason with….. Most of what Socrates did was listen.  No longer to 
listen is no longer to engage in the dialogue of thought.  Which disqualifies you as a scholar and a 
teacher, for what sort of example to his pupils is a teacher who covers truth’s ears and buries it 
under stone.  A university that will not listen does far more intellectual damage to itself than to the 
university it has stopped listening to.  (Jacobson 2007) 
Anthony Julius and Alan Dershowitz (2007) make the same point in a different way: 
…freedom of expression must incorporate freedom of address. It is not sufficient for my freedom 
of expression for me simply to be free to speak. What matters to me is that people should also be 
free to hear me. There should at least be the possibility of dialogue. Boycotts put a barrier in front 
of the speaker. He can speak but he is prevented from communicating. When he addresses another, 
that other turns away. 
The point here is that the harm of the academic boycott begins at home.  The boycott 
intends to harm Israeli universities and it may or may not, in the end, succeed in this 
aspiration.  But it definitely and immediately harms the universities doing the boycotting 
or the universities in which the campaign for the exclusion of academic colleagues rages.  
In hosting the false claim that Israeli universities are not genuine universities and should 
be shunned, British universities face the danger that their own status as universities will 
be degraded. 
When challenged about why Israeli academics are singled out for punishment while 
academics in other human rights abusing states are not, many boycotters respond that 
they would also support boycotts against the other states if somebody was to organize 
them and if the oppressed in those states were to call for it.  It is true that if there were 
boycotts of academics in all states which abuse human rights as much as, or more than 
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Israel, then the academic boycott would no longer be effectively antisemitic.  It would, 
however, indicate the end of the academic project and the end of the university.  The 
aspiration to international scholarly and scientific co-operation would be rendered vain.   
Judith Butler (2006) argues that a liberal abstract notion of academic freedom is not 
sufficient to make sense of the boycott debate.  While Palestinian academics and students 
may enjoy an abstract right to academic freedom, the material conditions necessary for 
the enjoyment of those rights do not exist under occupation, she argues: 
[S]tudents and faculty at institutions on the West Bank are regularly stopped at checkpoints and 
fail to get to class; they are often without fundamental material support for schooling, even lacking 
classrooms and basic supplies, and are subject to sudden closures that make the idea of a 
completed ‘semester’ almost unthinkable.  Indeed, substantive notions of freedom of ‘movement’ 
and freedom of ‘communication’ are systematically undermined under such conditions. 
Many who argue for an academic boycott of Israel say that it is hypocritical for Israelis to 
insist on their own right to academic freedom while their state denies such freedom to 
Palestinians.  Or as Steven Rose put it in a debate at Goldsmiths College UCU on 27 
September 2006, Israelis are hypocritical to ‘squeal’ about their own academic freedom 
while the occupation continues to deny freedom to Palestinians.  It should be noted here 
that this way of thinking risks setting the precedent that academics should be held 
responsible, and punished, for the policies of the government or state in which they work.  
Yet Butler is right to argue that academic freedom is severely limited in the occupied 
territories, not by a denial of the abstract right, but by the occupation, which renders 
academic freedom materially extremely difficult to realize.  This is true even if it is one-
sided since the universities of Palestine were also founded under Israeli occupation and 
did not exist before the Israeli occupation.  There is a problem of academic freedom in 
Palestine.  It is possible to respond to this by arbitrarily and artificially removing the 
academic freedom of Israelis, as punishment, in order to balance the situation, or in an 
effort to exert pressure on Israel to respect Palestinian freedom.  Or it is possible to 
respond to this by campaigning against the occupation and against the material denials of 
academic freedom which come with it.  Butler does not argue that abstract academic 
freedom may be trumped by other more important rights, but the opposite: 
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… I do not mean to say that we cannot invoke academic freedom in the abstract to show its 
absence in certain political conditions: we can and we must. But it makes no sense to value the 
doctrine in the abstract if we cannot call for its implementation.  
Butler is not arguing that one should balance an absence of material freedom in Palestine 
by regarding academic freedom in Israel to be unimportant; she argues that the principle 
of abstract freedom must be strengthened and deepened, made material by creating the 
conditions for its implementation.
114
  
This is an old theme in radical and Marxist thought and it is perhaps a central indicator of 
the most important schism in that tradition, the one which divides totalitarian thought and 
politics from the politics and philosophy of self-liberation.  The totalitarian traditions 
fight for uncompromising critiques of abstract right; they hold law, democracy, freedom 
of speech and human rights to be worse than useless to the disempowered.  Formal 
equality is, in these traditions, nothing but the form of rule of power.  It hides illegitimate 
exploitation behind an ideology of fairness, behind the American dream.  Men dominate 
women through the phallocentric notion of abstract equality; the bourgeoisie rules over 
the poor and exploited through the class-ridden hypocrisy of equality before the law; 
imperialist states legitimize their wars of interest with the cry of human rights.  This is 
the really radical tradition; not only does it see bourgeois rights as being promised but 
denied to the majority; it sees bourgeois rights as the very form of rule of illegitimate 
power. 
Marx himself was entirely explicit in his own critique of this vulgar and dangerous 
‘Marxism’.  In On the Jewish Question, (1994) he defended bourgeois rights – in this 
case the right to religious freedom for Jews – uncompromisingly against an argument 
which offered a much more ‘radical’ critique of society.  Against Bruno Bauer, who 
argued that Jews did not need religious freedom but really needed to free themselves of 
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their religion, Marx argued for a framework which takes rights seriously but which is not 
satisfied with their purely abstract nature in society as it exists.  Far from seeing rights as 
something unimportant or positively dangerous, Marx’s position was that radicals should 
fight for rights and should fight to extend them beyond the purely abstract.  His was a 
project of making rights real for all, not one of scoffing at those who ‘squeal’ about their 
rights.
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The boycott campaign sees academic freedom in Israel and throughout the globe as being 
something which may be legitimately sacrificed for the greater good of ending the 
occupation; academic freedom, they argue, is part of the ideological armoury brought to 
bear against those who fight the occupation.  I would argue the opposite.  The concept of 
academic freedom is important in itself but it does not go far enough; a material 
conception of academic freedom is necessary to go beyond the critique of the boycott all 
the way to a fight for freedom in the West Bank.  Academic freedom is not a principle 
which we should reject because sometimes it fails to deliver what it promises; rather, we 
should fight to hold it to its promise. 
(d) Damage to UCU 
As the violence done to the principle of academic freedom is felt first in the boycotting 
university, so does antisemitism strike first there too.  The boycott is not caused or 
motivated by an underlying antisemitism but is itself a cause or a catalyst or a license for 
antisemitism to emerge; it is also, itself, an antisemitic policy.  The boycott ‘debate’ 
launches the boycotters into a fight against the vast majority of Jews who oppose their 
campaign to exclude Israelis and who experience their campaign as an antisemitic attack.  
True, many boycotters are Jews, but not many Jews are boycotters.  No matter how often 
and how loudly Jewish boycotters speak ‘as Jews’, no matter how hard they struggle to 
neutralize antisemitism as an issue in the ‘debate’, no matter how desperately they insist 
that the Jewish community is split on the issue, they do not succeed; the Jewish 
community is not really split and antisemitism is an issue in the ‘debate’. 
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So the appearance of the campaign to exclude Israelis from our campuses brings with it a 
toxic atmosphere.  People who oppose the boycott are portrayed as pro-imperialist, pro-
Zionist, pro-apartheid, uncaring of Palestinian suffering, supporters of the occupation and 
users of the charge of antisemitism as a dishonest smoke screen.  And most of the people 
thus accused are Jews.  With the campaign to exclude Israelis comes a campaign to libel 
Jewish academics and Jewish union members; Jewish students too.  Not all Israelis are to 
be excluded; not all Jews are to be libeled; not all those to be excluded are Jews; not all 
those who are libeled are Jews; but Nazism was an unusual and  exceptional antisemitism 
insofar as it allowed no exceptions, no exceptional Jews, no good Jews. 
The boycott campaign threatens the principle of the university and it also threatens the 
principle of the trades union.  It is not a coincidence that many of those who consider 
themselves to be on the left of the trade union movement are pushing this campaign 
against Israelis at a moment when trade unions have never been less able to deliver on 
their core business.  UCU is supposed to fight for the pay and conditions of people who 
work in universities and colleges and it is supposed to fight for the principle of education 
in Britain.  For those who have raised ‘anti-imperialism’ far above all other radical 
principles, the fact that the union is unable to win on bread and butter trade union issues 
is less important than the project of joining in the global struggle against imperialism 
alongside the ‘resistance’ in Iraq, Hamas and Hizbollah, with Chavez, Castro and 
Ahmadinejad. 
At the same Bournemouth conference which passed the motion to support the campaign 
for an academic boycott of Israel, another motion was passed which illustrates this point 
clearly.  An amendment was proposed to add the following text to the motion opposing 
the war in Iraq:   
The various so-called resistance forces have regularly killed trade union, women’s and LGBT 
activists. The ‘resistance’ groups - various types of Ba’athist-fascist and Islamist organisation - are 
unremittingly hostile to the new labour movement. 
  This text was removed and replaced with the following:   
The 650,000+ excess civilian deaths in Iraq since 2003 and the destruction of civil society, 
including the attacks on trade unionists, women and LGBT people, derive directly from the 
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presence of occupying US and UK forces - practically, morally and legally under the Geneva 
Conventions. 
 
A stark illustration of the importance of this political disagreement was provided by 
Hamas, who on 18 July 2007, looted and smashed up the Palestinian General Federation 
of Trade Unions office in Gaza and summoned trades unionists for ‘interrogation’.
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UCU still represents university and college staff on national pay-scales and in national 
negotiations.  This is an achievement which is under threat.  The elite universities, the 
Russell Group, would like to break away from this framework, pay their elite staff better, 
and let the rest of the sector sink or change from being universities into being feeder 
schools for postgraduate study at research-active institutions.  In 2006 university staff 
was involved in ‘action short of a strike’ in pursuit of a pay claim.  This campaign ended 
inconclusively when unity began to crumble under pressure.  The employers settled for a 
small increase in pay and the union came out of the action in tact and with national 
bargaining still in place. 
The context of the boycott ‘debate’ is a union where unity is crucial to the achievement of 
its core aims; a moment when trade union unity might mean the difference between a 
national education system and a completely marketized system; a moment when the very 
existence of a union which represents all college workers is under threat.  This is the 
moment that the pro-boycott ‘left’ chooses to divide the union between those who know 
how to recognize the smell of antisemitism and those who can’t recognize it or who 
refuse to sniff the air. 
In 2005, when AUT had a policy of boycotting Haifa and Bar-Ilan, and there was a 
possibility of boycotting Hebrew University Jerusalem too, there were a number of 
serious legal threats to the union.  Given that much of the pretext for these boycotts were 
false, then AUT was in a position where it was spreading libel against globally respected 
academic institutions.  Anthony Julius, who had successfully represented Deborah 
Lipstadt against Holocaust denier David Irving, represented Both Haifa and Hebrew 
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Universities.  Julius wrote to the AUT threatening legal action for defamation.
117
  These 
kinds of threats, given the archaic legal framework governing defamation law in England, 
were threats which may have bankrupted the union.  Some trade unionists argue that it is 
illegitimate to threaten legal action in a trade union dispute, to run to the ‘bourgeois’ 
courts to settle a labour movement dispute; but it seems clear enough that trade unions 
have a legal duty not to push defamatory claims about entirely respectable universities, 
and those universities have every right to defend themselves by legal means. 
Many UCU members have resigned from the union over its support for the boycott.  
Many, like Shalom Lappin, have done so openly and have given their reasons publicly;
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it is likely that many others have simply stopped paying their dues, forgotten to renew 
their membership, or decided not to join in the first place.  In these ways, Jews and 
antiracists (people who oppose antisemitism) are being pushed out of the UCU.  Shalom 
Lappin is a serious left Zionist, a person whose adult life has been spent fighting for 
peace between Israel and Palestine, fighting for workers’ rights through trade unions, 
fighting for political change through authentic social democratic politics.  Lappin has had 
enough of standing in the dock within UCU and defending the right of our Israeli 
colleagues to be treated as human beings by us.  Nobody else needs such a defence.  He 
argues that the debate about whether to exclude Israelis is illegitimate - in the same way 
that a debate over whether or not the Holocaust happened is illegitimate, or a debate 
about whether women have souls.  He refuses to legitimate such a debate by taking part 
or by remaining in a union where such a debate is raging. 
The sections of the ‘left’ which ceaselessly push the boycott debate, which responds to 
defeats by pushing it once more, which treats the campaign to boycott Israel as though it 
were the most important political task in the world, are risking the very future of the 
union. 
(e) Damage to Palestine 
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Palestine is in crisis.  Hamas won a parliamentary election and made a successful coup 
against the Palestinian presidency in Gaza.  The occupation is intensifying, the wall is 
being completed, the checkpoints are as numerous and humiliating as ever; the Israeli 
settlements are growing and multiplying.   
In Britain in 2007 the Palestine solidarity movement re-branded itself by building a new 
broad organization called the ‘Enough Coalition’.  Many legitimate civil society 
organizations have signed up to this coalition, such as the charity ‘War on Want’, the 
green pressure group ‘Friends of the Earth’, the Transport and General Workers Union 
and Amicus (now merged into UNITE) and the public service workers union, UNISON.  
The Enough Coalition calls itself ‘a campaign for a just peace for all people in Israel and 
Palestine’
119
 yet while presenting itself as a coalition against the occupation, it fails to 
affirm Israel’s right to exist within the pre-1967 borders.  Indeed it clearly implies, in its 
mission statement,
120
 that the descendents of the 1948 refugees should be ‘allowed 
home’, a demand which is incompatible with a two state solution to the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine. 
Even after this re-branding exercise, even while riding the wave of the media discussion 
focused around the 40
th
 anniversary of the occupation, even during the summer in which 
much of the trade union movement has backed a boycott of Israel, even when the 
situation in Palestine continues to be desperate, the Palestine solidarity movement was 
unable to build mass support for its showpiece demonstration on 9 June 2007.  ‘Enough’ 
claim that there were 20,000 people there while other estimates are as low as 2,000
121
.  
Even if there were as many as ten or twenty thousand were present, this represents a 
failure to broaden the movement from the narrow activist core into a mass protest 
reminiscent of those against apartheid South Africa in the 1980s which attracted hundreds 
of thousands of marchers. 
One hypothesis is that ‘ordinary people’ who have sympathy with the plight of the 
Palestinians are still put off these demonstrations by the smell of antisemitism that swirls 
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http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181228582339&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull 
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around them.  A number of groups which speak ‘as Jews’ were there, hoping that their 
presence would demonstrate that at least some Jews should not be hated for their 
‘Zionism’: Jewish Socialist Group, Jews Against Zioinism, Jews for Boycotting Israeli 
Goods, Jews for Justice for Palestinians.  Yet the usual sprinkling of antisemitic placards 
was also present; George Galloway, who says that Jews are foreigners in Jerusalem, 
called for a boycott of Israel from the platform; the leader of the antisemitic Hamas 
movement in Palestine, Ismail Haniyeh, spoke via video link to the rally. 
Within the trade unions, the boycott ‘debate’ is not between those who support Israel and 
those who support Palestine, nor is it between Jews and Muslims.  It is in fact almost 
entirely a debate amongst people who say that they support freedom for Palestinians.  
Some boycotters allege that anti-boycotters are lying when they say they support a 
Palestinian state; some anti-boycotters notice that many of the boycotters support the 
military conquest of Israel by Hamas and Hezbollah, an eventuality which they doubt 
would result in any kind of freedom either for Palestinians or for Israelis.  But the 
overwhelming majority of those on both sides of the ‘debate’ hopes for a just peace and 
for freedom for Palestinians.  But the boycott campaign splits in half those who support a 
just peace and who want to oppose the occupation.  Discussion of Palestine and Israel has 
been almost entirely displaced by the completely different discussion about whether 
Israelis should be excluded from the cultural and economic life of the planet.  The 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign has, for the last 5 years at least, been a campaign for the 
boycott of Israel and for the de-legitimization of Israel. 
A political goal of the boycott campaign is to have its own definition of a ‘friend of 
Palestine’ adopted as left common sense.  It defines a friend of Palestine as somebody 
who supports a boycott of Israelis and it defines an enemy of Palestine as somebody who 
opposes a boycott of Israelis.  So a whole layer of people who think of themselves as 
friends of Palestine, who work towards an end of the occupation, who support the peace 
movements in Israel and in Palestine, who oppose racism in both Israel and Palestine – 
these people are treated by the boycott campaign as enemies of Palestinians.  In this way, 
the boycott campaign splits and disables Palestine solidarity work in Britain.  In this way, 
the boycott campaign damages Palestine. 
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(f) Inconsistency: why boycott only Israel when there are many more serious 
human rights abusers on the planet 
A question which is often the first one to occur to somebody when they learn that there is 
a campaign to boycott Israel, is to ask ‘Why Israel?’  There is genocide going on in 
Darfur as I write, and it has killed hundreds of thousands of people, as well as causing the 
death of hundreds of thousands more of the millions who have been displaced.  There is a 
dictatorship ruling Zimbabwe which fails to feed its population and which has organized 
hundreds of thousands of house demolitions in the last few years.  China has been 
running a bloody and repressive occupation of Tibet for decades, has moved millions of 
its own settlers into Tibet and has deported hundreds of thousands of Tibetans to the 
Laogai camps, the Chinese version of the Gulag.  Russia is running an occupation of 
Chechnya which has resulted in the deaths of countless thousands of Chechens, 
particularly during its re-conquest of Grozny, the capital city, in the mid 1990s.  There 
are very many states in the world where there are ethnic or gendered exclusions from 
citizenship, or systems of two-class citizenship, or systems whereby many of the people 
who do the work are non-citizens or guest-workers.  There are very many states in the 
world which came into being following ethnic struggles over territory and the forced 
movement of populations.  There are many states in the world which are still fighting 
over pieces of territory with their neighbours.  There are many states in the world where 
there is no freedom of the press, freedom of speech, no functioning legal system.  There 
are many places where trade unions and political parties are illegal and repressed.  There 
are many places where there is no democracy.  So, why, in British trade unions and the 
pages of The Guardian and The Independent, why on British campuses and in the British 
left intelligentsia, are there campaigns only to punish Israel?  Norman Geras (2005a) 
notices that the boycotters and the blacklisters 
all assure us that this isn’t about blank prejudice. It’s about human rights, racism and what have 
you, and Israel just happens to be the privileged exemplar. But when you ask for a principled 
reason which picks out Israel, and Israel exclusively, not only can the boycotters and blacklisters 
not give one satisfactory reason, they don’t even converge on a common reason.  Now it’s 
supposedly because they were called upon by Palestinian organizations.  Now it’s because no one 
has yet brought a resolution to the AUT on China, or Sudan, or Chechnya, or Iran, or Zimbabwe, 
or Iraq (in Saddam’s day), or the US (since then).  Or else Israel isn’t a special case, but it is a case 
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… ; and it’s good enough if it’s a case; and this just happens to be the case we’re focusing on. Or 
it’s because of illegal occupation, or because of UN resolutions. Or it’s because of racism, like 
with apartheid (or, sotto voce, and sometimes not so sotto voce, like with Nazi Germany). … But 
for want of decent reasons, the boycotters have something unfortunately as powerful; and this is a 
fixed hostility towards the State of Israel. 
Richard Kuper (2006) finds a number of reasons to single out Israel for particular 
criticism although it should be noted that we are more interested here in reasons for 
singling out Israel for unique punishment than for ‘criticism’.  Anyone may be criticized 
on particular grounds, but if someone is to be the only one punished then this must be 
because they are the only one worthy of punishment.  Kuper admits that ‘other states in 
the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, have been far 
greater violators of human rights’ but he goes on to offer four reasons why Israel is 
‘legitimately singled out’. 
First, Israel should not be judged against other states in the world but ‘in terms of its own 
founding principles’.  So Kuper proposes that it is reasonable to judge Israel as a ‘light 
unto nations’ and as a democratic state.  Theological debate is beyond my competency 
(and beyond Kuper’s too, I suspect), but it seems to me extremely threatening to imply 
that Israel should deserve unique punishment if it is judged to have failed to be the most 
moral and the best behaved state in the world (a light unto nations).  Similarly the idea 
that Israel should be punished if it fails to live up to the promise of democracy, while 
states which are not democratic should not be so punished has little to recommend it.  
This argument in fact, is one which holds the crime of hypocrisy to be the greatest crime 
imaginable, worse than genocide.  But anyway, does Kuper really imagine that the 
official narrative of Israeli nationalism is the only one to make rather overblown claims?  
Does he imagine that North Korea should be judged not against international human 
rights and humanitarian norms, but according to how it fails to be the socialist paradise 
on earth which is constitutionally bound to be? 
Second, Kuper suggests that Israel should be judged according to different criteria than 
other states because it has, within its territory, a number of sites which are of special 
significance to Christians, Jews and Muslims worldwide.  The claim here seems to be that 
the presence of such sites means that Israel’s record on human rights abuses should be 
judged differently to that of other states.  But Kuper does not go on to discuss how this 
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principle of holding states with religious sites to different human rights standards would 
impact on other states which are the home to religious sites, such as Saudi Arabia. 
Third, Israel is singled out by the USA for a particularly strong alliance.  But Kuper does 
not explain why this fact should cause people concerned about human rights abuses to be 
more concerned about Israeli human rights abuses.  Presumably this argument boils down 
to a charge of hypocrisy, this time leveled against the USA.   
Fourth, Israel claims to be not just a state for its citizens, says Kuper, but also a state for 
all Jews.  It exaggerates the danger of antisemitism in order to encourage Jews to identify 
with Israel and it implicitly makes a charge against Jews who are critical of some of its 
policies, of disloyalty.  Kuper inverts the real situation here.  Israel is open to all Jews for 
historical reasons connected to its birth following a serious outbreak of antisemitism in 
Europe; following the expulsion of Jews from the states of the Middle East; following the 
long experience of Russian antisemitism.  Israel has been a refuge from antisemitism; it is 
one of the rather sad myths of anti-Zionism that Israel benefits from, invents, exaggerates 
and provokes antisemitism in order to encourage Jewish immigration.   
It is true that any individual has every right to be concerned about whatever particular 
cause happens to engage them.  But a trade union has a duty not to act whimsically or 
arbitrarily but consistently.  A trade union should be concerned with human rights abuses 
and it should try to do something about human rights abuses.  It should not be concerned 
with and try to punish only one small set of human rights abuses. 
When you get pulled over to the side of the road for speeding and you stand with the self-
righteous police officer while he is writing out the ticket, and you watch the succession of 
other cars driving past at the same speed you were doing, you are likely to experience a 
feeling of injustice.  It is not, in truth, unjust.  You were breaking the law, and you have 
been caught.  In the long run, most of the others will eventually be caught and punished 
too, if they carry on driving at that speed.  But the boycott of Israel is not like this.  The 
boycott would punish speeders, but not speeders at random and not every speeder.  The 
boycott would punish nearly all Jewish speeders.  It would find reasons to be much more 
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concerned to punish Jewish speeders than any others.  Many reasons would be proposed, 
and none of them would appear to be antisemitic. 
Many nineteenth century socialists opposed capitalism; some of them singled out ‘Jewish 
capitalism’ for particular attention. Many people oppose street crime; some single out 
black muggers for particular attention. Many people oppose religious bigotry; some 
single out Islam for particular attention. Even then, it is possible and perhaps necessary to 
have a reasoned discussion about the relationship between Jews and capitalism, about the 
relationship between black kids and street crime and about the relationship between 
homophobia and Islam.  But it is also possible for these relationships to function at the 
heart of a racist commonsense; possible and likely. 
(g) Universities as particular targets of the boycott campaign 
There are two strands to the argument about why academics in particular should be 
boycotted.  One is that there should be a general boycott of Israel and as part of that, 
academics around the world should boycott Israeli academics.  The other is that Israeli 
academic institutions are themselves guilty, or particularly guilty, of facilitating, turning a 
blind eye to, legitimating and providing personnel for, Israeli human rights abuses.  The 
boycott campaign continues to recycle a number of libels and half truths about Israeli 
academia.  These are effective with an audience that knows little about Israel and less 
about Israeli universities.  Both Haifa University and the Hebrew University have about 
20% Arab students as well as significant numbers of Arab faculty members. This is a rate 
of inclusion of minorities which would shame many elite British institutions.  Another 
common misrepresentations is that ‘Israeli academics as a community - with some brave 
exceptions - are at best silent and at worst open in their advocacy’ (Rose 2006) of Israel’s 
immoral and illegal acts.  The truth is that the universities are spaces in Israel where 
conflict is pursued through words and ideas rather than guns and bombs. They are 
amongst the most antiracist spaces in Israel; spaces where ideas for peace are forged, 
taught and practiced.  
Some academics will indeed be rightwing; some may be profoundly reactionary. That is 
the nature of an open, democratic and free education system. It is a system that also 
 131 
guarantees a safe, tenured chair for the extreme anti-Zionist Ilan Pappe, even when he 
calls upon the world to boycott his own colleagues and his own institution. 
There is a list of names of hundreds of Israeli academics
122
, hardly brave exceptions, who 
publicly support those of their students who refuse to serve in the Israeli army in the 
occupied territories. The Oslo peace process, destroyed by Israeli and Arab extremists, 
was forged by links between Israeli and Palestinian academics.  Certainly there are 
institutional and other connections between Israeli universities and the armed forces and 
the defence industries; this is standard throughout the world.  In many states, universities 
are state controlled institutions.  In Israel, as in most democratic states, they are formally, 
and to a large extent actually, independent institutions.  
One precedent that the boycott campaign seems to set is that academics (and musicians 
and artists and sportspeople) should be held responsible and should be punished by 
exclusion, for the human rights abuses committed by their state.  This kind of collective 
responsibility is not the usual attitude taken by left and liberal critics of state human 
rights abuses. 
(h) Antisemitism 
The political culture in which the boycott ‘debate’ takes place is extremely poor and 
political education is often lacking.  The debate which takes place on the UCU activist 
email list is astonishing.  One UCU colleague wrote: ‘I have a big problem with this 
‘right to exist’ business’, as though Israeli sovereignty was an impertinence. Somebody 
else admits that the boycott ‘could qualify as indirect race discrimination’ but argues that 
this is necessary for the greater good. Another manufactures a difference between 
antisemitism and ‘antisemitism’, and pleads guilty to the second because he defines it as 
‘objecting to the policies of Israel’. Or: ‘Why should Israel’s legacy of horror and trauma 
be exploited to deprive the Palestinians ... their homeland? Just how long can the history 
of antisemitism and the holocaust be used ... to exempt Israel?’  One colleague wrote the 
following: 
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  http://www.seruv.org.il/UniversitySupportEng_Print.asp  
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What security is Israel entitled to? To non-hypocrites, the answer is obvious. The same security it 
gives Palestine, no more, no less. On its current record, then, Israel has no right to exist and it’s 
people must be conquered, partially expelled and brutalised by Occupation. (21 September 2007) 
Another wrote: 
The whole Israeli education system - from nursery to university - is embedded in the Israeli 
obsession with war as some sort of ‘defence’ against who knows what ...  The minute I tried to 
probe the fears of the Israelis I met the conversation moved into something that I can only decribe 
as a dreadful mix of possibly real and totally unreal anxieties about Europe in the past, Biblical 
history, contemporary Judaism, work, land and the American dream ...  These conversations were 
a gush of insecure and often irrational stuff that I tried to understand.  But I could not. (19 
September 2007) 
This colleague went on to write the following: 
But a one point we as a union are going to have to some eyeball to eyeball stuff with our 
counterparts in Israel and the message has to be got over that the occupation has to end ...  if 
Israeli academics think otherwise then let them say so in the international press ...  Lets tease them 
out ! (23 September 2007) 
Often a swirl of discourse can mix together different kinds of expression, from tacky 
rambling, to sharp criticism which merits serious responses, to clear antisemitism, to 
playground insults.  When different voices allow what they say to coalesce into an 
indistinguishable swirl it is difficult to hear the whole as anything other than 
demonization.  The union has threatened anyone who publishes any of these emails with 
exclusion from the list. This protects the privacy of those who are employing language 
and arguments which lay the foundation for antisemitic ways of thinking.  UCU has a 
policy against antisemitism to which members can appeal.  But UCU says that ‘criticism 
of Israel cannot be construed as antisemitic’. This formulation protects any statement 
which resembles or incorporates criticism of Israel, whether it is actually antisemitic or 
not.  In this way antisemitism was neutralized as an issue before the debate began.  
The threat of the boycott campaign, is not abstract or theoretical. Antisemitic ways of 
thinking, and expression, are here, now, in the unions, on campus, in the media, in the 
public sphere. The warnings of the parliamentary inquiry on antisemitism are minimized 
by those who make it their business to explain away and rationalize every claim of 
antisemitism (Bechler 2007).  Concern about antisemitism, they say, is really a dishonest 
neo-con smoke-screen, intended to de-legitimize criticism of Israeli human rights abuses. 
Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer’s book, the follow-up to the 2006 working papers, 
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was published in September 2007; their outriders are barking that anyone who does not 
want a debate about ‘Zionist’ responsibility for war is an opponent of free speech. 
(i) The defeat of the boycott campaign in the UCU 
On 28 September 2007, the campaign within the UCU for the exclusion of academics 
who work in Israel, from British academia, floundered to what seems to have beeen an 
abrupt and final defeat.  The union had sought legal advice on the question of the boycott 
and at least two separate legal opinions were studied by the union’s Strategy and Finance 
Committee.  Neither opinion is so far wholly in the public domain.  One was written by 
Lord Anthony Lester, a hugely respected human rights lawyer who had been inspired to 
campaign for antiracism legislation in Britain during his time working in the civil rights 
movement in the American South in the early 1960s
123
 and who had been influential in 
shaping the legislation which finally became law in the UK in the 1970s.  The UCU 
released
124
 the following excerpts from the opinion: 
It would be beyond the Union’s powers and unlawful for the Union, directly or indirectly to call 
for or to implement a boycott by the Union and its members of any kind of Israeli universities and 
other academic institutions; and that the use of Union funds directly or indirectly to further such a 
boycott would also be unlawful....to ensure that the Union acts lawfully meetings 
should not be used to ascertain the level of support for such a boycott. 
 
Paragraph 2.5 of the rules of the UCU states the following one of the ‘Aims and Objects’ 
of the union to be:  
To oppose actively all forms of harassment, prejudice and unfair discrimination whether on the 
grounds of sex, race, ethnic or national origin, religion, colour, class, caring responsibilities, 
marital status, sexuality, disability, age, or other status or personal characteristic…
125
 
 
Given the legal advice, the Strategy and Finance Committee had no choice but decisively 
to end the union’s flirtation with a boycott of Israeli academia.  To persist would have left 
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  Lord Lester (2006): ‘My involvement with the campaign for effective equality laws began in the early 
1960s, when I was in the USA studying at Harvard Law School. In 1961, I saw at first hand the entrenched 
racism in the Deep South during the period of civil rights activism. In 1964, I returned for Amnesty 
International to report on racial injustice in the American South during the ‘Long Hot Summer’. When I 
returned, inspired by Dr Martin Luther King, I joined Dr David Pitt and others to found a civil rights 
organisation in Britain, the Campaign against Racial Discrimination (CARD).’   
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  E-mail from UCU to its members, 28 October 2007 
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  UCU Rules, http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/e/a/ucurules_jun07.pdf, downloaded 14 October, 2007. 
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the union vulnerable to lawsuits, presumably on the grounds of unfair discrimination in 
violation of the Aims and Objects of the union and /or in violation of the Race Relations 
Act (1976).  Union trustees and members of the Strategy and Finance committee, as well 
as National Executive Committee members, could have found themselves held personally 
liable if they had ignored clear legal advice.  The Strategy and Finance Committee voted 
unanimously to end all consideration of the boycott proposal. 
Within days, a petition was being circulated and was signed by the hard-core of the 
boycott campaign.  The petition, entitled ‘No gag on debate in UCU’ opposed a ‘deluge 
of media abuse and the threat of legal action’ which the union had had to face since the 
passing of Motion 30.  The petition cast the boycotters as victims of a campaign against 
free speech.  ‘We call on the UCU not to cave in to these outrageous legal threats of 
censorship.’
126
  The UCU Left is the caucus in the union which, while it does not formally 
support the boycott, in fact provided the overwhelming majority of the activists for the 
campaign.  Eventually the six UCU Left members of the Strategy and Finance Committee 
had to step in to explain to its own people why it had been necessary to vote to end union 
backing for the boycott ‘debate’.  On 2 October 2007, the UCU circular to branches had 
made clear that this rhetoric about ‘gagging’ was inappropriate, by quoting another 
passage from Lester’s opinion: 
…the Union and its members are fully entitled to exercise their right to freedom of expression, 
discussion and debate by considering the pros and cons of the proposed boycott, and, if so minded, 
to pass and publish resolutions criticising the policies of the Israeli government and its supporters 
and expressing support for the rights of Palestinians, withdrawal by Israel from the occupied 
territories, and so on.
127
 
 
On 8 October the 6 UCU Left members of the Strategy and Finance Committee made it 
clear to its own supporters that the boycott was really over: 
The decision made on Friday 28th September by the Strategy and Finance Committee (SFC) was 
based on a discussion of the implications of the legal advice given by two QCs asked for 
separately by UCU and the by Trustees. That advice was clear and unequivocal: that a boycott of 
Israeli academic institutions and a call for such a boycott would be unlawful and therefore 
expenditure of money to “test support” for a boycott would also be unlawful. As has now become 
public knowledge through a letter to the Guardian, UCU’s QC is recognised as a leading expert on 
equality and human rights legislation. It would have been highly irresponsible for us to ignore 
such authoritative and unusually robust advice and thereby place union funds in jeopardy. 
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There will still be those who are tempted to explain the defeat by reference to a 
capitulation to bourgeois or Zioinst power.  But they will find it difficult to insist that 
anti-discrimination law is a mode of state repression when most people understand it as a 
victory, hard-won, by generations of antiracist activists.  It is easy to conceive of 
circumstances in which a union might decide to risk all in a fight against a law which was 
designed to make it weaker; but anti-discrimination law was designed to make unions 
stronger and it was functioning in this case to make the UCU stronger, by ending the 
divisive campaign which made the union inhospitable to the overwhelming majority of 
Jewish college and university workers.  There is law in place which prohibits bodies like 
the UCU from discriminating against Jews.  There was a time when there was no legal 
prohibition on Jewish quotas and silent or explicit exclusions and boycotts of Jews by 
civil society organizations such as universities, golf-clubs and trades unions.  The 
exclusion of Jews, it seems, is now no longer a private matter of choice for an 
organization; it is now illegal. 
Those who were for a boycott of Israel were not for boycotting the academics in all states 
which abused human rights but only in Jewish states which abused human rights.  It was 
a proposal which singled out the academics of one state for unique punishment.  
There will be some people who supported the boycott campaign who will persist with 
their demonization and their rhetoric of powerful ‘Israel lobbies’.  They will claim that 
well-funded lobbies defeated them; they will claim that British law or British lawyers are 
part of the Israel lobby; they will claim that the leadership of UCU sold out the rank and 
file.  In truth the real rank and file of the union was mobilizing. Hundreds of UCU 
members had rallied to the ‘Campaign for a UCU ballot’ within a week of it being set up. 
Union members up and down the country were part of the Engage network to oppose the 
boycott campaign.  A repeat of the AUT members’ revolt of 2005 had been imminent, 
where the union was rescued from the grip of a small coterie of Israel-hating activists by 
open debate and by the insistence of ordinary union members on having their say.   Some 
boycotters will persist even after their boycott has been widely recognized, morally, 
legally and politically, as a counterproductive and racist proposal.  But the majority of 
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UCU members will take this opportunity to rescue their union, to make it again into a 
union for all of its members. 
(iii) Sporting and Cultural Boycott 
In April 2006, West Ham United (a football club) had two Israeli players.  When West 
Ham took their team for a few days’ relaxation and training in the desert sun of Dubai, 
they sent their two Israelis off to Spain for a break (Adar 2006).  Israeli citizens are not 
welcome in the United Arab Emirates.  Bolton Wanderers left their Israeli player at home 
when they visited Dubai earlier in the season.
128
  West Ham and Bolton quietly 
acquiesced to the racist policy of the United Arab Emirates without making a fuss. 
Emirates Airlines have sponsored the new Arsenal stadium (The Emirates Stadium) in a 
£100m deal. Arsenal does allow Israelis to play football at the Emirates Stadium.  But the 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) launched a campaign against Arsenal because they 
also made a £350,000 advertising deal with the Israeli tourist board. Nobody opposed the 
lash-up between Arsenal and the United Arab Emirates - where women do not vote and 
where men’s votes do not determine the government - and where significantly less than 
half of the population are deemed to be citizens of the state.  The PSC urges us to contact 
Arsenal and to ‘remind’ them that Israel is a racist apartheid state (perhaps Arsenal had 
forgotten?).  PSC also proposes to pressurize the Football Association’s successful 
antiracist campaign, Kick It Out, to take a stand against this deal with the Israeli 
‘apartheid’ state.  The campaign to boycott South African sport focused on the fact that 
South African sport was ‘racially’ segregated.  It argued that sports people from around 
the world should not play as normal with teams that were picked according to the 
principle of ‘race’ rather than talent.  Israeli sport is not segregated because Israel is not 
an apartheid state. 
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 There is nothing new about sports teams bowing to the racist policies of states that they visit.  The 
English cricketing authorities tried to find a way of leaving Basil D’Olivera, who was classified as 
‘coloured’ by the apartheid regime, at home when they were due to tour South Africa in 1970. In the end 
they were forced to cancel the tour rather than bow to the South African government who wanted to choose 
who could play cricket for England. 
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In 2001, the UN organized a global conference against racism in Durban, with a parallel 
conference for Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The anti-Israel enthusiasts 
prevented both of these global conferences from doing anything useful about racism 
anywhere in the world. They did this by insisting that the greatest manifestation of racism 
in the world was ‘Zionism’.  They took over both of these conferences and used them to 
denounce Israel as racist and apartheid - and to insist that everyone else also denounce 
Israel. One result was that nothing useful came out of either of these conferences on anti-
racism. Now the PSC risked destroying the successful Kick It Out Campaign in a similar 
way.  
Footballer John Barnes, who knows what it is like to face 40,000 people making monkey 
noises at him because he is black, clearly did not think that Kick It Out should be de-
railed in this way. He visited Israel in March 2006 (Giver 2006) where he helped to 
launch Israel’s version of the Kick It Out campaign against racism amongst football fans. 
Their slogan is ‘Lets Kick Racism Out of Football’.  This campaign has been successful 
in helping to transform British football from the state it was in when John Barnes was a 
young player; a campaign against racism amongst Israeli football fans is sorely needed.  
While those who are in favour of boycotting Israel would prefer antiracists not to 
campaign against racism in Israel, John Barnes appears to disagree.  Barnes visited Israel 
only a week after the PSC began its effort to win the Kick It Out Campaign to a boycott 
of Israeli ‘apartheid’. 
In July 2006 the European cricket cup took place in Scotland.  This is far from being a 
professional and high profile event.  The only European country that plays cricket at the 
top level is England, which did not take part.  This was an amateur event without any 
great media coverage and without many spectators.  The Scottish PSC launched a 
campaign against the Israeli cricket team’s participation in the tournament:   
The Israeli cricket team is playing in Scotland on 3, 5, 6 July 2006 - help us STOP the game, Israel 
must not be allowed to enjoy their status as a ‘normal’ state, enjoying rest & recreation, while 
Lebanon burns and Palestine is imprisoned! Contact secretary@scottishpsc.org.uk.
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  Quote is from the Scottish PSC website and is no longer online; quoted 
http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=548, downloaded 26 February 2006. 
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 This campaign was successful in preventing Israel’s matches from going ahead.  The 
organizers announced that matches were cancelled due to ‘public safety issues’ 
(news.bbc.co.uk 2006).
130
  After John Barnes, another high profile antiracist ‘boycott 
breaker’ was Roger Waters, former member of Pink Floyd and the man who wrote the 
iconic 70s song ‘The Wall’.  Waters went to Israel to play a gig and while he was there, 
he took some time to campaign against the separation barrier being built by the Israelis 
on Palestinian land.
131
  His gig had originally been planned to take place in a park in Tel 
Aviv but following pressure from the boycott campaign, Waters agreed to move the 
venue.  The gig took place at Neve Shalom / Wahat al Salam, a village called in English 
‘Oasis of Peace’.  This village was founded jointly by Jewish and Palestinian Arab peace 
campaigners to educate for peace and to live in a mixed community.  Waters seems to 
have done a deal with the boycott campaigners which they were able to spin as a victory.  
But in truth, Waters played in front of thousands of fans in the heart of pre-1967 Israel, 
just off the main highway which connects Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.  He made his political 
opposition to Israeli policy clear but he rejected the boycott: 
Waters articulated his position as follows: 
I have a lot of fans in Israel, many of whom are refuseniks. I would not rule out going to Israel 
because I disapprove of the foreign policy any more than I would refuse to play in the UK because 
I disapprove of Tony Blair’s foreign policy.  (McGreal 2006) 
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  Osama Saeed, of the Muslim Association of Britain, said of the decision to drop the match: ‘This is 
fabulous news, though we would wish that the decision had been taken earlier by the organisers on the 
grounds of principle rather than practicality.’ 
However, Dr Kenneth Collins, from the Glasgow Jewish Representative Council, said: ‘We have already 
had daubings on a synagogue in Glasgow and one in Edinburgh and we are very worried that threats to 
Israeli interests could spread to Jewish interests in the city. ‘ 
‘The Jewish community in Glasgow are not spokesmen for Israel. We have a natural sympathy with what 
happens there and many of us have relatives there and we are very concerned about how Israel is treated 
and how it’s looked upon.’ (news.bbc.co.uk 2006) 
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  Waters: ‘The poverty inflicted by the wall has been devastating for Palestinians. It has kept children 
from their schools, the sick from proper medical care and continues to destroy the Palestinian economy. I 
fully support War on Want’s campaign, and hope that as many people as possible sign the wall as a strong 
message to the UK government that immediate action is essential.’ (WarOnWant.org 2006) 
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I am happy to play to anybody who believes in peace. I don’t discriminate between any of my 
fans, wherever they live. Being an Israeli does not disbar from being a human being.  (McIntyre 
2006) 
‘I’ve seen pictures of [the wall], I’ve heard a lot about it but without being here you can’t imagine 
how extraordinarily oppressive it is and how sad it is to see these people coming through these 
little holes,’ he added. ‘It’s craziness.’ (YnetNews.com 2006) 
He sprayed the words ‘No Thought Control’ in huge red letters onto the wall. 
It seems likely that one strategy we can expect more of from the Palestine Solidarity 
movement is to harass particular individuals who ‘break the boycott’ of Israel.  We 
should expect people like Waters to be at the centre of campaigns designed to make 
others think that it is just not worth the hassle of going to Israel.  The threat is of pickets 
of concerts and the branding of artists as ‘Zionists’ and ‘apologists for apartheid’. 
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CONCLUSION 
i Is criticism of Israel antisemitic?   
Sometimes criticism of Israel is antisemitic.  For example in the Hamas Covenant, which 
criticizes Israel for being a manifestation of a Jewish conspiracy alongside the French and 
Russian revolutions and the First and Second World Wars.  In this case, not only is 
criticism of Israel antisemitic, but so is the criticism of the French and Russian 
Revolutions.  Sometimes criticism of Hilary Clinton is misogynist, and sometimes it is 
not.  Sometimes criticism of Zimbabwe is racist and sometimes it is not. 
ii Is criticism of Israel necessarily antisemitic?  
 No, of course not, but who says that it is?  There are very few Jewish communal 
spokespeople or Israeli politicians who are prepared to make such an evidently false 
claim.  The contention that criticism of Israel is necessarily antisemitic nearly always 
functions as a straw-man argument.  The difficult arguments for some ‘critics of Israel’ to 
deal with are that criticism of Israel is often expressed using rhetoric or images which 
resonate with antisemitism; or that criticism often holds Israel to higher standards than 
other states, and for no good reason; or that it often employs conspiracy theory; or that it 
uses demonizing analogies; or that it casts Jews as oppressors; or that criticism is made in 
such a way as to pick a fight with the vast majority of Jews; or that the word criticism is 
really being used to stand for discriminatory practices against Israelis or against Jews.  
These much more serious and realistic charges are too foten brushed off by blithely 
employing the Livingstone formulation: ‘for far too long the accusation of antisemitism 
has been used against anyone who is critical of the policies of the Israeli government.’ 
(Livingstone 2006)  
The Livingstone formulation does two things.  First, it denies the distinction between 
criticism and demonization by subsuming both into the simple category of ‘criticism’.  
This is dangerous because what we need is clarity about the distinction, not denial.  
Criticism of Israeli human rights abuses is not only legitimate; it is appropriate and 
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important.  But those who deny the distinction between criticism and demonization 
render themselves incapable of making serious and legitimate criticism.  Apart from the 
direct damage done by demonization, these ‘critics’ also find that they have put 
themselves into a position where they are unable to do anything to help the cause of 
Palestinian independence, freedom or democracy; against their own intentions, they are 
actually more likely to harm than to help those causes.  Precisely where the boundary 
between criticism and demonization lies is an open question for public discussion and 
debate. 
Secondly, the Livingstone formulation does not simply accuse anyone concerned with 
contemporary antisemitism of being wrong, but it also accuses them of bad faith: ‘the 
accusation of antisemitism has been used against anyone who is critical…’ [my italics].  
Not an honest mistake then, but a secret, common plan to try to de-legitimize criticism 
with an instrumental use of the charge of antisemitism.  Crying wolf.  Playing the 
antisemitism card.  The Livingstone formulation, which as we have seen is becoming a 
standard response for those who seek, against the clear and mounting evidence, to deny 
that there is a problem of contemporary antisemitism, is both a straw-man argument and a 
charge of ‘Zionist’ conspiracy.  It is, in itself, an antisemitic claim.  Its regular 
appearance is also, in itself, evidence that antisemitic ways of thinking are unexceptional 
in contemporary mainstream left and liberal discourse.
  
The Reverend Steven Sizer (2006), a leading supporter in the Church of England of the 
campaign for boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) against Israel, added a Christian 
twist when he articulated the Livingstone formulation.  He wrote a letter to The 
Independent responding to an argument by the Chief Rabbi that the campaign for BDS 
was part of an emerging antisemitic culture in the UK.  The Synod (parliament) of the 
Church, declared Sizer, would not be ‘intimidated by those who like Chicken Little cry 
“antisemitism” whenever Israeli human rights abuses in the occupied territories are 
mentioned’.  Sizer conflates the campaign for BDS with the ‘mentioning’ of human rights 
abuses.  He goes on to ask ‘Why has the Archbishop faced a torrent of criticism over [a 
vote to divest from Caterpillar]?  Simple: the people in the shadows know that Caterpillar 
is only the first. “Let justice roll”.’  He confirms the suspicion of some opponents who 
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argue that the campaign against Caterpillar is a wedge being used to open up the 
possibility of the complete isolation of Israel.  And he strengthens the misgivings of 
others, who suspect that the use of terms like ‘people in the shadows’, with connotations 
of secret conspiracy, to describe opponents of BDS, is perhaps not coincidental. 
 
iii Is anti-Zionism a form of antisemitism? 
David Matas (2005) makes the argument that anti-Zionism is indeed a form of 
antisemitism: 
Zionism is the expression of the right to self-determination of the Jewish people.  
Anti-Zionism, by definition, denies and rejects this right by denying the right to a 
state for the Jewish people.  Anti-Zionism is a form of racism.  It is the specific 
denial to the Jewish people of a basic right to which all the peoples of the world 
are entitled.  
This is an argument which employs a similar methodology to that which gives the vulgar 
anti-Zionist result, ‘Zionism=Racism’.  Zionism is racism (by this definition) because it 
necessarily builds a state which defines belonging according to a prior notion of 
ethnicity; anti-Zionism is racism (by Matas’ definition) because it denies the right of 
Jewish self-determination while defending self-determination for all other nations.  By 
this methodology we can understand the world by looking carefully at the definitions of 
words; in contrast this work has employed a methodology of understanding which starts 
with an investigation of the world as it exists; concepts yes, but also discourse and also 
their actualizations in social movements.  In writing about both the Israel-Palestine 
conflict and contemporary antisemitism the concept of society is often absent.  As we 
have seen, anti-Zionism, even in its most macho historical materialist forms, often affords 
huge explanatory weight to ideas.  It appears reluctant to base its critique in an 
understanding of how society is actually functioning and changing, an understanding of 
how actual people are relating to each other and to the social structures which they create 
and by which they are created.  There is too much schematic thinking coming out of 
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ideational frameworks which are only tenuously anchored to actual social processes, 
agents and structure.  Anti-Zionism is not a form of racism.  But it is a profoundly 
flawed, shallow and light-weight framework and worldview.  Antiracist anti-Zionism 
presents itself as the legitimate child of Jewish socialist opposition to Zionism in the first 
third of the twentieth century; but some suspect that its real father is Soviet antisemitism.  
I have presented some of the kinds of evidence that is necessary to pin down the complex 
relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism.  A genealogy, a historical analysis, 
would also help. 
iv Would an academic boycott of Israel be antisemitic? 
Yes.  It is an antisemitic policy because it aims to punish Israeli academics, the majority 
of whom are Jewish, according to different standards to academics in other states.  If a 
North Korean mathematician wants to come to a conference in Britain, we will be happy 
to discuss mathematics with her; we will not demand that she repudiates her state’s 
constitutional claim that North Korea is a socialist paradise on earth nor that she admits 
that she lives under one of the most repressive and inhumane states on earth.  This is how 
it should be. Discuss calculus during the day; discuss politics over dinner; help her to 
defect, if she wants.  But if an Israeli wants to come to the same conference, she won’t be 
allowed; she won’t be allowed to attend the conference, to have her journal articles 
considered for publication or to remain part of the global academic community, unless 
she first passes some kind of test, such as repudiating her university or ritually 
‘criticizing’ the ‘apartheid’ policies of her state.  The North Korean will be allowed in, 
the Israeli will not.  This is an antisemitic policy. 
It is a long time since the principle was universally acknowledged in liberal society that 
racism does not depend on people acting out of malice or hatred; racism usually 
propagates itself in a more insidious and unconscious way.  In Britain the final official 
bastion for this conception of racism was the police force, and it was eventually 
conquered by the High Court Judge, Sir William Macpherson when he reported on the 
public inquiry into the police handling of the investigation of the murder of Stephen 
Lawrence.  The report said: 
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6.13 Lord Scarman accepted the existence of what he termed “unwitting” or “unconscious” 
racism. To those adjectives can be added a third, namely “unintentional”. All three words are 
familiar in the context of any discussion in this field. 
It is instructive to see the sophisticated and experienced antiracists of the boycott 
campaign turn their palms to the sky in the innocent manner of twentieth century Police 
Federation representatives and plead that a practice can only be racist if it is motivated by 
racism.  The boycott of Israeli academics is not motivated by antisemitism but it is 
nevertheless antisemitic in effect.  Any kind of impact assessment would demonstrate 
that it is a policy which would impact on Jews – both Israeli and not – much more heavily 
than anybody else.  And there is no morally, politically or legally relevant reason which 
could mitigate or excuse this racist impact. 
Another sense in which the boycott is antisemitic is because it is a campaign which 
spreads antisemitic ways of thinking, which sets itself up for a fight with Jews and which 
creates a toxic atmosphere of accusation and mistrust towards those Jews who oppose the 
campaign.  Non-Jews too, who oppose the boycott campaign are treated as though they 
were part of a Zionist conspiracy or Israel lobby and are thereby, also, subjected to 
antisemitic libel.  This sense in which it is antisemitic is not necessary to any imaginable 
campaign to boycott Israel; it is simply true of the boycott campaign which exists.  It 
relies on fostering an emotional internalization of Israel as being a unique evil on the 
planet and it cannot avoid allowing that passion to be directed also at those Jews who do 
not define themselves as anti-Zionist, and who speak out in opposition to the boycott.  It 
is only necessary to picture a scene where an Israeli professor, who has failed to repudiate 
her status as a faculty member of Haifa or Tel Aviv University, who has failed to 
denounce her country for being an apartheid state, is being picketed by British trade 
unionists in order to prevent her from giving a seminar; it is only necessary to picture this 
scene to know that this is an antisemitic policy.  Even if the picket was fronted by anti-
Zionist Jews, it would still be an antisemitic policy.  Picture the mundane organizational 
work which would be necessary to make the picket happen.  Picture the ways in which 
Jewish union members (the ones who are not anti-Zionist, and who had not yet resigned 
from the union in disgust) would have to be marginalized in the local branch.  Picture the 
Jewish students’ societies holding a counter-picket; picture the anti-Zionist Jewish 
 145 
students asserting loudly the right of the union to prevent the Israeli professor from 
speaking by screaming ‘criticism of Israel is not antisemitic’. 
And the boycott is antisemitic in another sense; also not a necessary sense, but necessary 
to the world in which we live.  The scene imagined above resonates in Jewish memory 
because of its similarities to previous anti-Jewish boycotts.  Jews were pushed out of 
Polish universities in 1968 in a purge which used the language of anti-imperialist anti-
Zionism.  Jews were pushed out of the universities of the Middle East in the 1950s and 
the 1960s, all except for the ones in Israel.  There were measures in place to exclude 
Jews, including quotas, in many US universities until the second half of the twentieth 
century.  Jews were discriminated against in Soviet universities and were stopped from 
studying certain subjects.  Jews were picketed out of the universities in Germany 
following the coming to power of the Nazis.  Jews were kept out of many of the 
universities of Europe until they forced their way in during the second half of the 19
th
 
century.  The boycotters can berate me impatiently and in outraged tones for bringing up 
all these entirely irrelevant stories, they can accuse me of ‘using’ antisemitism to de-
legitimize their ‘criticism’; they can accuse me of invoking a red herring or of throwing 
dust in the eyes.  In my own union branch it was argued that the fact that ‘Zionists’ are so 
horrified by the boycott, the fact that it ‘hits a nerve’, is  evidence of its effectiveness.  
They can deny the analogies as much as they like; but many Jews will know that it is not 
right for Israelis to be excluded from universities while everyone else in the world is 
allowed in; and people who consider themselves antiracist should know it too. 
iv Are people who support the boycott campaign antisemitic? 
I am not a prosecutor, in the Soviet style, accusing people of the crime of antisemitism.  I 
do not know what goes on inside people’s heads.  I am interested in antisemitism as a 
social phenomenon and as a macro phenomenon.  I am interested in what people do and 
what they say; and particularly in what is done and said in society in general.  I am 
interested in the emergent properties of anti-Zionism.  I am interested in the unintended 
consequences of people’s actions who are simply motivated by a wish to support the 
Palestinians. 
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I am interested in the following statistical correlation: Kaplan and Small (2006) found in 
their analysis of survey data, that ‘anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the 
probability that an individual is anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of measured 
antisemitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed.’
132
  So if we 
select Europeans who believe that Israel is an apartheid state and who believe that the 
Israeli forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians, and if we put them in a room, then 
that roomful of people would contain many more antisemites, defined independently, 
than a room of random Europeans.  Anti-Zionists should be aware of the fact that people 
who believe what they believe about Israel are significantly more likely than average also 
to be antisemitic.  This fact should make them consider carefully the possibility that what 
they say and do might exacerbate antisemitism.  It is interesting, then, that, by use of the 
Livingstone formulation, these antiracists very often refuse to be careful in that way.  But 
Kaplan and Small cannot tell us that there is not a current of antiracist anti-Zionism 
which is immune from the antisemitism which they detect in the general sample of people 
who show ‘anti-Israel sentiment’; and they cannot tell us what causal mechanism or what 
ideational processes or what chains of meaning relate hostility to Israel and racism 
against Jews. 
It is important to distinguish between the ideologically committed anti-Zionist core of the 
boycott campaign and the periphery of people who are attracted or seduced by its 
rhetoric.  The core knows, thinks it knows, has a responsibility to know, something about 
Israel and Palestine, past and present.  It has a responsibility to think seriously about the 
possibility of stirring up, licensing or legitimizing antisemitism.  Many of the people who 
are tempted to support the boycott campaign do so for the best of reasons and with the 
best of intentions.  They want to do something to help the desperate situation in Palestine 
and to do so in solidarity with the Palestinians.  The boycott campaign offers them a 
simple and easy way of demonstrating their uncompromising hostility to the violence and 
racism of the occupation.  And many of the people seduced by the rhetoric of the core 
campaigns do not know much about the conflict or about the history and tropes of 
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 Kaplan and Small (2006) ‘…based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of 10 European countries, the 
authors ask whether those individuals with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic’ and 
they control ‘for numerous potentially confounding factors….’ 
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antisemitism.  This is the group which is likely to make up many of the trade union 
activists who would be responsible for implementing a boycott on the ground, in the 
colleges.  This fact should give us cause for concern. 
v Is the left antisemitic? 
No, the left is not antisemitic.  Some streams and traditions which think of themselves as 
being on the left are fighting for their belief that Israel is a unique evil to be adopted as 
mainstream commonsense.  They are having some success in mainstreaming this view 
and with it often comes certain antisemitic ways of thinking.  These ideas are appearing 
all over mainstream discourse and are no longer marginalized on the extreme left and the 
extreme right.  Most of the speakers who opposed the boycott at the 2007 UCU 
conference identified themselves as being on the left.  Most of them were defending what 
they believed to be an authentic left wing position.  They argued for building solidarity 
with Palestinians and with the Israeli peace movement; for helping to facilitate links 
between Palestinian academics, Israeli academics and the outside world; for a strategy to 
oppose the occupation; they warned against antisemitism; they warned of the dangers to 
UCU and college workers’ unity which were posed by the boycott campaign; they 
warned of the damage which would be done to the cause of Palestinian statehood by 
support of the boycott.  The debate was between left traditions; the right was not really 
represented at UCU conference at all; not the ‘Zionist’ right, not the British right; unless 
one includes the Islamist right, whose influence was certainly felt but which was not 
significantly represented in person.  There have always been pro-totalitarians and 
antisemites on the left but they have never constituted the left because they have always 
been opposed by anti-totalitarians and anti-antisemites.  This is still the case. 
vi Why has the boycott campaign been so successful in Britain in 2007? 
This is a question which this research can only begin to answer tentatively.  Two 
peculiarities of the British come immediately to mind.  One is that, almost uniquely in 
Europe, Britain was not occupied by the Nazis and the other is that Britain has a 
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particular memory of colonialism and empire.  According to the ADL (Anti Defamation 
League) report on attitudes towards Jews (2007) in Europe, 
Respondents over the age of 45 are much more likely than other segments of the British 
population to “strongly oppose” the efforts to boycott Israel…. Of the 15 percent of those 
surveyed who say that they “strongly oppose” a boycott of Israel, 79 percent are over the age of 
45. 
One explanation of this differential in terms of age might be connected to memories of 
the Holocaust.  The older half of the population grew up and were politically formed in 
the shadow of the Holocaust.  The younger half, perhaps, regards it as something from 
history rather than something connected to their own lives.  Perhaps they are also 
influenced by anti-Zionist and antisemitic efforts to play down the extent to which the 
Holocaust was something connected to antisemitism or Jews in particular, and to play up 
the ‘use’ of the Holocaust and antisemitism which is allegedly made by ‘Zionists’.  If this 
explanation is right then it indicates that in the post-Holocaust world there were strong 
taboos against antisemitism.  It may be that those taboos are now less strong than they 
were in the twentieth century and it might also be that contemporary antisemitism tends 
to by-pass those taboos rather than to challenge them directly.  In any case, Britain was 
less immediately affected by the Holocaust than most of Europe; Jews were not taken 
from amongst other British people off to Auschwitz;
133
 and British society has not been 
forced to face the legacy of its own collaboration with that process, as many European 
societies have.  The British were never offered the opportunity to collaborate. 
Josephs (2007) quotes Barry Camfield, deputy general-secretary of the Transport and 
General Workers half of UNITE as saying in his speech to conference that  
Britain had stood alone against Hitler and had liberated Jewish victims of the Holocaust. “So we 
will not have the Israeli state telling us that the boycott is antisemitic,” he said. 
Apart from the senses in which Britain did much less than it might have done to liberate 
Jews, this could only be a British sentiment.  Britain, in Camfield’s imagination is not 
only not implicated and not guilty, it is actually the hero of the Holocaust, the St George 
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  A small number of Jews were deported from the Nazi occupied Channel Islands. 
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which slew the antisemtic Nazi dragon.  Here is yet another way in which the Holocaust 
is dragooned into service for the boycott campaign.   
While the inhibitions created by the memory of the Holocaust may be less strong in 
Britain than elsewhere, the legacy of British colonialism is not.  In the British debate, the 
sentiment that Britain is somehow responsible for Israeli human rights abuses because of 
its role in the period before and during 1948, as well as its contemporary role in the 
alliance with the USA, seems to be important.  If there are feelings of national guilt 
nursed on the British left then they are more likely to be concerned with the British 
Empire than with the Holocaust.  So one tentative explanation for the leading role that 
Britain is currently playing in the boycott campaign may be that the inhibition on 
antisemitism is weaker in Britain while the guilt element, driven by an essentialized and 
historically uninformed anti-imperialism, may be stronger. 
But Anti-Zionism and the boycott campaign are also genuinely global movements.  
While they do manifest themselves differently in different places, the centrality of the 
internet to the production and circulation of these narratives gives the movement a 
tendency to by-pass national particularities.  The English language press in Israel, 
instantly available online, Ha’aretz, YnetNews, the Jerusalem Post, provides much of the 
daily raw material around which political narratives are constructed.  Events and political 
interventions tend to impact quickly around the world.  The 2006 CUPE (Canadian Union 
of Public Employees) boycott decision was made during the same weekend as the Natfhe 
decision in Britain; Ronnie Kasrils and Desmond Tutu’s words are taken up everywhere 
from South Africa; Americans Mearsheimer and Walt had a huge and immediate impact 
on the rhetoric of British anti-Zionism; Matthias Küntzel and the anti-Deutsch left in 
Germany make their interesting interventions.  More comparative studies and more 
historical studies are necessary to shed more light on the question, ‘Why Britain?’  This 
study offers more of a snap-shot of contemporary British events than a historical analysis; 
it offers some enduring analysis of necessarily ephemeral case studies.  It looks at how 
antisemitism manifests itself in mainstream discourse, but not how much or how 
differently in Britain to other places.   
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As well as being an analysis of contemporary anti-Zionism and its relationship to 
contemporary antisemitism, this paper is also meant as a case study in cosmopolitan 
politics.  It brings together a conceptual discussion of anti-Zionism with an empirical 
analysis of public discourse in the UK, mainly between 2004 and 2007, with the boycott 
campaign, which I have argued constitutes a material actualization of those conceptual 
and discursive realities.  Most anti-Zionists, as well as the boycott campaign, think of 
themselves as being internationalist, and etymologically, they are indeed more inter-
nationalist than they are cosmopolitan.  They largely accept the methodologically 
nationalist narrative of the world as being divided into distinct nations.  They largely see 
international politics as being about the relationships between these national state actors.  
Mearsheimer and Walt (2006a; 2006b), whose work fits into the realist tradition of 
international relations, operate with a surprisingly unproblematized notion of ‘national 
interest’.  Anti-Zionism in general succeeds less in furthering the cosmopolitan project of 
disrupting the conceptual tradition of methodological nationalism than it does in 
rejuvenating the realist tradition of international relations.  Anti-Zionist thought and 
practice, as well as Zionist thought and practice, tend to rest on the principles of 
collective (national) responsibility and collective (national) punishment, rather than the 
difficult political work of disrupting nationalist realities.
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